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 Abstract 
 
There are currently 548 declared military facilities in the United Kingdom, located on 
372,000 hectares of military-owned or used land. Collectively known as the defence estate, 
this land is used for defence and training, and constitutes approximately 1.5% of the UK 
surface area. The research presented here interprets this landscape and its accompanying 
airspaces, infrastructures and processes as a spatial phenomenon, one which is in an 
almost constant state of flux. This thesis is, therefore, a study of militarised space in the UK 
as defined by recent developments in technology, mobility and communication. It analyses 
the processes by which land and space become militarised within different environments 
and the residual effects of this on the wider fabric of civil society.  
 
This thesis addresses issues of land appropriation, weapons testing, airspace design and 
notions of temporary, flexible, invisible boundaries. A multidisciplinary approach is adopted 
to analyse the histories, geographies and technologies evident at three case study sites. 
These are MoD Shoeburyness (Essex), Salisbury Plain Training Area (Wiltshire) and the city 
of Portsmouth (Hampshire).  
 
The first outcome of this research is a spatial interpretation of the defence estate, its 
transformation over the 20th century and its fluctuating control of the British landscape and 
skies. The second outcome is an analysis of the current military environment and its use of 
complex assemblages of land, sea, infrastructure and airspace to contain military activities. 
These localised, three-dimensional forms are not only becoming more refined to 
accommodate new weapons and technologies but they are also increasingly connected to 
each other. The third outcome is a speculative interpretation of the defence estate as a 
complex, connected totality, a parallel landscape of military spaces, activities and 
processes. 
 
Together, these outcomes demonstrate that the Armed Services of the UK preside over an 
increasingly complex and interconnected environment. They continue to engage with UK 
territory and space in unique and diverse ways but are increasingly influenced by external 
forces such as the commercial and civil sectors, public interest pressure groups and the 
conflicted governance of the state. 
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Preface 
 
This research began in the spring of 2007 as part the Future of Landscape and the 
Moving Image, a three year research project funded by the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council and based at the Royal College of Art. The project’s Principle 
Investigator, Patrick Keiller and co-researchers Doreen Massey of the Open University 
and Patrick Wright of Nottingham Trent University, set out to ‘explore received ideas 
about mobility, belonging and displacement in terms of landscape and images of 
landscape, in a context of economic and environmental change’. It was in this context 
that I was selected to undertake an AHRC-funded PhD studentship on the subject of 
my initial proposal, a study of how military spaces are defined or ‘produced’ in the 
British landscape.  
 
The origin of this research goes back over a decade and a half. After graduating from 
Central Saint Martins with a degree in fine art, I became increasingly interested in 
‘utilitarian’ forms of architecture in the landscape, from industrial and agricultural 
facilities to miscellaneous transport and utility infrastructures. From the perspective of 
visual culture these typologies seemed to run counter to certain expectations of the 
British landscape, which is often called upon to provide images of beauty, respite or 
bucolic repose. The extensive military landscape of the United Kingdom appeared to be 
the extreme antithesis of this vision but it also suggested evidence of a greater national 
anxiety, one which I thought needed further investigation.  
 
I decided to pursue this subject for a Masters dissertation in Humanities and Cultural 
Studies at the London Consortium where I focused on the island of Orfordness on the 
Suffolk coast. As the site of intense military research and development for most of the 
20th century, it is a place invested with the horrors of experimental weapons technology 
and nuclear warfare. Here it struck me that the numerous strange buildings and piles of 
military detritus around the island were actually the by-products, the residue of extreme 
military processes and practices, built to contain the possibilities of danger and death. I 
was also aware that this place was dead, at least to the military, and that in many other 
parts of the country the Armed Services and related private sector organisations were 
 constantly preparing for war, segregating vast areas of land, sea and air for their own 
purposes. It was becoming clear to me that the military were, even in this seemingly 
‘domestic’ landscape, designing and producing the most unusual and elaborate 
assemblages of space for the purpose of simulating the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
elsewhere. The problem, it seemed, was to try and understand how all these 
dangerous activities and spaces interacted with everything else in the UK, and why 
Britain developed such a densely militarised landscape in the first place. I was never in 
any doubt that these spaces were, and still are, defined by government policy and, as 
such, are political in the most literal way. They are the contested sites of patriotism and 
protest, duty and activism. However one feels about them, it seemed necessary for me 
to try and generate new possibilities for understanding these spaces, to try and keep up 
with government policy, military strategy and the increasing influence of the commercial 
sector in the defence environment. 
 
Being part of the Future of Landscape project at the RCA provided an environment that 
was both sympathetic to a sustained investigation into military geographies and offered 
a critical, supportive framework in which to proceed, develop and collaborate. It was 
also here that I began to understand how different visual and cultural practices could 
offer alternative perspectives on the subject of militarised landscapes and the invisible 
architecture of airspace. I hope that this thesis will play a part in widening the field of 
debate to include new forms of representation, visualisation and to reinterpret the ever-
changing movement of military power in the landscape. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
   Figure 1.1. Radome, RAF Trimingham, Norfolk. 
   Photograph: M. Flintham. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 2 
 
1.1 . Research quest ion 
 
Do the operational military spaces of the United Kingdom, in their various 
interconnected arrangements, constitute a pervasive ‘complex’ which coexists with 
civilian space, creating a militarised parallel landscape?  
 
 
1.2. Research aims and objectives: 
 
• To survey and visually represent the production of military space in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
• To understand how military space operates in relation to civil space, and to 
define the differences and similarities in methods of production. 
 
• To propose that the spaces created by the military are not simply the closed, 
fixed sites we imagine, but highly complex forms that are often connected to 
each other in invisible and intangible ways.  
 
• To study the increasing influence of the private sector on the UK defence estate, 
particularly its effect on the constitution of domestic military space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 3 
1.3 . Introduction  
The purpose of this research is to understand the extent and nature of military 
space in the United Kingdom (UK). It begins with the understanding that there are, 
according to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), 548 known military sites across the 
UK,1 which suggests, when compared to other European states, an unusually 
pronounced military presence in the British landscape. For those not employed by 
or in the service of the armed forces, military sites are generally the places we half 
glimpse on a journey to somewhere else; anonymous barbed-wire fences 
protecting distant grey aerodromes, or signalled by red flags on the edges of fields. 
This partially hidden landscape, known as the defence estate, actually constitutes 
between 1-2% of the surface area of the UK, and for reasons explored here and 
elsewhere, remains under-researched within current academic discourse. 
 
This research set out to gain legitimate access to military sites across the UK in an 
attempt to understand what, if anything, distinguishes these places from other sites 
of social interaction or productive processes. During the process, the research 
discovered that military sites can, in fact, be highly dynamic and flexible assemblages 
of spaces, some visible and solid, others invisible and immaterial. In addition, the 
activities and processes that occur within them can also define spaces, some 
instantaneous and dangerous, others written and rewritten on the landscape over 
decades. Most importantly, many of these sites and spaces are constituted on a 
parallel set of legal and judicial principles which necessarily separates them from 
‘civil’ space and limits unauthorised access.  
 
What follows is a line of enquiry that traces the transformation of the defence estate 
from the mass acquisition of land during 19th and 20th century to today’s leaner, 
private sector-assisted form via the anxious, ‘hardened’ estate of the Cold War. The 
increasingly systematised use of land, sea and airspace leads this thesis to an 
interpretation of military sites as ‘spatial complexes’; assemblages of military-owned 
land, architecture, infrastructures, volumes of airspace and designated danger areas. 
In identifying and visualising many of these assemblages this research concludes 
that they have become, over the last 30 years, more intensely used, systematised 
                                                
1 ‘Defence Estates Development Plan (DEDP) 2009 (Annex A)’, Ministry of Defence,  
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/A8806EE6-7A77-4998-BC89 
B9466190A85D/0/DEDP09_annex_a.pdf>, (accessed 29 January 2010). 
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and connected to one another in new and unusual ways. A broad picture emerges of 
the defence estate in its current configuration, as an entity that has mobilised the 
private sector to reorganise itself in the face of economic challenges, land 
constraints, and the changing nature of warfare. While much of this private sector 
involvement has proved misguided and rarely cost-effective, the rationale of 
corporate management and the appetite for rationalisation has nevertheless altered 
the military’s conception of space in both the domestic landscape and the battlefield. 
This thesis describes a domestic military landscape that is less distinct (and therefore 
less quantifiable and visible to scrutiny) and a military capability whose infrastructures 
and support services are exposed to the turbulence of a fragile global economy and 
unscrupulous business practices. 
 
This chapter will identify the questions and objectives of this research, and will 
describe a mixed methodology of field work, graphic visualisation, interviews, and a 
critical and theoretical framework for the current line of enquiry. 
 
Chapter 2 will provide a broad national and global context for the current research, 
an overview of the British military capability and its relationship to the defence estate. 
It will also describe links with other cross-national organisations such as NATO and 
the emerging European Defence Agency, and their impact on recent conflicts and 
humanitarian missions around the world. Special attention will be paid to the direct 
connection between the military geographies of the UK and specific conflict zones 
such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and crisis management operations around the world. 
Chapter 2 will also describe the relevance of the ‘special relationship’ with the USA 
and the physical impression it leaves on the British landscape. 
 
Chapter 3 will describe a selective history of defensive sites in the UK leading to the 
British defence estate in its current form. While the primary focus will be on the 
incremental growth of military land-ownership during the twentieth century, this will 
be conducted with reference to older forms of military fortification and barracking. 
The political and social motivations for the purchase of land will be studied as will the 
impact of specific conflicts such as the Napoleonic Wars, World Wars One and Two, 
and the Cold War. This chapter will depict a military landscape that is as much a 
product of institutional conservatism as it is of conflict (and the threat of conflict). 
However, it will also illustrate how the limits of military geographies are defined by the 
Chapter 1. Introduction 5 
possibilities of destructive technologies and the requirement to exclude civilians from 
their lethal effects. The increasing importance of militarised airspace will be assessed 
in its relations with military land use, training and national defence. In addition, this 
chapter will propose that the increasing systematisation of airspace throughout the 
20th century marks an important shift in the military’s ability to define space in three 
dimensions both in the field of conflict and in the domestic context. In this respect, 
Chapter 3 will assess the vertical and volumetric use of space as the military defence 
estate extends beyond land use and beyond the fluid parameters of naval navigation. 
The Cold War will be studied as a period of intense consolidation and technological 
innovation leading to an unprecedented nation-wide framework of connected sites, 
airspaces and communication/surveillance networks.  
 
Since the aim of this thesis is to understand what, if any, are the basic principles of 
military space in the UK, Chapter 4 will analyse the legal constitution of military 
controlled areas. Defence lands, enclosures and sometimes airspaces are protected 
by site-specific bylaws that prohibit unauthorised access and limit activities around 
them. Perimeter fences, guarded entrances and surveillance cameras are often the 
most obvious expressions of this spatial segregation. But while many bylaws are 
written to define the boundary of a site they are also used to regulate the behaviour 
of civilians outside certain sites to prohibit protests and activities such as 
photography and filming. However, the legal legitimacy of certain bylaws can be 
successfully challenged by the activities of civilians which can lead to a site being, in 
some sense, legally ‘reconstituted’. Certain examples in the thesis will show how 
military bylaws are adaptable, sometimes ambiguous and can lack legal legitimacy. 
In addition, Chapter 4 will describe how British military personnel are bound by a 
separate judicial system, the Military Criminal Justice System, which is marked by the 
principles of extreme discipline and the requirement to regulate the behaviour of 
soldiers at home, abroad and in hostile environments. The military institution, in this 
respect, is a self-regulating body, a ‘warrior class’ who define land and space in their 
own terms but who requires the state to legitimise their activities and to legally 
constitute the spaces they inhabit. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the first of three case studies undertaken as field work during 
2008-09. MoD Shoeburyness is a collection of military sites used primarily for military 
research and development (R&D) but is almost entirely managed by QinetiQ, a 
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private sector organisation which emerged from the British government’s Defence 
Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) in 2001. Many of the facilities are found on 
Foulness, an island at the mouth of the river Thames used for weapons testing, 
development and disposal. This restricted and uniquely hazardous island also 
happens to be home to a civilian community gathered in the isolated village of 
Churchend. While it resembles a ‘traditional’ English village in many respects, 
Churchend is at the centre of a complex system of land use and airspace 
architecture which is designed to both protect and exclude the vulnerable civilian 
inhabitants. Chapter 5 identifies a number of issues relating to the transformation of 
military land use and spatial design over the last 30 years.  Firstly, it looks at what it 
is like as a civilian to live inside a quasi-military zone, where weapons testing is 
implied if not experienced on a daily basis and where agricultural routines are 
organised around live firing schedules. Secondly it will look at the impact of 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) on the organisation of farming cycles and 
ballistics hazards. Thirdly, Chapter 5 will ask where the human body resides within 
the equation of military and agricultural land use, restricted airspace, weapons 
testing and the very real threat of danger. 
 
The second case study within this research is Salisbury Plain Training Area (SPTA), 
the British Army’s largest training facility in the UK. Chapter 6 will describe a 
selective history of military land acquisition across the county of Wiltshire throughout 
the twentieth century, a process which would largely spare Salisbury Plain the 
homogenising effects of modern agriculture but subject it, instead, to the effects of 
intense military activity. The emergence of new technologies such as the tank and 
the aeroplane will be assessed in relation to land and airspace use as will the residual 
effects of aerial reconnaissance photography on the disciplines of archaeology and 
geography. Chapter 6 reveals that many of these historical sites are now 
incorporated into military training exercises as strategic obstacles such as dummy 
‘mine fields’. This research also shows that, despites its relatively uncultivated, 
naturalist appearance, the military landscape of SPTA has been systematically 
subdivided into multiple parts, each with its own specific training function. This 
rationalisation of space is managed by a private company, Landmarc to increase 
efficiency of use by the armed services. Similarly, the Danger Area volumes and 
airspaces above the Plain are heavily used by a variety of aircraft for training. Chapter 
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6 builds a picture of SPTA as highly structured assemblage of spaces, a combination 
of land and air but managed as a single military resource. 
 
The final case study is the city of Portsmouth, Hampshire, which is the largest naval 
port in the UK. Chapter 7 describes the history and growth of the city as a defended 
site of considerable naval and military-industrial activity. The urban development of 
Portsmouth is shown to have been significantly influenced by the expansion of 
military sites and spaces in the region but also by the changing posture of the city 
from a defensible entity to a virtually indefensible place of significant military-industrial 
production. Indeed, the relationship between the military and industry provides the 
focus for this chapter in its analysis of regional private sector involvement in military 
activities. Chapter 7 identifies clusters of current military activity and military-industrial 
manufacturing in the region and traces the increasing influence of the private sector 
within them. This analysis of military/urban forms reveals the large extent to which 
military sites are now occupied and managed by commercial organisations. While 
military-industrial manufacturing has always been present in Portsmouth, the 
relinquishment of key military services, the training of personnel, catering, security 
and site management is a phenomenon that has its origins the economic strategies 
of the 1980s but which continues to this day. The congruence of naval activity and 
the high density of military-industrial manufacturing and service provision is 
responsible for a diffused assemblage of related sites across the region. 
 
The case studies offered here provide three very different perspectives on how 
military activity defines sites and spaces. Indeed, they show in very direct ways how 
military activities are processes that can, for instance, explode instantaneously or 
shape urban forms over centuries. They can exist in the construction of barbed-wire 
perimeter fences around a site or in the coordinates of an invisible volume of 
airspace – a very real space if you happen to fly into one during a heavy artillery trial. 
These case studies provide alternative examples of the military habitat: an island 
used for R&D, an army training area one tenth the size of Wiltshire and an entire city 
whose urban form continues to be defined by the principles of warfare and defence. 
Each was chosen because it offered a broad range of spatial forms and activities for 
analysis, and all three were accessed on multiple occasions with permission from the 
relevant authorities. Ideally, this research would have also included an active RAF 
base as a case study. This was not possible for a number of reasons including lack 
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of accessibility and the constraints of the project time frame. However, a number of 
recently decommissioned RAF bases were visited during the course of this research 
including Greenham Common, Sculthorpe and West Raynham.2 Two active RAF 
radar bases, Trimingham and Neatishead were accessed with permission from the 
base commanders but were not selected to become full case studies because they 
were unrepresentative of active ‘flying’ stations. All of these sites, however, informed 
the historical background for this research or the interpretive exposition of the later 
chapters. 
 
Chapter 8, Networked Landscapes describes and interprets two types of military 
networking. The first relates to the physical infrastructural networks that provide 
military sites with fuel, water, communication and information technology systems. 
These networks, which often run for hundreds of miles underground and sometimes 
connect military sites together, constitute a parallel and hidden aspect of the British 
military landscape. Many of these systems and networks, while essential to the 
military capability and defence estate, are now managed as Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) schemes or Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) meaning that the MoD 
has attempted to transfer responsibility and risk to the commercial sector. An 
analysis of these infrastructures, however, is essential to an interpretation of the 
current defence estate: despite their defused spatial formations and their hidden 
aspect they underpin and connect so many of the sites described in this thesis. They 
are the veins and arteries of the British military landscape. 
 
The second line of enquiry in Chapter 8 relates to the MoD’s doctrine of a Network 
Enabled Capability (NEC). This is conceived as a practical exploitation of digital 
information technology to enable a greater connectivity in the battlefield but also 
means of rationalising existing bureaucratic systems, bypassing hierarchies in 
defence command structures and capitalising on the apparent expertise of the 
private sector. NEC is reshaping the way warfare is conducted abroad which, in turn, 
has unusual residual effects on military activities across the British defence estate. 
The introduction of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into domestic training exercises is just 
one example of a broader reshaping of defence training strategies.  
 
                                                
2 A full list of active and decommissioned sites visited during the course of this research can 
be found in the methodologies section. 
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Chapter 9 brings together the salient themes of the previous chapters and builds a 
picture of  military sites as poly-spatial forms: assemblages or complexes with solid 
geographical, infrastructural and architectural foundations but incorporating invisible 
and vertical dimensions. These complexes are becoming increasingly systematised 
and restructured by new technologies and the influence of the private sector. 
Furthermore, Chapter 9 interprets the domestic military habitat as a spatial totality, 
as a pervasive, nationally connected complex of sites, regions, airspaces and 
processes. This chapter also addresses the validity of the word ‘complex’ in relation 
to the more diffused aspects of an evolving military-industrial dynamic in the UK and 
USA – a complex as a socioeconomic condition  
 
The final chapter, Parallel Landscapes, offers a speculative interpretation of domestic 
military space as distinct from civil space. The nature of this distinction is explored as 
a process of ‘detachment’, first from the obligation of domestic civil enforcement and 
later as a form of ‘self-segregation’ brought about by the proximity of lethal weapons 
and the proliferation of nuclear warheads across the UK. However, the influence of 
the private sector in most (if not all) forms of military activity is breaking down the 
distinction between military and civil activities (and their respective ‘spaces’) in both 
the domestic context and the war zone. This research can reveal that the ‘parallel 
landscape’ of military training and defence, once so distinct during the Cold War, is 
visibly diminishing in a confusion of private sector outsourcing, public accessibility, 
ecological rhetoric, and a questionable mass-mobilisation of digital communication 
technology. The end of the Cold War will be shown to be a critical moment in the 
evolution of (western) state coercive force, when military power itself is opened as a 
space for commercial enterprise. 
 
The use of ‘parallel’ in the title of this thesis was not, therefore, an arbitrary choice 
but actually frames several themes that relate to the changing character, proximity 
and influence of military power across the British landscape.  As the research 
progressed other key words presented themselves as possible alternatives - such as 
‘complex’, ‘poly-spatial’, ‘rhizomatic’ and ‘detached’, amongst others. However, all 
of these seemed to relate only to a specific aspect of the research (at the exclusion 
of others) and none seems to offer the inclusive, open and slightly ambiguous 
analogy that best described the research as a whole. If, perhaps, the word ‘parallel’ 
doesn’t quite do justice to the sheer connectedness and mutability of the British 
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military landscape, it does function as a useful point of departure for many of the 
themes that will be described in this thesis. 
 
1.4 . Theoretica l approach 
This section aims to provide a theoretical framework that informs and compliments 
the practical methodology described below. The literature review undertaken for this 
research began before the programme of field trips but ran concurrently to many of 
the other practical methods employed here. However, the two methodologies can 
be seen as mutually constitutive and in many ways, indivisible.  
 
1.4 .1.  In troduction  
This research has employed a range of different methods to address the research 
questions and its related objectives. Prior to undertaking field work and applying the 
other practical methods described in the next section, a review of relevant literature 
was conducted with a view to building a critical understanding of the military 
presence in the UK and the historical trajectory of martial power across the domestic 
landscape. This presence is most obviously seen in military bases, facility and 
training areas, but also in a range of processes and events that unfold across the 
landscape in a variety of ways. It quickly became apparent during this research that 
no one discipline or subject area could adequately describe the manner in which the 
armed services express themselves on, above and beneath the landscape: the 
multiplicity of places, events and processes under analysis required navigating and 
cross-referencing a series of familiar and less familiar academic approaches. Land 
use, for instance, might be studied in direct relation to the historical development of 
ballistics, or the design of airspace might demand an analysis drawn from critical 
geography. However, this somewhat eclectic approach was ordered and 
constrained by a bias towards visual culture, which generally begins by considering 
the design, functionality, beauty or symbolic value of objects or phenomena in their 
broader social milieu.  
 
It became increasingly apparent during this research that the military imagination 
conceives space differently from other social groups. Here, space is principally 
strategic and cartographic, defensible or destructive: space is the framework within 
which death and danger are measured. The military organisation and production of 
space emerged, therefore, as key theme for this thesis. More specifically, the 
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domestic military landscape is framed here as the place in which war is planned and 
prepared for, where the military imagination conceptualises the spaces of battle and 
configures the landscape on those terms. War, however, is the place where those 
plans, so carefully laid, unravel. 
 
Underpinning and articulating the methods employed here is a critical and theoretical 
interpretation of military activity and the ways in which the British Armed Services 
(and their associated private sector partners) coordinate their activities across the 
country. Despite the proliferation of literature relating to military strategies, to wars 
ancient and modern, and the mountain of material fetishising weapons technology, 
there are relatively few critical or analytical studies of training or defence activities in 
the UK, and still fewer that relate to military geographies or the organisation of 
domestic military space. However, the following significant texts stand out as relating 
either directly or indirectly to the subject in question, but all in some way contribute 
to an essential interpretive framework for progress. Many of these texts will be 
employed to shed a critical light on the surfeit of government reports, MoD 
documents and corporate promotional material available online today. Others assist 
in developing the key arguments present in this thesis. The synopsis of texts below 
will be organised thematically to introduce some of the persistent ideas that will 
shape this thesis. 
 
1.4 .2.  The production of  space. 
This thesis recognises that there are different conceptions of space. The focus here, 
however, is on those spaces conceived and defined by military activity. These 
include the delineation of land, architecture and buildings, the construction of 
physical borders and perimeters, infrastructure and other methods of limiting or 
extending martial activity. Military spaces are also defined by processes: some are 
instantaneous events such as detonations or impacts, others are mobile or transitory 
and delineate a space by their movement or trajectory. All of these spaces should, as 
in the civil realm, be regarded as ‘always under construction’ and a ‘product of 
relations-between, relations which are necessarily embedded material practices’.3 
There are, however, other orders of space that exist as representations, between the 
imaginary and the real, which, within the martial context, include forms of 
cartography and computer-assisted mapping but which can correlate with physical 
                                                
3 Doreen Massey, For Space, London: Sage , 2005, p.9. 
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space in very direct ways. There also invisible and immaterial conceptions of space 
such a those determined by coordinates; facetted volumes of airspace, danger areas 
or as controlled zones. This thesis will proceed on the basis that these static, mobile 
or representational spaces are produced as extensions of state and military power. 
 
Having called for a unitary theory or science of space, Henri Lefebvre’s The 
Production of Space4 remains a primary text for discourses in spatial culture and 
practice. Lefebvre’s persuasive call to bring together a range of interpretive methods 
to interrogate the spatial arrangements of capitalist production has been applied with 
varying success across a range of disciplines. The central proposition that a spatial 
subject can only usefully be interpreted by bringing together a number of different 
disciplinary perspectives is one with which this research wholly concurs. The act of 
applying a multidisciplinary approach to a spatial subject forms the basis for much of 
the methodology of this research, and The Production of Space will be referred to 
throughout as a primary model for this approach.  
 
Lefebvre addresses military space only indirectly, as a expression of state power 
and, perhaps more significantly, as a form of instrumental and abstract space that is 
not so far removed from the systematised processes of industrial mass production.5 
This perspective is useful in exploring a complex and mutually constitutive 
relationship that has formed between military power and capitalism in the UK. 
 
Similarly, David Harvey in Spaces of Capital, identifies military power as a form of 
state coercion which is often mobilised in the service of economic ambition, but 
which conceptualises space on its own terms. In this text, Harvey calls for ‘careful 
studies of how geography as a mode of understanding is formulated, used and 
applied in different institutional settings (for example, the military, Greenpeace, the 
state apparatus, multinational corporations, and so on)’.6 This thesis can be 
understood, in this respect, as an attempt to ‘read’ the geographies and spatialities 
of the military institution.  
 
                                                
4 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1991. 
5 Ibid., p.49 
6 David Harvey, Spaces of capital: towards a critical geography, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2001, p.209. 
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This research follows Lefebvre and Harvey in identifying state/military power as a 
spatial phenomenon, one which is essentially a process of production which nurtures 
a dynamic, if somewhat opaque relationship with the commercial sector. In the first 
decade of the 21st century, the relationship between military power, space and 
capital is more complex that ever, supporting vast military capabilities with 
international infrastructures and sustained by an equally vast armament industry – all 
of which are unravelling with alarming unpredictability in conflicts around the world.  
 
1.4 .3.  Mi l i tary  space 
The spatial bias that informs this thesis is also one derived from a unease with 
temporally-fixated accounts of technology, globalisation and the apparent ‘death of 
distance’ or even the ‘end of geography’. In these accounts military technology is 
implicated in an acceleration of speed and a psychosocial erosion of distance. It may 
be a truism to say as Sun Tzu did, that ‘speed is the essence of war’, but to say, as 
Paul Virilio did, that the ‘reduction of distance has become a strategic reality bearing 
incalculable economic and political consequences, since it corresponds to the 
negation of space’,7 may be over-stating the issue. Pragmatically speaking, it is not 
distance that has been reduced but duration. Whether one travels a kilometre in five 
hours or five seconds, the distance remains the same. This research recognises that 
the motives of military power remains essentially territorial and spatial, mobilised to 
defend national or regional borders, maintain flows of capital and commodities 
around the world, and to preserve other nuanced political interests.  
 
However, it was Virilio’s Bunker Archeology, a photographic and architectural study 
of the decaying Nazi Atlantic Wall defences, (and its accompanying essay Military 
Space), that identified a certain ‘rupture effectuated between human territory and the 
continuum of violence’.8 While ultimately critical of Virilio’s proposition, much of this 
thesis’ penultimate chapter is devoted to addressing an apparent shift in the British 
military’s conception of land and geography. 
 
Rachel Woodward’s Military Geographies is one of the few recent texts with original 
research and field work to recognise the significance and scale of military activity in 
                                                
7 Paul Virilio, Speed and politics: an essay on dromology, New York: Semiotext(e), 1986, 
p.133. 
8 Paul Virilio, Bunker Archeology, trans. George Collins, New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press, 2009, p.17. 
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the UK, but also to convincingly challenge much of the geographical and 
environmental data provided by the MoD.9 Crucial for this research, Woodward’s 
study identifies the value of thinking ‘coherently and critically about the moral 
authority on which military geographies are based’.10 Another key text for this 
research, The Military Use of Land: A History of the Defence Estate, by John Childs, 
maps the development of the military landscape from Iron Age settlements and 
fortifications to the training grounds and airfield of the present era.11 Childs’ 
quantitative, acre by acre analysis of the growth of the defence estate forms the 
basis for much of the land use details in Chapter 3.  
 
1.4 .4.  Complexes and networks 
The research question for this thesis rests on an interpretation of the word complex 
which is developed here as a structural model for interpreting spatial relations. Here 
is a definition of the word complex from the Compact Oxford English Dictionary: 
 
adjective 1 consisting of many different and connected parts. 2 not easy to 
understand; complicated. 
noun 1 a group of similar buildings or facilities on the same site. 2 an 
interlinked system; a network. 3 a related group of repressed feelings or 
ideas which lead to abnormal mental states or behaviour. 4 informal an 
obsession or preoccupation. 
This thesis assesses and develops the complex model of military spatial relations 
from the local level to the regional, and finally to the national level. In each case these 
assemblages of land, buildings, infrastructures and airspace architecture are shown 
to share a collective function and can be regarded as poly-spatial complex forms. 
However, this thesis also recognized the political and socio-economic forces that 
shape these forms. Britain’s changing military-industrial dynamic is assessed at 
various points in relation to the defence estate. In this respect, David Edgerton’s 
Warfare State: Britain 1920-1970, offers a thorough, ‘post-declinist’ reading of the 
development of the British military capability and its relations with industry and 
                                                
9 Rachel Woodward, Military Geographies, Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. 
10 Ibid., p.9. 
11 John Childs, The Military Use of Land: A History of the Defence Estate, New York: Peter 
Lang, 1998. 
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manufacturing.12 Warfare State and England and the Aeroplane describes a ‘liberal 
militarism’ which provided long term policies for armaments production and the 
development of military technologies.13 Following the changing military-industrial 
dynamic into the 1980s and 1990s, War on Terror, Inc by Solomon Hughes, 
proposes that Britain’s privatisation of military assets was more conceptually 
developed than the USA’s, with the Reagan/Thatcher axis providing a cross-Atlantic 
dialogue for accelerated commercial enterprise in the defence sector.14 Among 
others, these accounts of defence manufacturing and privatisation are woven into a 
history of the defence estate as it’s sites and infrastructures are increasingly 
managed by the commercial sector. This fact is shown to have significant 
implications for the organisation and management of the defence estate as a whole.  
The proximity of technological development, military activity and private sector 
investment is also explored in Antoine Bousquet’s The Scientific Way of Warfare 
which tracks the emergence of Network-centric Warfare (NCW) as a flawed but 
influential doctrine of digital communication and decentralized command 
structures.15 The principles of NCW have been embraced by the MoD as Network 
Enabled Capability (NEC), a doctrine which is incrementally reordering the theatre of 
war and, as a consequence, the training environments in the UK. 
 
1.4 .5.  Power 
Understanding the role power plays in generating and preserving military and 
institutional spaces is the subject of Paul Hirst’s Space and power.16 This 
Foucaultian reading of political and institutional spatial practice informs this thesis’s 
analysis of the evolving defence estate. Foucault’s critical approach to static 
constructs such as ‘state’, ‘sovereignty’ or ‘law’, is useful for this thesis in 
introducing dynamic, unexpected forces into the play of power that defines 
militarised space. The appearance of these spaces in a landscape is shown to be 
not simply the work of the ‘state’ or the ‘military’ but a matrix of institutions, people, 
                                                
12 David Edgerton, Warfare state: Britain, 1920-1970, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006. 
13 David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological 
Nation, Macmillan Academic and Professional LTD, 1991. 
14 Solomon Hughes, War on Terror, Inc.: corporate profiteering from the politics of fear, 
London: Verso, 2007. 
15 Antoine Bousquet, The scientific way of warfare: order and chaos on the battlefields of 
modernity, London: Hurst, 2009. 
16 Paul Hirst, Space and power: politics, war and architecture, Cambridge: Polity, 2005. 
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technologies and architectures, making the process of interpretation that much 
harder. 
 
Patrick Wright’s The Village that Died for England, is a detailed account of the ebbs 
and flows of power that shaped the Isle of Purbeck in Dorset and finally extinguished 
the village of Tyneham as a living community. At first glance this appears to be a 
document of the ‘final triumph of the metallic state over the old organic nation of 
romantic protest’, but quickly reveals the mesh of imbrications between people, 
institutions, land, weapons and the conflicted character of the ‘state’.17 This study of 
British militarism will be referred to throughout this thesis and serves as a model for 
detail and depth of research. 
 
This is by no means a complete review of the literature referred to in this thesis but it 
does indicate a number of trajectories that coalesce into an analysis of the defence 
estate in its current form. In this respect, this thesis does not provide a 
comprehensive or fixed methodology for interpreting spatial relations but instead 
proposes a multidisciplinary model which approaches the subject of domestic 
military space from a number of different perspectives. The principal focus for this 
thesis are the poly-spatial assemblages described above; the complexes of land, air 
and architecture, within which the destructive possibilities of war are seemingly 
contained but which, in fact, leak the residues of British militarism into the spaces 
and places beyond. 
 
1.4 .6.  Research l imitat ion 
There are areas of military activity which could not be assessed by this research due 
to the constraints of time, access to information or the requirements of national 
security. 
 
This thesis is principally about the relationships between military land use and 
airspace. An assessment of Royal Navy activities is limited to research on the city of 
Portsmouth and other naval bases in the UK. Additional studies on military activity in 
UK coastal water were not possible due to time limitations. However, it should be 
                                                
17 Patrick Wright, The village that died for England : the strange story of Tyneham, London: 
Faber, 2002, p.422. 
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recognised that this is an important area of military activity that needs further 
investigation. 
 
This research also intended to address the military use of the electromagnetic 
spectrum  as an invisible form of spatial delineation. However, the details of military 
radar use for air defence remains secret and it would be inappropriate to 
approximate the radial distribution of signals, their vertical dimensions or identifying 
signal ‘blind spots’. The use of satellite-based hyperspectral imaging for visualising 
radar signal distribution was out of the question because it could effectively expose 
gaps in British air defence. However, this remains an important and developing area 
of military activity that demands further attention. 
 
There are other omissions such as the MoD’s blocking of off-shore wind farm 
planning applications because of potential radar interference from rotating turbines. 
This issue became an interesting counterpoint to the apparent ‘greening’ of the MoD 
and their engagement with environmental issues. However, this matter, which has 
been ongoing for a number of years, appears to have been resolved by the purchase 
of a booster radar to be based on the Norfolk coast.  
 
The are undoubtedly other important issues which have been missed or left out for 
structural reasons, or which were otherwise beyond the scope of this research. This 
thesis was not intended to be a comprehensive or all-inclusive study but, amongst 
other things, a springboard for more detailed analyses.  
 
1.4 .7.  T imel iness  
Over a three year period this research project has identified numerous accomplished 
and relevant texts, many of which are cited above. However, this thesis 
acknowledges a need to build on the work already undertaken in the fields of spatial 
culture and practice by assembling a multidisciplinary methodology for interpreting 
recent developments in defence and the military-industrial sector. The conceptual 
tools and visual technologies are available to push for a greater transparency and 
accountability of military activities, to question the need for the high level of military 
land and air use, and to track the increasingly interconnected military presence 
across the UK, around its coasts, and in its skies.  
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This research also hopes to address the lack of critical discussion on airspace as a 
projection of power or as an extension of land-based activities. The stratification and 
subdivision of the skies is something which appears to have largely evaded 
academic consideration and public discussions are, understandably, almost entirely 
focused on the socially intrusive flight paths around major airports. This thesis aims 
to highlight the use of airspace as an functional component of the defence estate 
and as an evolving element of warfare and national defence. 
 
1.5 . Practical  methodology 
Having established the Research Question and Objectives after the initial literature 
review in 2007-08, a set of practical methods were used to facilitate the next stage 
of research. These methods were used to identify and/or visualise military sites and 
spaces in the UK, and gain information relating to planned site visits. During 2008-
09, field work was also undertaken in parallel to these desk-based activities. The list 
below represents a selection of techniques and processes used throughout the 
research programme and seeks to position them in a wider cultural framework. 
 
1.5 .1.  Database survey. 
In the absence of a comprehensive list of military sites in the UK, this research began 
compiling a database as a reference tool. However, during the course of 2009 the 
MoD published its own comprehensive database of national and international sites. 
This new comprehensive database has proved to be an invaluable reference tool and 
is referred to throughout this thesis. Where possible, information from this database 
is cross-checked with other sources. 
 
1.5 .2.  Mapp ing, Goog le Ear th and Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) . 
This research recognises that mapping is never objective (whatever the makers’ true 
intentions) but is created by individuals or groups for specific, often political reasons. 
The histories of cartography, while often conveying different cultural and spatial 
imaginations, is one steeped in territorial expansion, military ambition and grandiose 
symbolic value. In this context, this thesis acknowledges a debt to texts such as The 
New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography edited by Paul Laxton,18 
                                                
18 J. B. Harley and Paul Laxton, The New Nature of Maps: essays in the history of 
cartography, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001 
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and Maps and Politics by Jeremy Black for revealing so clearly those links between 
politics, power and representations of geography.19 More closer to home this thesis 
also recognises the very literal relationship between military intelligence, geography 
and the British landscape, so precisely described in Map of a Nation: a biography of 
the Ordnance Survey by Rachel Hewitt,20 and in Kitty Hauser’s biography of O.G.S 
Crawford, Bloody Old Britain.21 
 
Despite the fact that Ordnance Survey (OS) provides arguably the most 
comprehensive and accurate resource of British geographic information, the 
organisation is effectively part of the state apparatus. As such it was, until recently, 
required to omit sensitive military sites from its maps – leaving large blank areas 
where significant installations clearly reside. Thankfully, this deception is not as 
widespread as it once was and today OS maps convey the large majority of military 
sites in some detail. Whatever the good intentions and obvious commitment to 
creating the highest quality maps of Britain, confidence in OS is questioned by its 
deference to state requirements on national security. 
 
The evolution of OS mapping into an online phenomenon is only a small aspect of an 
explosion of internet-base cartography. However, OS is being left behind in the 
public’s quest for free and flexible geo-information (currently provided by companies 
such as Google and Microsoft). The now common use of geo-tagging, which 
combines satellite-based GPS (Global Positioning System) and online maps, is 
transforming the way individuals and groups organise themselves in relation to their 
environments. Moreover, digitised geographic data can more readily be employed to 
critically interrogate those dominant forces at work in the landscape. Critical 
cartography may not be new but has certainly been invigorated in recent years by 
digital and online technologies.  
 
This research was encouraged and motivated by such attempts to self-manage geo-
information and augment traditional or state-endorsed cartographies with additional 
information.  
                                                
19 Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics, London: Reaktion, 2000 
20 Rachel Hewitt, Map of a nation: a biography of the Ordnance Survey,  London: Granta, 
2010. 
21 Kitty Hauser, Bloody old Britain: O.G.S. Crawford and the archaeology of modern life, 
London: Granta, 2008. 
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Maps (and OS maps, specifically) were not only an essential investigative tool for this 
research but a way of conveying to the reader the exact location and boundary limits 
of a military holding or area of land. It has been necessary to cross-reference maps 
from a number of sources including OS, MoD public-access information websites, 
and other online resources such as Google Maps, in order to determine the changes 
to military boundaries which may occur over time. A number of maps were 
specifically produced for this research by the author and are included in this thesis. 
Much of the land use assessment of Salisbury Plain Training Estate is based on an 
active military map of the area acquired during the field work process.  
 
Online satellite image resources such as Google Earth have been an invaluable for 
studying military sites. It is possible to view much of the UK at high resolution, and 
hence the vast majority of military establishments are not only visible but can be 
legally scrutinised, logged and reproduced for publication. The research recognised, 
however, that satellite and aerial images are sometimes many years old and must 
therefore be considered historical documents. The relationship between aerial 
reconnaissance and academic and artistic practice is analysed by Kitty Hauser, once 
again, in Shadow Sites which details how conceptions of the British landscape have 
been informed and reformulated by military surveillance images.22  
 
Furthermore, it is with a sense of irony that this thesis draws so heavily on Satellite 
photography and GIS considering the military origins of such technologies, a fact 
which is explored in great detail by T. J. Barnes in the essay Geography’s 
Underworld.23 The rapid development of analytic cartography and geographic 
information science is shown here to be due, in no small part, to their fundamental 
role in US Cold War early warning defensive systems such as SAGE (Semi-
Automated Ground Environment). The mathematical modelling of geographic and 
spatial data was essential to SAGE’s function in national perimeter air defence for the 
United States. Parallel developments in Military Geographic Information (MGI), terrain 
analysis, digital terrain modelling and cruise missile guidance systems such as 
ATRAN (Automatic Terrain Recognition and Navigation) are described in sobering 
                                                
22 Kitty Hauser, Shadow Sites: photography, archaeology, and the British landscape, 1927-
1955, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
23 T. J. Barnes, 'Geography’s underworld: The military–industrial complex, mathematical 
modelling and the quantitative revolution', Geoforum, Vol. 39, no. 1, 2008, pp. 3-16. 
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terms in American Cartographic Transformations during the Cold War by John 
Cloud.24 Harun Ferocki’s three cinematic installations Eye/Machine I, II and III also 
served to illustrate to devastating effect the way images of terrain are captured and 
processed by cruise missiles as they navigate autonomously to their fatal destination. 
 
The evolution of geographic data manipulation and modelling is recognised in this 
thesis as a process driven to a significant degree by military imperatives. It seems 
fitting then that such technologies should be used here to interrogate the spaces and 
landscapes of military control.  
 
Google Earth was also used to identify sites and add graphic layers to highlight areas 
and perimeters. In addition, by entering coordinates from the Civil Aviation Authority 
and using a 3D graphic function of Google Earth, it was possible to visualise volumes 
of active restricted airspace around particular military sites or elsewhere. This 
information, while already in the public domain, can now be viewed in a new graphic 
form in this thesis. This research used similar graphic models created by other users 
in the Google Earth community, most notably by Lloyd Bailey. Other users in the 
community have been credited for model design where appropriate and the 
accuracy of their work has been checked for inclusion here. It must also be 
recognised that the dimensions of airspace volumes change quite frequently and 
those recorded and visualised in this thesis may well change in the future. 
 
1.5 .3.  F ie ld studies. 
This study would have been impossible without first-hand experience of militarised 
environments, and in this sense it broadly follows a social science model of acquiring 
empirical data though pre-arranged field trips and site visits. By their very nature, 
military sites are hard to get into and resist the curiosity of casual visitors, and for 
these reasons the process of gaining permission to enter them was sometimes 
lengthy. A request to enter RAF Trimingham, for example , seemed to be 
accompanied by a lengthy vetting process in which my university credentials were 
checked and the legitimacy of my research questioned. Once this process was 
completed, however, the RAF site personnel were very accommodating, even to the 
extent of escorting me around the Norfolk countryside pointing out unmarked military 
                                                
24 John Cloud, ‘American Cartographic Transformations During the Cold War’ Cartography 
and Geographic Information Science, Vol 29, Number 3, July 2002 , pp. 261-282 
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radio and signal sites. Repeated visits to Salisbury Plain were similarly greeted with 
guarded but friendly curiosity by personnel very keen to help where possible. On 
other occasions, more imaginative methods of entry were used. Gaining access to 
USAF bases in the UK can be very difficult, where visits are often limited to a guided 
bus tour with an pre-written commentary. I resolved to enter RAF Feltwell (a near-
space listening station and Signals Intelligence site in north Norfolk) on the 4th of July, 
a day when, for a few hours, thousands of US service personnel from across the 
country (and members of the local civilian community) are invited to a celebration of 
all things American – a day that was considerably more revealing that a guided bus 
tour. Similarly at Foulness island on the Thames estuary, the site is closed to all non-
residents except for a handful of days in the year when the tiny local heritage centre 
is open to the public. I used one of these days to enter the site and meet the local 
population who subsequently invited me back for a tour of the island and a series of 
interviews.  
 
The methods used to enter active sites have been varied and often unusual but 
always legal. However, the study also placed considerable emphasis on 
unstructured visits and encounters, a strategy which allowed a degree of serendipity 
and unpredictability into the research. The experience of visiting a site without a 
formal invitation or simply observing a militarised area from beyond its perimeter can 
elicit a range of responses from military and private security guards. I could not have 
imagined being followed for quite some time by a private security guard from the 
QinetiQ research site on Portsdown Hill, Portsmouth as I legally photographed the 
facility from a nearby roadside. Nor could I have predicted being given a highly 
informative ‘off-piste’ guided tour of RAF Woodford in Suffolk after ‘straying’ from an 
agreed route around the decommissioned base. 
 
Whatever form the visits have taken, the sensory experiences gathered during field 
trips have been invaluable in conveying the nuanced differences between places; the 
smell of a fuel spill on a hot runway or the unlikely sight of Fairy Shrimps thriving in 
fresh tanks tracks, and innumerable other subtle but significant experiences have all 
implicitly informed this writing. Like Rebecca Solnit in her study of activism and the 
landscapes of America,  Storming the Gates of Paradise, I wanted ‘more scope, 
more nuance, more inclusion of the crucial details and associations that are 
Chapter 1. Introduction 23 
conventionally excluded’.25 This experience of sensed ‘phenomena’ is in line with the 
general proposition of this thesis - that military space encompasses much more than 
land, architecture and technology, much more than material objects even. In this 
respect, the earth’s natural environment and the complex, fluid medium of weather 
can be read in this thesis as a counterpoint to the cartographic or systematised 
parameters of human (and in this case military) activities. The division of the earth 
from the sky in the landscape is, as Tim Ingold has suggested, an ‘illusion’, filled as it 
is with the complex atmospheric weather systems that blow, buffet and sustain us.26 
It is also the same atmosphere that hosts the invisible airspace structures that figure 
so much in the following pages. 
 
Evidence gathering and analysis for this research has been supported by field trips to 
active military sites in the UK during 2008-09. Additional trips were conducted during 
2009-10. Recently ‘drawn-down’ or decommissioned sites were also visited to 
assess the impact of recent military disposal, but also to allow a degree of scrutiny 
which may not be permitted in active military sites. Active sites visited include: 
 
• RAF Sculthorpe, Norfolk. Much of this site has been sold to developers or used 
for business applications. However, the landing strip continues to be used by the 
British Army for training exercises. 
 
• RAF Neatishead, Norfolk. A Remote Radar Head (RHH) station used to provide 
radar and communications for the national Air Surveillance And Control System 
(ASACS). 
 
• RAF Trimingham, Norfolk. A small site with a Type 93 radar (most notable for its 
‘golf ball’ radome covering) which is used to provide coverage for ASACS (see 
Figure 1.1). 
 
• Salisbury Plain Training Area (SPTA), Wiltshire. The largest British Army training 
site in the defence estate. 
 
                                                
25 Rebecca Solnit, Storming the Gates of Paradise: landscapes for politics, Berkeley, Calif: 
University of California Press, 2008, p.2. 
26 Tim Ingold, 'Earth, sky, wind, and weather', Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 
Vol. 13, 2007, pp. 19-38. 
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• RAF Holbeach, Lincolnshire. A target bombing range on the edge of the Wash 
used for training RAF, USAF and NATO pilots in air-to-surface attack. 
 
• MoD Shoeburyness, Essex. A research and development site with multiple 
facilities, predominantly used for weapons testing and disposal.  
 
• RAF Feltwell, Norfolk. A USAF non-flying station used, until recently, for tracking 
orbital and low orbital objects. Also allegedly used for intelligence surveillance 
and eavesdropping.  
 
Non-active sites visited include: 
 
• RAF West Raynham, Norfolk. Closed – 1994. A derelict site latterly used as a jet 
fighter station and a launch site for Bloodhound SAM missiles. 
 
• RAF Bentwater, Suffolk. Closed – 1993. Used by the USAF for fighter aircraft. 
During the Cold War Bentwater had the capacity to store and deliver tactical 
nuclear weapons. 
 
• RAF Greenham Common, Berkshire. Closed – 1993. Notably used to house 
cruise missiles and the site of a sustained protest by the Greenham Common 
Women’s Peace Camp. 
 
• RAF Stenigot, Lincolnshire. Closed in the late 1980’s. Used for the Chain Home 
radar network and Ace High tropospheric communication system.  
 
• Kelverdon Hatch. Regional Government Headquarters bunker, Essex. Closed – 
1992.  
 
These study trips and others, have shown how necessary first-hand experience is in 
gathering original data (much of which is evident in this thesis), and that it is possible, 
with the assistance of the armed services and other agencies, to gain access to 
places which are normally restricted to the general public. Field trips are an essential 
way of obtaining original information that would otherwise not reach the public 
domain. Three case study sites were chosen for analysis in this thesis: MoD 
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Shoeburyness, Salisbury Plain Training Area, and the city of Portsmouth. In each 
case it was necessary to make repeated visits. The rationale for choosing these sites 
is as follows: 
 
MoD Shoeburyness was chosen because of its unique identity as a MoD-owned, 
private sector-managed, R&D facility with a civilian community living permanently 
within the military enclosure – the only such case in the UK. Based predominantly on 
the island of Foulness, the civilian and military/research communities coexist by 
creating an elaborate system of barrier controls that restrict access to areas for 
specific periods.  
 
Salisbury Plain Training Area (SPTA) was chosen because of its status as the largest 
army training area in the UK. SPTA is significant for this thesis because of the 
complex spatial structures evident in and around the area – land holding, airspaces 
and military hazards all combine to create a highly complicated assemblage of 
connected spaces. 
 
As the principal port of the Royal Navy, the city of Portsmouth was used as a case 
study for this thesis to examine the way military activities effect the development of 
urban growth. For over six centuries Portsmouth has grown around naval activities 
and continues to support a large military-industrial manufacturing base. The role of 
the  private sector was examined as a determining factor in the constitution of 
military sites and space in the region. 
 
1.5 .4.  In terv iews and ora l histories. 
Living and working within militarised environments is a common experience for 
thousands of British service personnel. There are, however, few experiences 
common to all, but most would be conscious of the hazards of military activity. The 
few that were interviewed for this research (either formally or informally) all worked or 
lived within potentially dangerous militarised environments, and as such were 
questioned about their relationship to their place of work or, in the case of Foulness 
Island, their home.  
 
A mixture of techniques were used but the form of the interviews was always 
determined by the interviewee: military staff (specifically, Flight Lieutenant Dan 
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Gibson at RAF Trimingham, personnel at RAF Neatishead and Richard Osgood 
Salisbury Plain) generally preferred a formal procedure – at least initially – to clearly 
define what was actually taking place and why. Civilians, particularly those of the 
farming community on Foulness, were eager to talk as a group over tea and biscuits 
but some later spoke individually to disclose more detailed information. All the 
individuals interviewed on Foulness consented to be named in any subsequent 
publications but disclosure was not deemed necessary in this thesis.  
 
Sometimes actions speak louder than words: a silent walk with a farmer as he looks 
in the furrows for artillery casings and sabots before they mangle his harvester can 
be a sobering and revealing experience. Equally telling can be the steely gaze and 
authoritative language of the Serco or QinetiQ gatekeeper as he runs through the 
safety guidelines for entering a site or persuades you to sign away institutional 
liability. In Portsmouth, a series of informal conversations took place with residents 
and employees of military contractors, all of which added valuable colour and texture 
to the case study rather than yielding solid data on military activities.  
 
Some interviewees are referred to by name in the text and have signed the 
necessary release consent forms. Others preferred to remain anonymous, and in 
such cases the data was also used in the text but was supported, where possible, 
by additional material. With each meeting, interview or conversation, I was prepared 
with background information but always tried where possible to let the interviewees 
lead the discussions. In all cases, University ethics guidelines were observed and I 
made every effort to avoid leading or inappropriate questions. 
 
1.5 .5.  Photographic documentation 
Site visits and field trips were documented with still photographs, some of which are 
shown in this thesis as supporting evidence. Permission was obtained before 
photographs where taken inside restricted or controlled areas.  
 
Despite having a background in fine art and photography, I was conscious that this 
research should not become an investigation into image-making or over-burden the 
study by introducing aesthetic or artistic enquiry. However, despite myself, this has 
occurred a number of time in the thesis and I accept that the outcome is better for it. 
With hindsight, I only wish that I had the courage to introduce more of it, more 
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speculative interpretations of the landscape as image - or maybe just more images. 
My initial reticence grew after seeing images and text so brilliantly fused in W.G 
Sebald’s The Rings of Saturn and Austerlitz.27 Equally important for this thesis, but 
not less responsible for dissuading me from embarking on an image or practice-led 
enquiry is Virilio’s Bunker Archeology, the text of which was written after a 
photographic tour of the Normandy beaches and the crumbling Nazi fortifications 
that pitch and sink in its sands.28 To my knowledge, Virilio (who is clearly a highly 
accomplished photographer), never undertook a similar study, where images have 
such a persuasive influence on the reading of the text. Exceptional though these 
works are, they reveal a complex philosophical dialogue between text and image, 
something which this research did not set out to achieve. 
 
While there was an element of self-denial about the value of images (or image 
interpretation) in this research, the motivation from the start was simply to produce a 
body of text that could stand on its own, and perhaps more importantly, to stretch 
my own limited abilities as a writer in an academic environment. 
 
1.5 .6.  Searches and archives 
Military archives, museums and libraries were visited to obtain records and 
information, and in this context the National Archives was also a valuable resource of 
declassified information. The internet was an essential resource for obtaining current 
military documents, many of which are not published anywhere else. Online searches 
of corporate documents and promotional material provided an invaluable insight in to 
the scale and character of the defence industry. The internet also gave essential 
access to research centres and agencies such as the Stockholm International Peace 
Institute (SIPRI), the International Security Information Service (ISIS), the Rand 
Corporation, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and the 
International Relations and Security Network (ISN), the Centre for Defence 
and International Security Studies (CDISS), and the Defence Analytical Service 
Agency (DASA), all of which provide relevant statistical data and information relating 
to military land use, weapons proliferation and national defence capabilities. The 
wealth of online material compiled by military enthusiasts and researchers was also 
                                                
27 W. G. Sebald, The Rings of Saturn, trans. Michael Hulse. London; Harvill, 1999, and 
Austerlitz, trans. Anthea Bell, London; Penguin, 2002. 
28 Virilio, Bunker Archeology. 
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useful in assessing building typologies and sites maps, as were the informal military 
personnel and pilot web forums. Websites such as Subterranea Britannica29 and 
Secret Bases30 are both run by determined and dedicated researchers who are 
committed to legally disseminating accurate information about government and 
military facilities.  These websites and many others like them reveal a hunger to know 
more about the landscapes and sites that play such an ambiguous and secretive role 
in defining the state’s coercive force. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
29 Subterranea Britannica, 
<http://www.subbrit.org.uk/>, (accessed 15 Feb 2011). 
30 Secret bases,  
<http://www.secret-bases.co.uk/>, (accessed 15 Feb 2011). 
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       Figure 2.1 Salisbury Plain tank crossing. 
         Photograph: M. Flintham 
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2.1 . Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of the current British military 
capability and to orientate the defence estate in a local and global context. It will 
described the scale of the defence estate, the size of the British military in relation to 
other global powers, its deployment overseas and its affiliation to other trans-
national treaties and organisations. Military budgets and expenditures will be 
assessed and compared to the other European countries. France will be highlighted 
as a country which shares a similar military capability and defence budget to the UK 
but which is undergoing a radical restructuring of its defence estate. The USA will 
also be studied as a nation which has become the world’s dominant superpower 
and which shares an ongoing ‘special relationship’ with the UK. This relationship is 
inscribed in the British landscape, in the use of RAF stations for US air operations 
and signals intelligence (SIGINT) eavesdropping sites. The British nuclear capability 
will also be described in its proximity to US interests and its part-privatisation by US 
corporations. Also outlined in this chapter are some of the ‘bridges’ between the 
defence estate of the UK and war zones and relief efforts around the world. Air 
bridges, are also used to ‘repatriate’ soldiers killed in action which has led to very 
localised scenes of mourning and the apparent phenomenon of ‘grief tourism’. The 
defence of British sovereign territory is the one of the principle function of the armed 
services and a ‘rapid deployment’ of fast jets is shown to be part of this ‘defence’; a 
show of power intended to reinforce national land, sea and airspace boundaries, 
and to deter speculative incursions by foreign powers. Major training exercises can 
also be viewed, in this respect, as tacit forms of defence.  
 
2.2 . The Brit ish defence capab il i ty 
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is the department within the British government 
responsible for defence. It is funded by parliament with the Secretary of State for 
Defence as the professional head of the armed services as a whole. The stated 
purpose of the British military is ‘to deliver security for the people of the UK and the 
Overseas Territories by defending them, including against terrorism; and to act as a 
force for good by strengthening international peace and stability’.1 Each with its own 
                                                
1 'Defence Framework: how defence works', Ministry of Defence, June 2009, p.2, 
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/001123AD-34F2-4CE5-AF07-
C622A99A4F6C/0/defence_framework_20090630.pdf>, (accessed 8 June 2010). 
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Service Chief of Staff, the British Armed Forces are divided into three distinct 
services: the Royal Navy (RN), the British Army and the Royal Air Force (RAF). They 
have a combined total of 187,210 regular force personnel, 3,600 Ghurkhas, 
approximately 2,040 full-time regular reserve personnel and 40,780 volunteer 
reserve personnel.2 In addition, the MoD employs 86,970 civilians working in all 
areas of the organisation. The MoD and the Armed Services therefore form an 
organisation of considerable size and complexity which also extends into education3 
and a number of research and development agencies including, most prominently, 
the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL). The military also provides 
a 24 hour search and rescue service (including mountain rescue) across the UK and 
coastal waters, a service which operates from six location using RAF Sea King 
helicopters and a Nimrod Maritime patrol aircraft.4 The military delivers humanitarian 
and emergency relief to crisis zones around the world, often in coordination with the 
United Nations (UN) and various Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO).5 In 
addition to the three main armed services there are a number of formalised joint 
service bodies including the Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR), Joint Force 
Harrier (JFH), Joint Helicopter Command (JHC), the Joint Chemical, Biological, 
Radiation and Nuclear Regiment (Jt CBRN Regt), Joint Service Signals Organisation 
(JSSO) and an undisclosed number of Special Forces units. The increasing number 
of joint service units and integrated operations abroad reflects a shift in doctrine 
away from a nationally-orientated defensive posture to one of a rapidly deployable, 
expeditionary nature. The formations of the UK Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) 
and the establishment of the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), Northwood, 
Middlesex, are examples of this change in posture, an attempt to provide greater 
                                                
2 Charles Heyman, The Armed Forces of the United Kingdom 2010-2011, Pen and Sword, 
2009, p.8. 
3 The MoD runs a number of educational bodies including Britannia Royal Naval College 
(Royal Naval officer training college.), the Joint Service and Command Staff College 
(command and staff training), RAF Cranwell (Royal Air Force officer training college), the 
Royal College of Defence Studies (part of the UK National Defence Academy), the Royal 
Military Academy Sandhurst (army officer training academy), and the Research and 
Assessment Branch (also part of the UK National Defence Academy) 
4 No.22 Squadron fly from the Royal Marine Base Chivenor (Devon), Wattisham Airfield 
(Suffolk), and RAF Valley (Anglesey). No.202 Squadron fly from RAF Boulmer 
(Northumberland), RAF Lossiemouth (Moray) and Leconfield (Yorkshire). 
5 Most recently this has included the deployment (at the request of the United Nations) of 
Military Police and a Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship for the transportation of aid to Haiti after the 
earthquake in January 2010. Other efforts include operations by the Commando Engineers 
to assists in the building of shelters, infrastructural support and the distribution of food after 
the earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005, and considerable military assistance was 
supplied in the wake of the 2004 Asian tsunami. 
Chapter 2. The British military capability and the defence estate 33 
institutional agility in response to so-called ‘hybrid’ forms of conflict.6 These are 
wars that are increasingly fought between state and non-state actors characterised 
by traditional manoeuvres and attrition but also by asymmetrical attacks, 
insurgencies and the apparent threat of chemical, biological or radiological 
weapons. 
 
The UK is permanent member of the UN Security Council, the body which usually 
provides a legal mandate for multinational military or humanitarian operations. The 
UK is also one of the 28 members of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and 
consequently contributes over £150m to its civil and military budgets.7 The majority 
of the UK’s military operations are conducted in concord with NATO forces and as 
such are currently deployed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo and Bosnia, Cyprus, 
Georgia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nepal 
and other sites around the world (see figure 2.2). Moreover, the UK commands 
NATO's Counter Piracy operation in Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa from the 
Allied Maritime Command HQ, Northwood, London. The British government’s 
position is that NATO is central to UK defence policy but retains the right to act 
unilaterally if need be. NATO members frequently use each other’s defence estate 
facilities and airspace to vary training patterns and encourage force integration. 
During 2009, for instance, Salisbury Plain Training Area (SPTA) in Wiltshire played 
host to exercise ‘Urgent Quest’ which involved troops and equipment from eight 
allied NATO nations and Sweden.8 Similarly, NATO air crews train in electronic 
surveillance and counter-measures against ‘enemy’ radar jamming and targeting 
systems at RAF Spadeadam in Cumbria, the only facility in Europe where such an 
Electronic Warfare resource exists.9 Conversely, British troops regularly train in a 
number of allied countries including Norway: early 2010 saw the multi-national 
                                                
6 ‘Strategic Trends Programme: Future Character of Conflict’, Ministry of Defence,  
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/00CD3C81-8295-4B79-A306-
E76C370CC314/0/20100201Future_Character_of_ConflictUDCDC_Strat_Trends_4.pdf>, 
2010, (accessed 9 June 2010), p.13. 
7 See NATO website,  
<http://uknato.fco.gov.uk/en/uk-in-nato/uk-contribution-to-nato>, (accessed 8 March 
2010). 
8 Ministry of Defence: Progress in Combat Identification, National Audit Office, 2006, p.9. 
9 See RAF website,  
<http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafspadeadam/aboutus/electronicwarfare.cfm>,(accessed 09 
March 2010). 
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NATO exercise ‘Cold Response’ integrate 20,000 soldiers from 14 different 
countries into a comprehensive ‘invasion’ and defence force. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Deployments of the Armed Forces 1 April 2008 – 31 March 2009. Source MoD. 
Crown Copyright, 2008.10 
 
 
As a member of the European Union (EU), the UK also forms alliances that can, 
apparently, be both separate and complimentary to those instigated by NATO. In 
2004, for instance, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established "to 
support the Member States and the [EU] Council in their effort to improve European 
defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European 
Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the future”.11 In 
addition, the EDA has a core aim of strengthening the European defence, 
technological and industrial base, and developing key military concepts such as 
Network Enabled Capability (see Chapter 10 for a fuller assessment of NEC). 
Explicit in EDA’s strategy is the belief that the apparent deficit in military spending 
                                                
10 Annual Report and Accounts Volume One 2008-2009, Ministry of Defence, HM Stationary 
Office, 2009. 
11 See European Defence Agency website,  
<http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Background&id=122>, (accessed 8 
March 2010). 
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across the EU can be addressed by encouraging greater cross-national 
cooperation and increasing the connections between military and industry – 
effectively a new EU military-industrial strategy. 
 
In terms of a single EU military capability, member states have adopted the Helsinki 
Headline Goal 2010, a strategy to provide personnel and resources for, 
 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. As indicated by the 
European Security Strategy this might also include joint disarmament 
operations, the support for third [world] countries in combating terrorism 
and security sector reform.12  
 
For this purpose the UK offers three mechanised, armoured or air assault brigades 
and the provision to ‘provide a Battlegroup force package ready and trained to 
respond to emerging contingencies’.13 In addition, the UK is a member of other EU 
multilateral military initiatives such as the European Air Group (with Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain), the Sealift Coordination Centre (with the Netherlands) 
and the European Amphibious Initiative (with France, Italy, Netherlands and Spain). 
 
2.3 . UK mil i tary  expenditure. 
Supplied by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Table 2.1 
shows the 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2008. Spending 
figures are in US Dollars, at current prices and market exchange rates. First and 
foremost it reveals the disproportionate size of the US defence budget in relation to 
the other major powers which, under George W. Bush, was at its highest level in 
real terms since World War II. The UK is shown to be the world’s fourth highest 
military spender, narrowly overtaken by France who, after the election of Nicolas 
Sarkozy in 2007, embarked on a ‘renovation of transatlantic relations’ and an 
assurance that defence spending will increase 1% above inflation per year.14 
                                                
12 Headline Goal 2010, General Affairs and External Relations Council, European Council, 17 
May 2004. 
13 Heyman, The Armed Forces of the United Kingdom 2010-2011, p.28. 
14 The French White Paper on defence and national security, Ministère De La Défense, 2008. 
This proposition by the French government seems increasingly unlikely during the current 
global financial crisis.  
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However, other sources put the UK in second place on the list of defence spenders 
after the USA, and attribute France’s apparent ascendance to the depreciation of 
the GBP against the USD.15 
 
   Spending  World       Spending Share of GDP      Change, 
Rank Country ($ b.)  share (%)   per capita($) 2007 (%)a       1999-2008(%) 
 
1 USA   607   41.5        1967        4.0          66.5  
2 China   [84.9]   [5.8]       [63]         [2.0]        194  
3 France   65.7   4.5       1061         2.3        3.5 
4 UK   65.3   4.5       1070        2.4                   20.7 
5 Russia   [58.6]   [4.0]       [413]         [3.5]        173 
 
Sub-total top 5 882  60 
 
6 Germany  46.8  3.2        568         1.3        –11.0 
7 Japan   46.3  3.2        361         0.9        –1.7 
8 Italy   40.6  2.8         689         1.8        0.4 
9 Saudi Arabiab 38.2  2.6         1511         9.3        81.5 
10 India  30.0  2.1         25         2.5        44.1 
 
Sub-total top 10 1084  74 
 
11 South Korea  24.2  1.7        501         2.7       51.5 
12 Brazil   23.3  1.6        120         1.5                   29.9 
13 Canada  19.3  1.3       581         1.2       37.4 
14 Spain  19.2  1.3        430         1.2       37.7 
15 Australia 18.4  1.3        876         1.9       38.6 
 
Sub-total top 15  1188  81    
World        1464                 100         217             2.4                44.7 
 
[ ] = estimated figure; GDP = gross domestic product. 
a The figures for national military expenditure as a share of GDP are for 2007, the most 
recent year for which GDP data is available. 
b The figures for Saudi Arabia include expenditure for public order and safety and might be 
slight overestimates.  
 
Table 2.1. Source: Military expenditure: SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament 
and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
                                                
15 The exchange rate conversion in Jane’s report, for instance, uses annualised rates from 
IHS Global Insight which still pegs the UK second in the world. See Jane’s website,  
<http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-Western-
Europe/Defence-budget-United-Kingdom.html>, (accessed 11 March 2010). 
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Over the last decade UK defence spending has steadily increased from £21,792bn 
in 2000 to £35,320bn in 2008. By the MoD’s own standards the proposed budget 
for 2010-11 will be 11% higher in real terms (after inflation) than in 1997 which 
‘represents the longest period of sustained growth since the 1980s’.16 In fact, if 
Armed Forces Pensions, War Pensions and Allowances are included then the 
projected figure for 2010-11 reaches over £44bn.17 As a percentage of GDP, 
however, defence spending has remained relatively constant at around 2.4%.  
 
Despite the economic crisis of 2008 and its long-term implications for national debt, 
it seems likely that the British government will go ahead with major procurement 
projects. These include the two Future (aircraft) Carriers (already delayed and likely 
to cost in the region of £5.2bn), up to 150 Joint Strike Fighters (£62m each), and 
the planned replacement for Trident, the British nuclear deterrent (the complete 
delivery system - missiles, warheads and submarines – is estimated to cost 
between £15 - £20bn). It was undoubtedly the financial burden of commissioning 
long-term projects such as these and fighting two major conflicts that led the MoD 
to take steps to ‘manage a funding gap of £21 billion’.18 The recent Green Paper on 
defence, produced in the absence of a long-overdue Strategic Defence Review, 
largely avoids addressing these seemingly huge financial obstacles.19 With these 
vast figures in mind it could be argued that the British government’s ambitions for 
national defence and procurement have not yet adjusted to the economic realities 
of life after the 2008 crash.20 In addition, MoD procurement strategies have long 
been criticised for their apparent mismanagement and failure to anticipate the 
changing nature of warfare since the end of the Cold War – or as one commentator 
recently stated, ‘Britain always buys the wrong equipment at the wrong price for the 
                                                
16 ‘Defence Spending’, Ministry of Defence,  
<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/Organisation/KeyFactsAboutDefence/
DefenceSpending.htm>, (accessed 11 March 2010). 
17 Defence Plan, Including the Government’s Expenditure Plans 2008 - 2012, Ministry of 
Defence, The Stationary Office, June 2008. 
18 Defence Equipment 2010: Sixth Report of Session 2009–10, House of Commons Defence 
Committee, The Stationery Office, February 2010, p.6 
19 Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review, Ministry of 
Defence, The Stationary Office, February 2010. 
20 For a more radical assessment of the future of the armed services see, Simon Jenkins, 
'My once-in-a-generation cut? The armed forces. All of them.' Guardian 2010, p. 27. 
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wrong wars’.21 These arguments are likely to continue at least until a new Strategic 
Defence Review clearly states the aims of national defence in an era of economic 
uncertainty. 
   
2.4 . The defence estate 
In addition to undertaking military operations at home and abroad, the MoD 
manages a considerable amount of land and property across the UK, collectively 
known as the defence estate. In fact, it is often claimed that military operation would 
not be possible without the provision of a substantial training environment in the UK 
and abroad. In this sense the domestic defence estate is an expression or a by-
product of national defence and warfare elsewhere. The MoD manages the defence 
estate ‘in trust and on trust for the nation’, meaning that they have an obligation to 
maintain it in line with an overarching plan for sustainable development and 
ecological conservation.22 The apparent paradox of caring for an environment which 
is systematically bombed, polluted or churned up by armoured vehicles has been 
discussed in detail by Woodward,23 Doxford and Hill,24 Wright25 and most recently 
by Dudley.26 The defence estate itself is a combination of freehold and leasehold 
land; 239,000 ha (590,982 acres) or approximately 1% of land area of the United 
Kingdom, a figure which has remained relatively static since the extensive 
reorganisation after the Cold War.27 The MoD also has limited rights to use a further 
133,000 ha (328,650 acres) of land around the UK bringing the combined area of 
potentially militarised land to 372,000 ha (919,232 acres). Childs notes a marginal 
decrease in military land ownership after 1991 but remarks on the increasing trend 
to acquire rights and licenses to use land: 
 
                                                
21 Julian Glover, 'Our defence policy is caught between pride and guilt', Guardian, Monday 
22 March 2009, p.30. 
22 The Defence Estate Strategy 2006: In Trust and On Trust,  Ministry of Defence, 2006. 
23 Rachel Woodward, 'Discourses on Military Environmentalism', Centre for Rural Economy 
Working Paper 48, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 2000. 
24 David Doxford, and Tony Hill, 'Land use for military training in the UK: the current situation, 
likely developments and possible alternatives', Journal of environmental planning and 
management, 41 (3), 1998, pp.279-97. 
25 Wright, The village that died for England. 
26 Marianna Dudley, ‘A Fairy (Shrimp) Tale of Military Environmentalism: 
The ‘Greening’ of Salisbury Plain’, in Militarized Landscapes: From Gettysburg to Salisbury 
Plain, eds. Tim Cole, Chris Pearson, Peter Coates, London: Continuum, 2010. 
27 See Defence Analytical Service Agency statistics at: 
<http://www.dasa.mod.uk/modintranet/UKDS/UKDS2009/c6/table602.html>, (accessed 9 
June 2010). 
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Rights and licenses are usually taken out for a period of 10 years: the MoD 
may not possess the freehold but it has the full rights to the use of that land. 
In effect, the purchase of rights rather that freeholds or leaseholds enables the 
MoD to acquire land cheaply and often without the aggravation of a public 
enquiry. It also enables the military estate to be managed with a degree of 
flexibility in order to react to changes in defence requirements.28 
 
The increase from 103,400 ha in 1990 to 133,000 ha in 2009 marks a subtle but 
significant change in land acquisition strategies. It also calls into question the logic 
of permanent freehold ownership, particularly in a time when the nature of military 
operations remains uncertain. 
 
Despite being subjected to intense military activity such as bombing and heavy 
armoured vehicle training, much of the ‘rural’ training estate is relatively 
undeveloped and has been spared the effects of modern agriculture. Subsequently, 
82,970 ha (205,023 acres) have been designated as Sites of Special Scientific 
Interest (SSSIs) which if combined, would be an area twice the size of the Isle of 
Wight.  
 
The defence estate can be better understood in terms of service-specific sites: 
there are currently 63 RAF stations (19 of which are flying stations), three major 
naval bases (HMNB Portsmouth, HMNB Devonport, Plymouth and HMNB Clyde), 
14 major Army Training Areas (ATA) (Kirkcudbright, Garelochhead, Otterburn, 
Warcop, Catterick, Castlemartin, Sennybridge, Dartmoor, Salisbury Plain, Lydd, 
Hythe, Stanford, Longmoor and Aldershot), 37 minor training areas (many of which 
are considerable in size) and numerous ranges, camps, accommodation and 
administration facilities. Figure 2.3 below shows the general distribution of training 
sites across the UK and the division of the country into seven administrative 
districts. The map does not include the numerous airfields used for training or sites 
leased to the MoD for temporary use. 
 
The ‘built’ environment of the defence estate is harder to quantify because the 
notion of a military ‘site’ is an ambiguous term. The MoD, For instance, lists 548 
sites in its 2009 rationalization audit but the number of individual Service Family 
                                                
28 Childs, The military use of land, p.212. 
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Accommodation (SFA) units across the UK is in the region of 50,000.29 To 
complicate matters further, many of the properties in England were sold to 
Annington Homes Limited (AHL) in 1996 and leased back to the MoD as part of a 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI).30 There are also numerous administration, storage 
and infrastructural buildings, and many other sites which are under so-called ‘care 
and maintenance’ orders (still owned but not actively used by the MoD or the armed 
services). 
                                                
29 For a comprehensive list of MoD-owned sites see Annex A of ‘The Defence Estate 
Development Plan’ Ministry of Defence , 2009,  
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/A8806EE6-7A77-4998-BC89-
B9466190A85D/0/DEDP09_annex_a.pdf>,  (accessed 5 March 2010). 
30 Defence Estate Development Plan 2009, Ministry of Defence, 2009, p.16. 
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Figure 2.3. Defence Training Estate: Training Area and Ranges. Crown Copyright, Ministry of 
Defence 2009. 31 
 
                                                
31 Map source:  
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/6553E496-F00E-4317-A58A-
3B6CCB7E3379/0/dte_map_uk.pdf>, (accessed 9 June 2010) 
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There are significant modernisation and development projects underway across the 
defence estate: Projects Allenby for Salisbury Plain and Connaught for Aldershot are 
major infrastructural initiatives designed to address seriously depleted standards in 
accommodation and services at these garrisons. At Tidworth garrison on Salisbury 
Plain, for instance, accommodation was in 1984 ranked ‘with the poorest to be 
found within the NATO Alliance’ and at Aldershot ‘a large proportion of the 
infrastructure is in inadequate condition due to the poor quality of the original 
structures and a lack of investment’.32 Both Allenby and Connaught are being 
undertaken by Aspire Defence Limited as a PFI worth £8bn over a 35 year period. 
These projects amongst others will define a new category of military base in the UK: 
the ‘super garrison’ - existing sites which are greatly expanded and modernised to 
accommodated additional troops returning from bases in Germany. At St Athan in 
the Vale of Glamorgan, the MoD plans to build a joint service Defence Technical 
College and Aerospace Business Park which will provide training for up to 4,500 
students in a range of engineering, communication and aeronautical subjects. This 
single facility will replace a number of military institutions around the UK as part of 
an ongoing rationalization of the defence training estate. Here the PFI is undertaken 
by Metrix (a consortium of defence and educational organisations including QinetiQ, 
Sodexo, Raytheon, Nord Anglia Education, EDS, City & Guilds and the Open 
University) and is valued at approximately £12bn. This project, latterly known as 
‘Package 1’ of the Defence Training Review (described below) has seen 
considerable delays due in no small part to the fact that ‘debt is more expensive 
[after the global financial crisis] and Metrix's ability to offset rising costs with land 
sales has diminished’.33 For a full list of current PFIs see Appendix 2.1. 
 
 
The gradual demilitarisation, rationalisation and subsequent development of defence 
sites since the end of Cold War has had surprisingly little effect on the aggregated 
total area of land used by the military which remains static at 1% of the UK land 
area. In France, however, where the total land area is over twice that of the UK, the 
                                                
32 For more information see ‘Project Histrory: A brief history of Project Allenby/Connaught’, 
Ministry of Defence, 2010, 
<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/DefenceEstateandEnviron
ment/AllenbyConnaught/ProjectHistory.htm>, (accessed 16 March 2010) 
33 Karl West, 'Credit Crunch hits £11bn Forces deal after development land value 
plummets', The Daily Mail, 12th September 2008. 
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defence estate is in the region of 110,932, almost exactly half the size of Britain’s 
domestic estate.34 With its comparable military capability and almost identical 
defence budget, France seems able to conduct military training and national 
defence on a much smaller area of domestic land. In addition, France is 
accelerating a process of base closure, shutting down 50 smaller garrisons and 
facilities scattered around the country, reducing land forces to 88,000, and creating 
11 larger, joint-service ‘experimental’ bases.35 France’s radical defence reforms are 
determined by economic necessity and a practical realisation that a scattered 
distribution of sites across the country no longer makes strategic or economic 
sense. This concept mirrors the MoD’s (as yet unrealised) desire to have fewer, 
larger bases and create a more streamlined and rapidly deployable force. Despite 
these aims there will be, according to the MoD ‘little scope to reduce the existing 
UK training estate in the near term, as it will continue to be required to support the 
delivery of military capability, despite the increasing use of synthetic 
environments’.36  
 
Not included in official data for the size of the defence estate are the low flying 
zones, Air Tactics Areas (ATA) and volumetric Danger Areas which are regularly 
used by the armed services for training and national defence. Some of these blocks 
of space are vast in size and account for a considerable amount of UK sovereign 
airspace. Much of this thesis will be devoted to analysing these spaces as products 
of military activity and processes. 
 
In addition to what amounts to nearly a million acres of land in the UK, the defence 
estate has significant holding in Germany (1,129 ha), Kenya (137,959 ha), Cyprus 
(5,347 ha), the Falkland Islands (33,996 ha), Canada (25,900 ha), and Gibraltar (131 
ha) with the use or control of other major training facilities in Belize, Nepal, Poland, 
Norway, Singapore, Ascension Island, Brunei, Diego Garcia, Oman, Iraq and 
                                                
34 Woodward, Military Geographies, p.13. 
35 Projet de loi relatif à la programmation militaire pour les années 2009 à 2014, French 
Senate,  
<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/dossiers/programmation_militaire_2009-2014.asp>, 
(accessed 9 June 2010). See also, The French White Paper on defence and national 
security, Ministère De La Défense,  
<http://www.ambafrance-ca.org/IMG/pdf/Livre_blanc_Press_kit_english_version.pdf>, 
(accessed 9 June 2010), p.9. 
36 Defence Estate Development Plan 2009, Ministry of Defence, p.3. 
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Afghanistan.37 
 
Despite this extensive use of land across the UK and abroad there continues to be 
an ongoing reluctance to relinquish or reduce the defence estate, with the army 
being the most vocal in its defence of land for training. The difficulty of balancing 
training requirements against the use of land is further complicated by changing 
operational directives determined by government. Therefore the ‘right’ amount of 
land for training is only ever nominally measured against a military capability of the 
‘right’ size. These, in turn, are measured against foreign policies with optimistic 
projections but wildly unpredictable outcomes. The debate about size versus need, 
as Woodward points out, is political and any study of military geography will 
ultimately call into question the function and value of the armed services in the 
national and global environments.38 
 
2.5 . Defence land and the Anglo-American relat ionsh ip. 
A legacy of the Second World War and Cold War is the continued presence of the 
American military on UK soil. Seven RAF stations are permanently used by the 
United States Air Force (USAF) including RAF Alconbury (Cambridgeshire), RAF 
Croughton (Oxfordshire), RAF Feltwell (Norfolk), RAF Lakenheath (Suffolk), RAF 
Fairford (Gloucestershire), RAF Mildenhall (Suffolk) and RAF Menwith Hill (North 
Yorkshire). RAF Welford (Berkshire) is apparently one of the largest munitions stores 
in Europe and is still used to store USAF bombs for US aircraft at forward bases 
such as RAF Fairford. 
 
Since the first deployment of Nuclear weapons on UK soil in September 1954, 
many US bases around the UK have been the focus of sustained protest by anti-
nuclear campaign groups including, most prominently, the Woman’s Peace Camp 
at Greenham Common (1981-2000). These campaigns were successful at drawing 
attention to the fact that the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ effectively turned 
the UK into one of the principal targets for the Soviet nuclear arsenal.39 In this 
                                                
37 ‘The Defence Estate Development Plan’ Ministry of Defence , 2009, 
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/A8806EE6-7A77-4998-BC89-
B9466190A85D/0/DEDP09_annex_a.pdf>, (accessed 5 March 2010). 
38 Woodward , Military Geographies, p.20. 
39 There is a growing distinction between diplomatic and military aspects of the ‘special 
relationship’ between the UK and the USA. While both countries remain closely connected 
by interdependent intelligence networks, compatible battlefield technologies and a raft of 
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respect the geographies of US military land use across the UK were (and perhaps 
still are) also those of profound anxiety, suspicion and potential annihilation. 
However, sometime in the early twenty-first century all US nuclear warheads were 
apparently removed from USAF bases in the UK (although no official announcement 
has been made on the matter). This did not end the US military presence nor the 
use of Britain as a strategic ‘bridge’ between the US and continental Europe, the 
Middle East and Asia.40  
 
The US Pentagon lists 25 sites across the UK in which there are 9,304 serving US 
military personnel and 604 US civilians.41 Many of these are currently engaged in the 
monitoring of Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) from sites such as RAF Menwith Hill in 
Yorkshire and the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHG) in 
Gloucestershire. Shrouded in secrecy and misinformation, SIGINT is the gathering 
of digital and electromagnetic information using various forms of surveillance 
technology to monitor and filter communication between individuals or groups. 
Unlike the pronounced USAF presence in the UK, the geographies of the UK-USA 
Security Agreement (actually a SIGINT data sharing agreement between the USA, 
UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) are largely hidden in the landscape or 
tangled within communication infrastructures. Tracing and connecting their routes 
across the landscape is an ongoing act of detective work undertaken by 
surveillance researchers who diligently identify exotic transmission masts or note the 
particular direction of microwave dishes. Some, like Steve Wright, uncover 
transnational systems of secret and possibly illegal eavesdropping apparatus,42 
while others like David Murakami Woods map the connections between military, civil 
and commercial elements of the ‘surveillance society’, all of which have some form 
                                                                                                                                 
mutually binding defence agreements, the UK periodically shows unease at being perceived 
as subservient to the US administration. The Obama administration currently seems to take 
a less sentimental view of the relationship, and the UK for their part are keen to play down 
any hint of automatic acquiescence. 
40 Hans Kristensen, ‘U.S. Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn From the United Kingdom’, 
Federation of American Scientists, 2008, 
<http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/us-nuclear-weapons-withdrawn-from-the-united-
kingdom.php>, (accessed 18 March 2010). 
41Department of Defence, Base Structure Report – Fiscal year 2009 Baseline, US 
Department of Defence,  
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/BSR2009Baseline.pdf>, (accessed 3 March 
2010). 
42Steve Wright, 'The ECHELON Trail: An Illegal Vision.' Surveillance and Society, 3/2/3,  
<http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/journal.htm>, 2005, (accessed 22 March 2010). 
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of geographical or spatial presence.43 
SIGINT does have a small number of notable, ‘iconic’ sites in the British landscape; 
RAF Menwith Hill, for instance, with its conspicuous scattering of white radomes, is 
run by the US National Security Agency (NSA) as part of the UK-USA Security 
Agreement.44 This peculiarly organic-looking facility seems to sprout new fungoid 
growths with each passing year, and at the last count there were over 25 white 
geodesic radomes hiding a variety of radars and antennas. RAF Feltwell in Norfolk 
has also been linked to various SIGINT activities but is principally known for its 
previous function as an outpost of the USAF's 5th Space Surveillance Squadron 
(5SSS) which tracked the physical location of satellites orbiting the Earth. Figure 2.4 
shows the US military soldiers at Feltwell on the 4th of July, a day which annually 
transforms 137 hectares of East Anglia into a place of American celebration and 
independence. Behind the servicemen on the fire truck three radomes can be seen, 
each housing a Deep Space Tracking System (DSTS) or a Low Altitude Space 
Surveillance (LASS) system, technologies whose exact function is still very much 
open to speculation. 
                                                
43 David Murakami Wood (ed), 'A Report on the Surveillance Society: for the Information 
Commissioner by the Surveillance Studies Network', Surveillance Studies Network, 
<http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_Surveillance_society_full_report_final.pdf>, 2006 
(accessed 22 March 2010). 
44 RAF Menwith Hill and the UK/USA Security Agreement is often variously connected to the 
global eavesdropping system known as Echelon.  According to the Scientific and 
Technological Options Assessment programme (STOA) of the European Parliament, ‘within 
Europe, all e-mail, telephone and fax communications are routinely intercepted by the 
United State National Security Agency, transferring all target information from the European 
mainland via the strategic hub of London, and then by satellite to Fort Meade in Maryland via 
the crucial hub at Menwith Hill in the North Yorkshire moors in the UK’. See Steve Wright, 
‘An Appraisal for Technologies of Political Control, European Parliament Directorate General 
for Research (Dir. B) STOA Programme, Luxembourg, 1998’, in; Paul Todd and Jonathan 
Bloch, Global intelligence: the world's secret services today, London: Zed, 2003, p.45. 
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Figure 2.4. RAF Feltwell, Norfolk, UK. American Soldiers stand in front of three space 
surveillance radar domes. Photograph: Matthew Flintham. 
 
The continued use of British land for US training and operations is a reflection of the 
close strategic relationship between UK and US governments. The long history of 
SIGINT, which reached fruition during the Second World War and continues to this 
day, is one which sometimes runs contrary to Britain’s alliances with Europe and 
the EU. Martin Rudner argues that SIGINT is at the heart of US/UK intelligence-
sharing, and as such pulls the UK away from a closer association with the EU, 
leading to competing and adversarial intelligence communities.45 In this sense, the 
UK continues to be torn between its alliance with the US and that of ‘Old Europe’, 
as US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pejoratively described those 
members of the EU (principally France and Germany) that did not wish to follow it 
into Iraq. 
 
The Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ is currently based on the assumption that 
‘in all but minor affairs, little can be accomplished [by the UK] without help from the 
                                                
45 Martin Rudner, 'Britain Betwixt and Between: UK SIGINT Alliance Strategy's Transatlantic 
and European Connections', Intelligence and National Security, Vol.19, issue 4, 2004. 
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Americans, who will participate only if they lead’.46 This admission by Defence 
Secretary Geoff Hoon in 2003 reflected the Blair government’s desire to maintain an 
active and interventionist foreign policy despite limited economic means. Today, 
there seem to be signs of a change in attitude, a realisation of sorts, that the UK’s 
military ambition ought to be balanced against its immense national debt and a 
future of economic austerity. 
 
2.6 . Bridg ing the geographies o f train ing and confl ict 
The direct links between the domestic British landscape and military missions 
around the world has changed considerably since the end of the Cold War. Britain’s 
national defensive posture is no longer focused exclusively on the Soviet Bloc 
states. Russia remains an erratic and volatile influence, but the balance of 
international power has pitched sharply in favour of the USA, and states such as 
China, India and Brazil are economically and militarily ascendant. The residual 
effects of September 11th 2001 and the rise in Islamic militancy has led many world 
powers to recalibrate their national security strategies and their geopolitical 
affiliations.  
 
For Britain, the most significant deployments in recent years have been in 
Afghanistan as part of the UN authorised, NATO led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), and in Iraq as part of the Coalition Force authorised under 
UN Security Council Resolution 1546. Afghanistan continues to place considerable 
strain on the military establishment and successive British governments. British 
service fatalities for the ongoing operation in Afghanistan reached 261 in early 2010 
and the number of personnel wounded in action stands at 1,126. According to the 
lowest credible estimates, the number of civilians killed during the conflict stands at 
8,309 (as of February 2010).47 The British military mission in Iraq officially ended in 
April 2009 with a total of 179 UK service personnel killed in action, and for the 
period between January 2003 and July 2009 the total wounded reached 315.48 At 
the time of writing (April 2010), documented civilian deaths from violence in Iraq are 
                                                
46 Michael Hancock, ‘Transatlantic security challenges’, European Security and Defence 
Assembly, December 2007, 
<http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/cr/2007/cr07.php>, 
(accessed 9 June 2010). 
47 ‘Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq’, Unknown News,  
<http://www.unknownnews.net/casualties.html>, (accessed 2 March 2010). 
48 Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA), Ministry of Defence, 2010. 
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between 95,822–104,529 (minimum and maximum estimates by Iraq Body 
Count).49 According to the Human Security Report Project, the financial cost for the 
UK of both conflicts for 2009-10 alone, is in the region of £4.37bn.50 Other sources 
put the total cost of both wars (for the period 2001-09) at £14bn.51  
 
However tragic and highly contentious these wars may be, they sometimes seem 
far removed from everyday live in the UK. Cultural difference and geographical 
distance can easily become obstacles to understanding the very real connections 
between the British landscape and military operations abroad. Zones of conflict and 
natural disaster such Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti are points of convergence for 
military personnel and equipment from countries around the World. A continuous 
supply chain feeds these wars and relief efforts, connecting the domestic 
landscapes of training and defence to these places of danger, violence and faltering 
security. According to a National Audit Office report, Operation Telic in Iraq required 
‘the deployment of significant military capabilities from all three armed services 
including some 46,000 personnel, 19 warships, 14 Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels, 
15,000 vehicles, 115 fixed-wing aircraft and nearly 100 helicopters’.52 This initial 
mass-mobilisation would be supported by an almost constant exchange of troops 
and equipment via ‘air bridges’ between RAF Lyneham and Brize Norton in the UK 
and Baghdad International Airport. The same stations also served the concurrent 
and rapidly escalating conflict in Afghanistan with huge C-17 and C-130 transporter 
planes making several journeys to Kandahar Airport every week. Sometimes fast 
jets heading to the war zones from bases in the UK would be accompanied by 
Tristar air-to-air refueling tankers from Brize Norton. USAF B-52 bombers flew from 
RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire leading the ‘shock and awe’ barrage of Baghdad in 
2003. America’s desire to spread democracy in the Middle East also saw RAF 
Fairford becoming a forward base for B-2 stealth bombers - but not before a multi-
million dollar refit of the entire aerodrome including new sunken fuel bowsers, an air-
                                                
49 ‘Documented civilian deaths from violence’, Iraq Body Count (IBC),  
<http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>, (accessed 2 March 2010). 
50 ‘Britain's War Costs In Iraq And Afghanistan Triple’, Afghanistan Conflict Monitor,  
<http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2009/07/british-troops-expand-major-afghan-
operation-.html>, (accessed 2 March 2010). 
51 Richard Norton-Taylor, 'UK military costs in Afghanistan and Iraq soar to £4.5bn', 
Guardian, Thursday 12 February 2009. 
52 'Operation TELIC - United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq', National Audit Office, The 
Stationary Office, December 2003, p.1. 
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conditioned hangar and a Stealth Coating Dock.53 The B-2’s have since left Fairford, 
perhaps because the once imminent plans to remove Iran’s nuclear capabilities 
have receded, if only slightly. 
 
The transporter planes that carry troops and cargo to war zones are also charged 
with the grim task of bringing back the bodies of British soldiers killed in action. RAF 
Lyneham has become the point of repatriation for these soldiers and the beginning 
of a journey across a new landscape of mourning. From Lyneham, a funeral cortege 
proceeds down the A3102 and through the market town of Wootton Bassett and 
on to the John Radcliffe Hospital in Oxford for inspection by the defence coroner. 
Only then are the bodies released to the families of the deceased. For nearly three 
years the people of Wootton Bassett have lined the streets to pay their respects to 
the fallen soldiers but more recently the town has become a place of apparent ‘grief 
tourism’ and the focus of a much broader debate about the respect due or owed to 
the armed services.54 Media trucks and camera crews now fill the streets on ‘repat’ 
days along with people from all over country mirroring what some have called the 
‘Diana’ effect; a disproportionate outpouring of grief that has its roots in the 
complexities of the British national character. It is almost as if the British media’s 
appetite for stories of grief and stoic patriotism engendered by the conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan have been distilled into one manageable location. The events have 
also been perceived both as a counterpoint to the apparent rise of British Islamic 
extremism and a public apathy towards the plight of soldiers fighting abroad. 
Curiously, the Wootton Bassett phenomenon would never have occurred had it not 
been for the diversion of repatriation flights to RAF Lyneham after the runway at 
Brize Norton was closed briefly in 2007 for resurfacing.  
 
2.7 . Defence and the sovere ign terr ito ry  
Despite the gradual switch from a defence posture to a more expeditionary, 
interventionist policy, the armed services are still actively required to protect against 
national invasion. The very act of training is perceived as a form of defence: the 
                                                
53 Alan Turnbull’s recent analysis of RAF Fairford includes accessing planning application 
documents  from Cotswold District Council and close aerial photography of the site. See, 
‘RAF Welford and RAF Fairford – its new B-2 Stealth Bomber role’, Secret Bases,  
<http://www.secret-bases.co.uk/secret4.htm>, (accessed 24 March 2010). 
54 Will Pavia, ‘Wootton Bassett fears being in front line of ‘grief tourism’’, The Times, 29th 
July 2009. 
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obvious displays of simulated warfare and military might are considered as tacit 
forms of deterrence. Major training exercises are regularly carried out at specified 
zones in UK waters, particularly in the North Sea (East Coast SXA), the Hebrides 
(West Coast SXA) and Cape Wrath. RAF fast jets fly hundreds of sorties a year 
across the low fly zones of the UK and the Air Tactics Areas around the coasts. 
These conspicuous displays of power are complemented by ASACS, which 
monitors airspace for incursion and provides an early warning system for the UK 
territory. ASACS also controls the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) force; a squadron of 
Typhoons from RAF Coningsby in Lincolnshire and Tornados from RAF Leuchars in 
Fife – all of which are on-call 24 hours a day and can be deployed in minutes. The 
QRA force was scrambled 20 times during 2009 to intercept Russian aircraft in or 
near UK airspace.55 ‘Incursions’ by Tupolev TU-160 bombers are increasing in 
number and generally coincide with Russian training exercises and missile tests in 
the North Sea and Arctic Ocean. These incidents are also seen as an expression of 
escalating diplomatic tensions between Russia and the UK following the poisoning 
of ex-Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko in London in November 2006. These 
apparent incursions highlight the ambiguous nature of training exercises and their 
function as potential gestures of intimidation. They also prove that the remote, 
invisible boundaries of state territory can often be the focus of sustained tension 
and antagonism between nations. Appendix 2.2 shows how Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS) aircraft are predominantly deployed around northern 
sovereign airspace. 
 
2.8 . The Brit ish nuclear  capabi l i ty 
The UK is one of nine nations known or thought to possess nuclear weapons along 
with Russia, USA, China, France, North Korea, Pakistan, India and Israel. Whilst the 
exact number of warheads in the British arsenal has not been disclosed, SIPRI puts 
the figure in the region of 185 (160 operationally available at any one time).56 Having 
dispensed with its ground and air-launched systems during the last two decades 
the UK now has a single delivery system: four Vanguard class, nuclear powered 
submarines equipped to carry nuclear weapons, all based at HMNB Clyde, 40km 
(25 miles) west of Glasgow, Scotland. At least one submarine is deployed at all 
                                                
55 Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Cold War Echo - RAF Scrambles to Intercept Russians', 
Guardian, Thursday 25 March 2009. 
56 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security, OUP, 2009, p.359. 
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times as part of a posture known as Continuous At Sea Deterrence. The weapons 
themselves are Trident II (D-5) Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), 58 of 
which are leased from the US under a system of ‘mingled asset ownership’ which 
are; 
 
[…] randomly selected from the stockpile at the US Navy’s Trident facility in 
Kings Bay, Georgia, and loaded onto British submarines. The Submarines 
then go to the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport, Scotland, where 
the missiles are fitted with warheads designed and manufactured at the 
Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), Aldermaston, England.57  
 
A secretive institution, the AWE is located at two sites in Berkshire: AWE Burghfield 
(91 ha) where the nuclear warheads are assembled and maintained, and the 
headquarters at AWE Aldermaston (303 ha), a sophisticated research and 
development facility which has been the focus for a sustained campaign against 
nuclear weapons. AWE employs around 4,500 staff and 2,000 contractors and is 
managed by AWE Management Limited (AWE ML), a consortium of three equal 
shareholders: Serco, Jacobs Engineering Group and Lockheed Martin.  
 
For political and economic reasons the British government is currently under 
sustained pressure to rethink its nuclear strategy. In its 2009 yearbook, SIPRI refers 
to a letter in The Times newspaper in which three senior military figures not only 
challenge the need for a nuclear deterrent but question its current validity as a 
supposedly ‘independent’ capability which, in fact, relies on the USA ‘for the 
provision and regular servicing of the D5 missiles’.58 Further criticism surrounds 
AWE ML and the fact that two American corporations, Jacobs and Lockheed 
Martin, ‘now own two-thirds of the UK’s sole nuclear weapons laboratory which has 
implications for the independence of the UK’s nuclear deterrent’.59 In this respect, 
the Anglo-American relationship reaches to the very heart of the UK’s military 
capability and has been accused of undermining the very foundations of the 
                                                
57 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.359. 
58 Lord Bramall (Field Marshal), Lord Ramsbotham (Gen.) and Beach, H. (Gen.), 'UK does 
not need a nuclear deterrent', Letter, The Times, 16 Jan. 2009. 
59 Stephen Jones, Recent developments at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, House of 
Commons Note, 24 March 2009), p.13 
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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in which technology sharing between nations is not 
permitted.60 The privatisation of nuclear weapons production in the UK to American 
corporations (a process which bypassed parliamentary debate) continues a tradition 
of secrecy and ‘cloak and dagger’ politics. The process by which the UK struggles 
to justify and pay for its flagging nuclear capability now resembles nothing less that 
a fictional narrative, a satire in which the control of a country’s deadliest weapons 
are handed to a foreign consortium in the name of efficiency and rationalisation. The 
MoD claims to hold a ‘special share’ which will maintain and protect the UK’s 
strategic interests and adds that ‘It is the UK government, not AWE, that sets the 
UK's nuclear policy. UK sovereign interests remain protected at all times, as does 
the independence of the UK deterrent. The safe operation of AWE will remain 
unaffected by the sale’.61 The nature of this ‘special share’ remains a mystery and 
the British government may find its strategic interests being eroded or defined by 
US corporate interests.  
 
2.9 . Strateg ies, reviews and papers 
This chapter has outlined some of the key aspects of the British military capability 
as it stands at the beginning of 2010. All these factors (and many others) impact on 
the geographies of the defence estate, the domestic habitat of the British armed 
services. The next Strategic Defence Review (SDR), scheduled for 2010, will no 
doubt include recommendations for changes in the size or arrangement of the 
defence estate.62 These are likely to include a continuation of the ‘larger, fewer sites’ 
ethos described above, but this is unlikely to mean that less land will be used for 
training given the recent dependence on infantry-based strategies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. If the SDR of 1998 set out the major procurement projects for the 
future (super-carriers, Typhoon Eurofighter jets, etc.) and the shift towards an 
expeditionary posture for the 21st century, the Defence White Paper of 2003 was a 
shocked response to the instabilities caused by global terrorism and the events of 
11 September 2001 in particular. The latter also outlined major strategies for 
                                                
60 Ben Russell, 'Secret nuclear sell-off storm', The Independent, Saturday, 20 December 
2008. 
61 Stephen Jones, Recent developments at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, p.14. 
62 The last Strategic Defence Review, written in 1998, mentioned a number of major building 
sales since 1990 totalling £700m and identified a number of likely sales worth a further 
£700m. However, the review could not see any scope for reduction in training estate land. 
See, Strategic Defence Review: Modern forces for a modern world, Ministry of Defence, July 
1998.  
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streamlining the defence estate including the Core Site Rationalisation Initiative.63 
But it was the Defence Training Review (DTR) of 2001 that began the most 
comprehensive rationalisation and integration of the defence estate since the end of 
the Cold War. This was in response to the surprising admission that the ‘training 
estate, despite earlier rationalisations, is still too large’,64 and that ‘Site running costs 
typically represent about 40-50% of the total costs of a training establishment’.65 
We can assume from this that the built environment of the defence estate is more 
costly to run than MoD-owned land and training ranges. In this respect there is 
actually very little impetus to reduce defence land, particularly when it can be a 
source of rent revenue from agriculture or industry. Hindsight has shown us that the 
defence estate may well have been too big but the military has since shown little 
inclination to reduce the total area of MoD-owned land.  
 
The rationalisation programme outlined in the DTR of 2001 barely hints at the scale 
of privatisation planned for the defence training sector – although it does suggest 
that training will become a ‘customer driven process’. Later the programme will be 
split into two packages under a system of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and 
Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) worth £11bn. Package 1 (training for 
communications, engineering and information systems) will gather a number of 
existing military educational institutions in one site, a new Defence Technical College 
at St Athan in Wales. Package 2 (training for Personnel Administration, Logistics, 
Police and Guarding, Security, Languages, Intelligence and Photography) has, at 
the time of writing, been unable to find private sector bidders for the contract and 
has therefore stalled. The effectiveness of PPPs, PFIs and privatisation on the 
defence estate will be addressed in Chapters 8, 9 and 10. 
 
2.10. Conclusions 
If there is currently a sense in which the military are pulled in so many directions by 
different global commitments and competing alliances, there is also a feeling that 
the defence estate is the home, the geographical bedrock of the military institution. 
Over the last two decades the MoD has adjusted to change by following the logic of 
                                                
63 Defence White Paper: Delivering Security in a Changing World, Ministry of Defence, The 
Stationary Office, December 2003, p.16. 
64 Modernising Defence Training: Report of the Defence Training Review, Ministry of Defence 
2001, p.4. 
65 Ibid., p.34. 
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laissez-faire economics strategies and by embracing the private sector, a process 
which has subtly changed the militarised landscape and nature of military space 
itself. What follows is an examination of that transformation: the conservative military 
institution that was believed to be so integral to the British cultural landscape has 
become a ‘capability’, one that now reveres digital and social networks, remote 
technologies and a strives for ‘total situational awareness’. Above all, however, it 
has become something that covets the apparent dynamism of the corporate sector. 
To assess the effectiveness and the side-effects of this transformation it is 
necessary to choose a beginning. The following chapter will therefore assess the 
development of the defence estate throughout the 19th and 20th centuries as military 
regiments embed themselves in the landscape, deriving their identities from places 
and regions, and enclosing wider and wider parts of the landscape for their own 
purposes. 
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          Figure 3.1. World War Two air traffic control tower. 
          RAF West Raynham, Norfolk. Photograph: M. Flintham 
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3.1 . Introduction 
A walk in the British countryside can reveal a high concentration of military detritus, 
so much, in fact, that the landscape sometimes appears to have been materially 
forged in conflict. The processes by which we choose to erase or spare these 
vestiges of war and defence often seems arbitrary, when so many seem to be of 
obvious historical importance but do not fit into the narrow parameters of ‘heritage’. 
There are many more ruins from the First, Second and Cold wars than can possibly 
be spared. There is, however, a strong argument for documenting as much as 
possible as quickly as possible. The cataloguing of over 20,000 military sites across 
the UK by the Defence of Britain Project, for instance, records a period in which ‘11 
million acres (20% of the total land surface of Great Britain) was under some form of 
military control’ and that there was ‘a ‘totality of defence’ over the entire 
landscape’1 Already, most of these temporary and hastily constructed defences 
have disappeared, quite understandably removed, torn down or ploughed back into 
the land. Recording their remnants, however, or the memories of those who used 
them is essential to understanding a landscape whose character during the 20th 
century was fluid, temporary, and unquestionably more militarised than it is today.  
 
There is also a case for understanding the incremental preparation for war in peace 
time, since the transformation of the British landscape during the 20th century has 
much more to do with military training and passive defence than is readily accepted. 
Defence, in this sense, is still a productive process which alters and shapes the 
environment in ways not dissimilar to industrialisation, urbanisation and intensive 
agricultural cultivation. However, it is a form of production determined, in part, by 
functional necessity and a ‘violence sometimes latent, or preparing to explode’.2 
The residual effect of warfare has also created a permanently militarised training 
environment, a fragmented but sizable collection of land, buildings and holdings 
scattered across the UK, known today as the defence estate. The purpose of this 
chapter then is to trace the development of the defence estate, both in war and in 
peace. Rather than embark on a comprehensive, acre-by-acre history of the British 
defence estate (an endeavour completed so thoroughly by John Child and whose 
                                                
1 For a comprehensive archaeological survey of militarised sites from the 20th century see, 
Defence of Britain Project, Council for British Archaeology, 
<http://www.britarch.ac.uk/cba/projects/dob/>, (accessed 20 May 2010). 
2 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p. 227. 
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work will be referred to throughout), this chapter will study three key themes or 
spatial types: the barracking system as a way of strategically placing and 
segregating troops; the extensive use of land for training; and the use of airspace 
both as a vertical projection of sovereign territory and as a way of segregating 
military activity in peace time. These themes are related and inseparably connected 
but it is useful to identify how each influences the other and why. This chapter will 
therefore build a picture of an estate that is shaped by warfare but also by an 
almost constant preparation for war.  
 
3.2 . Camps and barracks 
AD 43 was the year the British Isles were first inscribed by the rectilinear enclosure, 
the year when the circular fort was first challenged by the square camp. The four 
hundred year occupation of the British Isles by the Roman Empire was driven by the 
logic of territorial expansion, the acquisition of private property and the exploitation 
of local resources by a force that was transparently militaristic in its appearance, 
methods and bureaucratic structure. Its arrival also signalled the beginning of a new 
type of warfare, one that was brutally effective and reliant on highly organised 
standing armies and a strategy of establishing fortified linear frontiers. The Romans 
also brought exotic technologies which, in the short term, were highly effective 
against an adversary that was used to nothing more sophisticated than a sword, 
arrow or slingshot. The incorporation of artillery weapons such as the ballista 
(crossbow) and onager (catapult) with tried-and-tested strategies into siege warfare 
had devastating consequences for the oval Iron Age palisade enclosure. By 
contrast the Roman military enclosures (castrum) that began appearing across the 
iron-age landscape were rectilinear in shape with timber walls and could be thrown 
up in a matter of hours if need be.3 
 
Several discernable types of Roman military enclosure have been identified. 
Whether the enclosure has been classified as a fortlet, housing just a small number 
of men, a temporary marching camp, a five to ten acre auxiliary garrison fortress or 
a fifty acre legionary fortress, all conformed in most respects to a tried and tested 
                                                
3 The term castra (hence castle, castillo, chateaux, etcetera), has its origin in primitive Latin, 
from kastrum meaning both to ‘cut’ and ‘separate’ (hence, castrate), and ‘entrench’ or 
‘fortify’. This etymological lineage is the source of place names ending in –caster or -chester 
found in the English language. The sheer proliferation of such places in the United Kingdom 
is a testament to the impact of the Roman militarised landscape on the English language.  
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template: all would be defined by a stone or timber-stake palisade and surrounded 
by one or more V-shaped ditches. Larger forts had a gated entrance at each side 
while smaller ones tended to only have only one or two. The logic of maintaining a 
defensive presence seems at first to be undermined by the incorporation of multiple 
entrances into the fort perimeter wall, but as Williams suggests, the Roman army 
was essentially an offensive, not defensive force and would therefore have placed 
more importance on the need to deploy troops quickly than to establishing a 
restrictive siege-proof enclosure.4  
 
Again, in contrast to the familial arrangement of buildings within the indigenous hill-
forts and camps (which would have developed over the course of numerous 
generations), the internal plan of Roman forts and camps followed a formulaic 
pattern: in the middle third of the site was the principia which housed the officers 
and functioned as a headquarters. In this area, depending on the size of the fort, 
there might also be a workshop, hospital, granary, bathhouse and storerooms. The 
front and rear parts of the fort, known as the praetentura and retentura, housed 
rows of vertically aligned barracks for troops. By contrast, the round or oval forts of 
the indigenous Britons were designed to protect communities of loosely connected 
families. The Roman fort was defined for one purpose: offensive warfare. 
 
Although the systematised methods of Roman warfare were largely abandoned by 
the Britons, Anglo-Saxons and Vikings, they re-emerged during the Enlightenment 
as a paradigm, ‘as the ideal schema for discipline’.5 The appearance of the  barrack 
as part of the martial apparatus in the seventeenth and eighteenth century was one 
example of a recourse to the ordered spaces and structures of classical antiquity, 
the embodiment of power and control in the built environment. Prior to this, 
however, the fashioning of the nation state under the Tudors saw a 
conceptualisation of the military as an essentially national capability but one which 
required subdividing into distinct functional types. Under Henry VIII, the combined 
effects of a prolonged invasion crisis and the evolution of the Navy as a military 
                                                
4 Geoffrey Williams, Stronghold Britain, Stroud: Sutton, 1999, p.59. This fits in with 
archaeological speculation that many Roman forts were either drawn-down, to use a 
modern phrase, or abandoned once a region had been stabilised and\or the local 
population had become sufficiently sympathetic to the Roman campaign. Troop units could 
then be redeployed to other regions or back overseas again.  
5 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, London: Penguin, 1991, p.146. 
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institution led to purpose-built forts and blockhouses for gunners and porters being 
positioned at strategic anchor points along the south coast.6  Existing castles were 
also subdivided and adapted for residential functions. However, ‘the extent of 
accommodation available did not allow anything resembling the common 
perception of a barrack’.7 Although there are references later to semi-permanent 
accommodation for soldiers during the Civil Wars,8 the barrack as a recognisable 
architectural form appeared with the disbandment of the New Model Army and the 
establishment of a core standing army under Charles II. An initial wave of barrack 
building following a programme of fortification at the major naval ports of Tilbury, 
Sheerness, Portsmouth and Plymouth was overseen by the Ordnance Office under 
Dutch Chief Engineer, Sir Bernard de Gomme. Considered by many to be the 
greatest military engineer of the seventeenth century, de Gomme standardised 
ordnance building types, basing barrack designs on the military unit – a company of 
six or more men. There was still a constitutional and public antipathy towards the 
formation of a large standing army and their accommodation in purpose-built 
barracks. As a consequence barrack building was still not widespread in England 
despite a uniform growth in standing armies across Europe and sporadic hostilities 
with France. The reasons for this were twofold. Firstly, the cost to the Whigs of 
creating permanent accommodation for the army was seen as too great and 
billeting still offered a convenient way of indirectly passing the costs ‘on to publicans 
and the innkeepers (and hence the drinking public)’.9 The second reason was the 
wars in Ireland: Cromwell’s conquest had created a volatile, highly contested and 
heavily militarised environment, one which the English were not keen to replicate on 
the mainland having tasted the efficiency of the New Model army some years 
before. The ‘liberal view of the barracks, as the physical manifestation of a 
potentially autonomous, anti-constitutional armed force’ or as a ‘nest for the 
standing army’,10 also drew comparisons with Roman institutional militarism: 
 
To prevent the executive power from being able to suppress […] armies 
should come from the people […] as was the case with Rome till Marcus 
                                                
6 Keith Feiling, A History of England, Trowbridge: Redwood Burn, 1975, p.368. 
7 James Douet, British Barracks: 1600-1914, London: The Stationary Office, 1998, p.5. 
8 David Papillon, A Practical Abstract of the Arts of Fortification and Assailing, London, 1645, 
ch.10. 
9 Douet, British Barracks: 1600-1914, p. 42. 
10 Ibid., p. 41. 
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new-modelled the legions by enlisting the rabble of Italy […]. The military 
power […] should be composed of natural subjects […] they should live 
intermixed with the people; no separate camps, no barracks, no inland 
fortresses should be allowed.11 
 
The Hanoverian military of the eighteenth century was effectively a police force 
indemnified against prosecution by the Riot Act of 1714 and was frequently called 
on to suppress industrial disputes, popular rebellions and acts of civil disobedience. 
The first Jacobite rebellion in the same year, saw Berwick-upon-Tweed granted a 
defensible barrack designed by Nicholas Hawksmoor and big enough to house over 
900 men as part of a counter-insurgency measure which also included barracks in 
Bernera (Spey); Inversnaid (Sterlingshire); Kiliwhimen (in the Great Glen), and 
Ruthven (Badenock). Fort Augustus, built by General Wade on the banks of Loch 
Ness served as the headquarters for the British Army in the Highlands. The initial 
failure of these forts and barracks to contain Prince Charles Edwards Stuart’s army 
led to the construction of Fort George in the centre of the Highlands, a massive 
bastioned traced complex built on a spit projecting into the Moray Firth near 
Inverness. Capable of housing two battalions of 1,600 men, it was, at the time of 
construction in 1753, the largest fortified works under British control. Fort George is 
still used by the British Army and is home to the Black Watch (the 3rd Battalion the 
Royal Regiment of Scotland). It is also a popular tourist destination and as such is 
one of the few operational military bases open to the public. 
 
Without doubt, the priority for the army and navy in the 18th century was the foreign 
wars in France, the Low Countries, Germany and the colonies, and troops were 
regularly embarking and returning to the main ports of Bristol, Plymouth, 
Portsmouth, the Medway towns, Liverpool and Newcastle-upon-Tyne.  The surging, 
unruly mass of troops around these towns led to the establishment, between 1765-
1781, of major naval barracks, particularly for the newly created Royal Marines. The 
defensive function and strategic importance of these heavily fortified military-
industrial centres was not doubted by the political community but the establishment 
of inland fortresses and barracks was still a contentious issue for many. In London, 
the Ordnance Board began construction of a vast permanent barracks on 
                                                
11 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4th edn (Dublin 1771), cited in 
Douet, British Barracks: 1600-1914, p.41. 
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Woolwich common very close to the dockyard and the arsenal. At over 1,000 feet 
in length it was ‘probably the longest residential building in Georgian Britain where 
‘all the ancillary buildings were at the rear arranged in a grid pattern reminiscent of a 
Roman fort’.12 When the barracks were finally occupied in 1808 there was enough 
room and support for 3,500 men and 1,700 horses. Already by 1796, the newly 
established Barrack Department had constructed forty-two permanent barracks 
around the United Kingdom with a capacity for 16,311 soldiers, and at Colchester, 
Glasgow, Sunderland, Portchester and Chelmsford a series of vast encampments 
were designed to accommodate swelling troops numbers preparing for the 
Napoleonic Wars. 
 
The constant movement of troops around the British Isles was mirrored over the 
Channel in Regency France where ‘the army, the vagabond mass’ was far greater 
in number and presented itself as an urgent social problem that somehow had to be 
contained.13 By 1745 there were barracks in 350 French towns and ‘it was 
estimated that the total capacity of the barracks in 1775 was about 200,000 
men’.14 Political opinion in Britain, however, was still resisting a comprehensive 
national barrack programme until the reign of George III when billeting was 
becoming increasingly unpopular with an impossible burden placed on inns and 
lodging houses across the country. This was compounded in the last decade of the 
century by the revolutionary turmoil in France which was inspiring political 
transformation across Britain and galvanising radical groups towards civil unrest. 
The monarchy and Pitt’s government were concerned that billeted troops would be 
exposed to seditious influence and the contagion of unrest would spread beyond 
the Corresponding Societies of the artisan classes and the manufacturing industries 
to the army itself. Birmingham, Nottingham, and Sheffield all received cavalry 
barracks for three troops each. The largest, however, was saved for Manchester, 
the forge of the industrial revolution. Coventry and Norwich also received policing 
barracks as did Knighsbridge and Hounslow in London, and in 1812, ‘12,000 men 
were stationed between Leicester and York in order to suppress the machine-
breaking Luddites’.15 There is no question that civil unrest was endemic across 
much of the country and that given a slightly different set of social circumstances, 
                                                
12 Trevor May, Military Barracks, Princes Risborough: Shire Books, 2002, p.9. 
13 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.142. 
14 Ibid., p.142. 
15 May, Military Barracks, p.11 
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Britain may have followed France into revolution. Removing the army from seditious 
influences undoubtedly played a role in stabilising the Hanoverian dynasty and its 
governments, but to what degree remains a matter off speculation.16 What is clear 
is that this act not only led to the barrack becoming an accepted part of the urban 
fabric and a physical presence in almost every town and city in the UK, but that it 
also cemented the hitherto precarious relationship between the military and the 
state. It follows then that the possibility of social unrest and the policing of actual 
disturbances during this period is partially responsible for the geographically 
diffused distribution of the armed forces across the British Isles. The barrack 
effectively reinforced the notion of a separate ‘warrior class’, detaching the soldier 
and the military itself from civil society.17 This cultural and spatial differentiation will 
be explored further in Chapter 10. 
 
The imposing architectural style of military barracks is generally overlooked within 
discourses on civil control. Often neoclassical or retrogressive in form they exude an 
oppressive sense of institutional authority or, as is often the case, they are 
completely out of sight behind the high enclosure or beyond the barrier at the 
gatehouse. Like the town hall, museum or hospital, the military barrack quietly 
resides in the register of familiarly imposing municipal buildings. Each of these 
institutions articulates a unique form of state control, and the barrack is no 
exception: within it a harsh educational and reorientation programme is taking place 
every day, one that requires consenting adults to subjugate their minds and bodies 
to the will of the military regime. It prepares the human being for almost 
unimaginable acts of obedience and ultimately for death. Here the architecture of 
military discipline extends from the ‘body-machine complex’ of the soldier to the 
barrack, to the camp, to the garrison town, and somewhat inevitably to the so-
called ‘super garrisons’ of today. 18 
                                                
16 Although, given the brutality of the disciple inside some northern barracks, it is surprising 
that any form of cohesive military identity was formed. For a fuller account see, J. R. 
Dinwiddy, Radicalism and reform in Britain, 1780-1850, London: Hambledon, 1992. 
17 Even as late as 1824, the exact function and value of the barrack and the Barrack 
Department itself was a matter of repeated parliamentary debate. One member reminded 
the house that ‘The barrack system had long ago been decided against, as a novel and 
unconstitutional mode of lodging a standing army. That system was calculated, perhaps, to 
turn out a finer soldier for the parade – a living machine, more likely to pay prompt and 
implicit obedience to his officer […].’ The member also questioned the value of creating ‘a 
mere automaton of a soldier, or perpetuation a system which separates the character of the 
soldier and the citizen’. See, Hansard, HC, vol 10, cc861-5, (09 March 1824). 
18 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.153. 
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Of the 158,630 service personnel stationed in the UK today many are housed in 
single person living accommodation or barracks within military enclosures. Barracks 
are a part of the established military training infrastructure which expanded greatly 
during the 20th century, and as such can be found in almost all major towns and 
cities. Many, however, are close to, or within the boundaries of land used for military 
training.  Catterick, a newly-designated Super Garrison,19 for example, is ‘home to 
18,500 people, housing ten major units and numerous minor formations’,20 and 
provision is being made for a further five major units. Catterick’s nineteen barracks 
form part of a vast regional training complex that encompasses 34 square miles of 
the North Yorkshire Dales and is the HQ for the Army Training Estate North. Project 
SLAM (Single Living Accommodation Modernisation) is a nationwide initiative 
undertaken by Debut Services on behalf of the MoD to create new barracks, 
renovate existing ones and address some of the ‘appalling’ conditions found at 
many of those built in the 1960s and 70s.21 It is part of the current trend towards 
the coalescing of home-based service personnel into expanded camps and super 
garrisons. This reflects the current rationalisation of MoD-owned property and 
military land-use, and is a move away from the 17th and 18th century model of a 
national network of barracks as a measure against civil uprising, border control and 
coastal invasion. While there is little doubt that the barrack evolved stylistically from 
both the Roman fort and Tudor castle, it could also be argued that the strategically 
placed barrack performed a similar symbolic function until well into the nineteenth 
century, as a place emblematic of subjugation or of state power. But is it true to say 
that today, the barrack is a benign presence across the British Landscape? Those 
living in Northern Ireland may have very different perspectives. There the barrack is 
just one element in a complex military infrastructure which, until very recently, 
formed part of an embattled, sectarian environment – or some would say, a war 
                                                
19 For information on Catterick’s status as a Super Garrison see, ‘Richmondshire Local 
Development Framework’, Richmondshire District Council, February 2008, 
<http://www.richmondshire.gov.uk/PDF/Richmond%20and%20Catterick%20Garrison%20
AAP%20Issues%20and%20Options%20consultation.pdf>, (accessed 21 May 2010). 
20 ‘Defence - Fifteenth Report, Single Living Accommodation’, House of Commons Select 
Committee, July 2007, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/535/53502.htm
>, (accessed 21 May 2010). 
21 So far SLAM has produced 6,000 new and 3,800 ‘up-graded’ bed spaces. The 
widespread criticism surrounding military accommodation continues despite the 
improvement of SLAM and a parallel project, CHALLENGER in Northern Ireland. 
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zone. Jonathan Olley’s remarkable series of photographs, Castles of Ulster, show 
police stations and British Army barracks refortified with corrugated steel against 
sporadic attacks by ‘barrack-buster’ mortars and bristling with improvised 
defences, their elevated watchtowers scrutinising communities below with obvious 
menace.22  Olley also captures images of the British Army hilltop surveillance 
fortress on Courtney Mountain and Sugerloaf Hill in South Armagh (see Figure 3.2). 
They show a recourse to the basic principle of using elevated land to establish a 
privileged position from which to survey the landscape for approaching enemies, 
but also to project a symbolic or dominant presence over the surrounding 
communities.23 Northern Ireland may be experiencing its first tentative peace for 
many decades but its history of bitter sectarianism and bloody street fighting was 
akin to urban warfare. This fact alone serves to emphasise that the functions and 
symbolic values ascribed to military barracks are not the same across the British 
Isles but vary dramatically from place to place. The public perception of the British 
armed services and their nationwide network of barracks is not fixed. It is 
determined by local specificities and by the constantly changing political and social 
climate. What for some is a reassuring image of tradition, heritage and social 
stability, for others is a bitter reminder of social oppression and violent subjugation.  
 
                                
Figure 3.2. Romeo One One watchtower, Courtney  
Mountain, Lislea, South Armagh, Northern Ireland, UK. 
Copyright Jonathan Olley, 2007. 
 
 
                                                
22 Jonathan Olley and David Brett, Castles of Ulster, Belfast: Factotum, 2007. 
23 Eyal Weizman shows clearly that this principle is still very much in use as he charts the 
recent surge of Israeli hill-top settlements in the West Bank. See, Eyal Weizman, Hollow 
Land, London: Verso, 2007. 
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3.3 . Land for  t raining 
The idea of setting land aside for military training is not an invention of the modern 
era. The Romans, once again, established large areas of land for equestrian training 
and built complex fortifications to simulate siege warfare. It was the modern era, 
however, that saw the combined use of the rifled cannon and the exploding 
projectile by armies inflated to enormous sizes by mass-conscription – all of which 
had to be accommodated somewhere. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 
there were 204,000 men serving in the army but the ‘distaste of the British public 
for their army was so great that arguments about crops were sufficient to prevent 
the army purchasing or renting land for training’.24 However, drill training was 
generally conducted on parade grounds and fields around barracks were used for 
musket practice. These improvisations and piecemeal acquisitions of land were 
done in apparent ignorance of the ‘profound military changes in Europe’, where the 
German, Austrian and Russian armies were all acquiring permanent land for artillery 
training and troop manoeuvres.25 Nevertheless, it was during the Victorian era that 
the link between the building of military barracks and a dedicated training estate 
became established in the UK: the realisation by British commanders that the army 
needed to train for warfare in brigades and divisions rather than collections of 
battalions was paired with the need to freely communicate troops from barracks to 
training areas.  In 1854, 10,000 acres (4000 hectares) of land were acquired at a 
strategic point between London and the Channel ports, and over the next two 
decades the village of Aldershot became an army garrison town with brick huts for 
20,000 men and sandy heathland on which to train.26 It also ‘stood conveniently on 
the flank of any advance upon the capital from all points east of the Isle of Wight’.27 
The Aldershot complex was also conveniently close to the Royal Military Academy 
at Sandhurst, the Staff College at Camberley and a number of outlying rifle ranges. 
Land was also purchased around Colchester and new wooden barracks for 5,000 
men were built on Ordnance Field, while Middlewick Farm to the south was used for 
rifle practice. Both Aldershot (today known as the ‘Home of the British Army’) and 
Colchester remain primary garrison towns for the Army. The Crimean War also saw 
a permanent training camp established at Curragh, County Kildare for 5,000 men.  
But as Childs points, while France, Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary had vast 
                                                
24 Childs, The Military Use of Land, p.115. 
25 Ibid., p.115. 
26 May, Military Barracks, p.14. 
27 Childs, The Military Use of Land, p.117. 
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tracts of land for military manoeuvres, in Britain, ‘available space was confined to 
the small amount of land owned by the government, lent as a favour or rented from 
private owners’.28 
 
Despite fierce resistance from landowners and farmers, training rights to 207,199 
ha of Salisbury plain were purchased by the War Office between 1871-72 and in 
1897 they  bought 16,187 ha to the east and west of the river Avon. This initial act 
and the incremental purchase of land in and around the County of Wiltshire will be 
studied in greater detail in the Chapter 6 on Salisbury Plain. However, it remains to 
be said that this process was greatly facilitated by the Military Land Act of 1892 
which enabled not only the purchase of land but the creation of bylaws to restrict 
access to designated areas under pain of prosecution.29 Permanent camps were 
built at Bulford and Tidworth in 1902, an artillery range at Durrington expanded to 
become Larkhill Camp in 1920 and became the home of the School of Artillery.  
 
In 1902, the war office owned, or held on long-leases, 115,000 acres 
[46,538 ha]. By 1911, the estate had increased to 155,400 acres [62,888 
ha]. On the eve of the First World War, the defence estate was thus relatively 
small consisting principally of the holdings at Aldershot (22,000 acres) 
[8,903 ha], Salisbury  Plain (40,000 acres) [16,187 ha], Shoeburyness 
(20,000 acres of foreshore) [8,093 ha], Stobs in the Borders, Trawsfynydd 
and Rhayadr in Wales, Hythe, Redesdale [which became known as the 
Otterburn Training Area] (20,000 acres purchased in 1910) [8,093ha], 
Dartmoor (26,000 acres) [10,521 ha], barracks and depots sufficient to 
accommodate 160,000 men, and 160 rifle ranges.30 
 
Whether Childs’ detailed research points to a ‘relatively small’ estate during this 
period for training or not, the fact remains that the Military Lands Act of 1892 
empowered the War Office to massively extend their geographical reach over a 
twenty year period. The subsequent Military Manoeuvres Act of 1897 and the 
Defence of the Realm Acts of 1914 and 1916 consolidated the War Office’s ability 
                                                
28 Childs, The Military Use of Land, p.118. 
29 The Military Lands Act, 1892. 
30 Childs, The Military Use of Land, p.192 
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to requisition land for up to two years after any hostilities.31 This was apparently for 
the purpose of rectifying damage done to land during military use. However, it also 
meant that land could be compulsorily purchased up to three years after the initial 
requisition. These Acts provided the basis for the creation of a new kind of space, 
one that could be taken by compulsory purchase and defended, if necessary, from 
intruders. 
 
The First World War saw the defence estate rapidly expand to accommodate a 
million volunteers and conscripted soldiers, though most were trained overseas 
near the channel ports of France or behind the frontline itself.  By 1920, however, 
the War office had returned most buildings and land requisitioned for training, but 
eighteen years later during the lead-up to the Second World War they once again 
began purchasing vast tracts of land. By 1938 they owned or had training rights to 
0.45% (101,980 ha) of the land area of the UK. This was the moment before the 
tipping point of mass land requisition by the War Office, when 20% of the land area 
would eventually be used for training or defence, when the country itself became a 
fortress under siege by the Nazis. The urgent process by which land and coastal 
water where appropriated was enabled by the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 
1939.32 The extent of military land acquisition is well documented but, suffice to say, 
the ‘principal requirement for land was in the creation of battle areas and battle 
schools, usually about 8.5 kilometres square, camps for accommodation, and firing 
ranges’.33 The other unprecedented acquisition of land was airfields for the RAF and 
the USAAF which will be considered later in this chapter 
 
Stanford Battle Training Area (11,331 ha) was established in 1942 on the Breckland 
fringes of Thetford Forest primarily for Army Infantry combat and rifle practice, but 
the same area had been used for military training as early as 1911 when 30,000 
troops were engaged in manoeuvres and housed in temporary bell tents. The 
annexation of the villages of Stanford, Tottington, West Tofts and parts of the 
surrounding parishes began with an unequivocal promise from the Commander of 
Home Forces that the tenants would be allowed to return ‘whenever the war was 
                                                
31 Defence of the Realm (Acquisition of Land) Act 1916. 
32 The Emergency Powers Act 1964, (includes both the initial Acts of 1920 and 1939). 
33 Childs, The Military Use of Land, p.194. 
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won’.34 Compulsory purchase of land began immediately after the war and 
landowners were offered just 25 pounds an acre, a rate fixed at 1938, pre-inflation 
prices. Today Stanford Battle Area remains East Anglia’s principle army training 
area. 
 
In 1940, a boggy plateau in Powys, Wales, became another Army training site of 
considerable size. The Sennybridge Army Field Training Centre (now known as 
SENTA), occupies 19,424 ha of Mynydd Epynt plateau and the mountain of 
Mynydd Bwlch-y-groes. Here too villagers and farming communities were displaced 
by compulsory purchase igniting a great deal of resentment against the British Army 
and sparking a number of bitter articles in the Welsh language newspapers.35 Also 
in Wales, the Royal Armoured Corps established Merrion Camp and the 
Castlemartin firing ranges in 1939 on the Pembrokeshire coast. 
 
Perhaps the most poignant and controversial example of military requisition must be 
the village of Tyneham in the Isle of Purbeck, Dorset. In The Village that Died for 
England, Patrick Wright chronicles the lives and protests of the villagers who were 
‘tipped so precipitously out of their valley’ in the winter of 1943 in order that existing 
firing ranges could be extended for D-Day troops training.36 Again we read of 
villagers willing to temporarily relinquish their homes for the war effort only to have 
the early promise of return reneged upon. Childs notes that ‘the subsequent 
requisition and purchase of much of the Isle of Purbeck by the Royal Tank 
Regiment has been described by one author as ‘military occupation at its most 
blatant and arrogant’.37 However, the case of Tyneham also revealed a community 
factionalised by the military requisition of land, one torn between a sense of national 
duty and the vision of landscape corrupted by an alien militarism. 
 
80 miles west in the county of Devon, Dartmoor had been used for army training 
since 1875, and the ranges principle camp, Okehampton was established in 1894 
                                                
34 Leigh Driver and Stephen Whitehorne, The lost villages of England, London: New Holland, 
2006, p.89. 
35 For a comprehensive and moving account of the expropriation of Mynydd Epynt see, 
Herbert Hughes, An uprooted community: a history of Epynt, Llandysul: Gwasg Gomer, 
1998. 
36 Wright, The village that died for England, p.248. 
37 J. H. Bettey, Dorset, Newton Abbot: David and Charles,1974, cited in Childs, The Military 
Use of Land, p.121. 
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followed quickly by a lease of 4,046 ha from the Duchy of Cornwall. In the early 
1900s, 1,395 ha of Willsworthy Manor on the west of the moor was purchased by 
the War Office and later developed to accommodate grenade and field firing ranges 
in addition to permanent buildings and tents. Curiously there is no known evidence 
of army training on the moor during the First World War as there had been on 
Salisbury Plain. Artillery training continued, however, throughout the 1920s and 
‘30s, and as the likelihood of another war increased more buildings appeared 
across the moor including three gas decontamination chambers and troop 
accommodation at Okehampton and Willsworthy Camps. By the end of the Second 
World War ‘the War Office, as the Ministry of Defence […], owned, leased, licensed 
or had requisitioned some 31,617 hectares of the Moor’ for training.38 In 1973 this 
figure was substantially reduced to 13,179 ha in light of Lord Nugent’s review of the 
defence estate, the details of which will be addressed later in this chapter. 
 
In Northumbria, the substantial Redesdale army firing ranges were extended to 
20,234 ha in 1940, making it the largest artillery range in the UK at the time. 
Otterburn Training Area (OTA), as it became known, was now large enough to 
accommodate complex artillery manoeuvres firing into sizable impact zones in the 
centre of the range. Recently the infrastructure of OTA was adapted to 
accommodate the Artillery System 90 (AS90) and the Multi Launch Rocket System 
(MLRS), both of which have a range of over 20 miles. Currently, the military 
occupies approximately a quarter of the Northumberland National Park and has the 
right to use an additional 57,465 ha of Forestry Commission land.  
 
The progressive acquisition of land throughout the twentieth century mirrored the 
increased requirements for training during times of conflict and threat. While this 
may seem obvious, it should be noted that before to the First World War most 
training was conducted abroad prior to battle. Even during the war, much training 
was taking place in the infamous ‘Bull Rings’, the battle training centres at 
Boulogne, Calais, Rouen, Étaples-sur-Mer and Dieppe.39 However, the retention of 
                                                
38 For further information see ‘The Armed Forces on Dartmoor - a Brief History’, Dartmoor 
Training Area,  
<http://www.dartmoor-ranges.co.uk/military_use_3_brief_history.html>, (accessed 27 
September 2009). 
39 For a fictionalised account of the notorious Bull Ring Mutiny at Étaples-sur-Mer, see Henry 
Williamson, Love and the loveless: a soldier's tale, Stroud: Sutton,1997. 
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land for training across Britain, while relatively small before the First World War, 
increased significantly during the conflict and then again before and after the 
Second World War. Most interesting, however, were the issues and protocols 
surrounding the retention of land after these times of a national crisis. The military’s 
ability to retain large areas of land long after the two world wars (and the Cold War) 
was advanced, firstly, by a doctrine built on conjecture: that it is a false economy to 
sell land in case it should be needed at some later date.40 While this was certainly 
not the absolute rule, it undoubtedly contributed to the incremental increase in the 
acquisition of land over the course of the 20th century. Secondly, the return of 
military land to its original owners was impeded by the Requisitioned Land and War 
Works Act of 1945,41 which allowed the state to compulsorily purchase or retain 
land that had been damaged during military training or defence. Much land was 
returned to its original owners and compensation paid for damage caused by 
training – but a great deal was not. By 1950, the landscape of defence, with its 
principal army Battle Training Areas (BTA) and RAF airfields in place, had been 
shaped into the basic form that we recognise today, but not without causing a 
good deal of consternation among land owners and public interest groups. This fact 
was typified by a number of events including the Crichel Down Affair42 and the 
eviction of tenants from the Stanford Battle Training Area, Mynydd Epynt and 
Tyneham, and the numerous individual claims for compensation or the return of 
land and property. If there ever was a ‘grass roots’ antipathy to the military retention 
                                                
40 This doctrine, first propagated by the Conservative Under-Secretary for War, 1903-05 
hinged on the economic threat that if defence lands were sold to save money they would 
only have to be repurchased at higher prices at some point in the future. See Childs, The 
Military Use of Land, pp. 191-92. 
41 Requisitioned Land and War Works Act of 1945, c.43. 
42 Winston Churchill gave a promise in Parliament that 725 acres of land belonging to the 
Critchel House estate would be sold back to its original owners after it was no longer 
needed as a practice bombing range. This promise was not kept - the land was instead 
handed over to the Ministry of Agriculture at a price inflated beyond the reach of the original 
owners and then lease out to tenant farmers. Subsequent ‘accusations of civil service 
cover-up, ministerial corruption and departmental maladministration’ let to a campaign and  
public enquiry known as the ‘Crichel Down Affair’ which resulted in the resignation of the 
Minister of Agriculture, Sir Thomas Dugdale, and the establishment of the ‘Crichel Down 
Rules’ of land requisition and sale.  The ‘rules’ remain vague and challengeable but are in 
place to recognise the ‘moral obligation, consequent on the compulsory nature of the 
original acquisition, to give former owners the pre-emptive right to re-acquire what was 
taken from them. The precise mechanics under which this principle operates, and the 
determination of the price at which the sale occurs are details which require a consistency of 
application and regulatory guidance in order to function fairly and predictably’, Robert 
Gibbard, 'Whose land was it anyway? The Crichel Down Rules and the sale of public land', 
Working Papers in Real Estate & Planning 01/02, Reading University. 
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of land after the Second World War it was probably fired by the fact that the rules 
were clearly written in favour of the state rather than the individual, and the Crichel 
Down Affair served, if only partly, to redress the balance. 
 
Military sites would become more politicised, more visible and yet more hermetic in 
the coming decades as the British public increasingly took to the roads and hills in 
pursuit of something called leisure. Improved mobility and a degree of surplus 
income fed a desire to reengage with the British landscape, a process which may 
well have been obstructed by the numerous military enclosures, checkpoints, 
warning flags and post-war detritus liberally scattered across the country. These 
reminders of warfare, rationing and martial power would have probably been 
unwelcome for a generation nervously looking to the future, and only a few of these 
sites showed any sign of being returned to the public realm.43 
 
It was not until 1971 that a comprehensive review of the defence estate was 
undertaken with a view to returning substantial areas of the defence estate to the 
National Parks or back to private ownership. Lord Nugent of Guilford was charged 
with chairing the Defence Lands Committee, a body convened by Edward Heath’s 
Conservative government to address the concerns that ‘the Ministry [of Defence] 
had ridden roughshod over the concerns of local communities and interest 
groups’.44  The result of Nugent’s audit was the release in 1974 of 13,233 ha across 
the UK, but his recommendation for the transfer of the RAC School of Gunnery at 
Lulworth to Castlemartin in Pembrokeshire was rejected by the MoD. This final point 
had become such an emotive issue for the people of Dorset and so central to the 
debate surrounding the military’s relationship to the environment that Nugent’s aims 
could only really be regarded as half-fulfilled. However, the Committee’s report was 
effective as a way of checking the military’s constant call for more land and 
revealing significant inefficiencies in the use of existing land for training. It was also 
the moment when environmental issues were introduced into the debates 
                                                
43 Childs, The military use of land : a history of the defence estate, p.205. ‘In 1947, the 
Ministry of War had decided to retain 1,027,000 acres, approximately 2% of the land [area 
of the UK] available. Although the number of troops in Britain fell substantially since 1960, 
between 1947 and 1971 the MoD released only 279,200 acres [112,988 ha], principally 
because of the continuing demands imposed by the increasing range of weaponry (i.e. 
guided missiles, artillery rockets) and the loss of training grounds overseas as Britain 
“withdrew from Empire”’.  
44 Ibid., p.205. 
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surrounding the military use of land.45 Whether they liked it or not, the military were 
now responsible for the land which had inadvertently been spared the rigours of 
modern agriculture. In fact, green issues would become the main weapon in the 
military’s arsenal to keep large tracts of land for training. These issues will be 
studied in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
 
The report of the Defence Lands Committee, began a trend of land disposal which, 
by the peak of the Cold War in 1985, had seen a reduction in the total defence 
estate by 29,900 ha. However, Table 3.1 below reveals an alternative trend 
beginning at the same time: the MoD were increasingly acquiring rights and licenses 
to use land for specific periods of time – usually for periods of 5 or 10 years. So by 
1995, the freehold and leasehold land owned by the MoD remained at 1985 levels 
(approximately 240,000 ha) but the Ministry had acquired additional rights to use 
another 122,200 ha of land for training. By 2009, this figure had risen to 133,000 
ha. Since the Nugent report, the defence estate has seen significant reductions in 
RAF stations and airfields, barracks, storage depots, R&D sites and administration 
buildings. Surprisingly, between 1985 and 1996, the army training estate had 
actually increased in size by 96,497 ha or 35%.46 Despite a period of rationalisation 
during the 2000s, the overall size of the defence estate has remained relatively 
static at 1996 levels but the ability to acquire special rights and licences has allowed 
the armed services, particularly the army, to treat land flexibly and bypass the usual 
protocols for acquiring freehold and leaseholds. 
 
 
 
Table 3.1. Figure in thousands of hectares. Source: MoD Defence Statistics incorporating 
additional data from John Childs, The Military Use of Land. 
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46 Childs, The military use of land, p.211. 
Chapter 3. Land, space and transformation in the British defence estate 74 
 
Most significantly, the total area of freehold and leaseholds has remained broadly 
the same for 25 years while rights and licenses have increased by 97,100 ha to 
133,000 ha. The Cold War may be long over and service personnel numbers 
reduced from 314,800 in 1990 to 194,700 in 2009, but, paradoxically, the land 
supposedly required for defence and training continues to increase.47 The increase 
in military land use over this period was, however, masked by factors such as 
improved public access and an apparent willingness by the MoD to engage with 
environmental issues. This new permeability may be in stark contrast to the ‘closed’ 
military estate of the 1970s and 80s but it nevertheless hides a firm grip on the 
British landscape, one that shows no signs of weakening.  
 
3.4 . Air  defence and a irspace. 
The history of warfare has never simply been about land, sea or the projection of 
power across a horizontal plain. It has always incorporated elements of airspace: 
the passage of a projectile across the sky denotes a vertical dimension to warfare 
that is as old the spear, catapult or slingshot. The arc drawn by an artillery shell as it 
passes through space has to be guessed or actively calculated as a parabolic 
trajectory over a horizontal plain. The history of ballistics is, therefore, an increasing 
awareness of the dynamics of space and the play of gravity upon an object. 
Equally, military surveillance has always required elevated positions from which to 
assess territory: establishing promontory watchtowers and forts has been a key 
feature of strategic military behaviour, but it was observation balloons and powered 
flight that finally extended human vision into the skies. Though the sky has always 
held latent possibilities for military activity, it was during the 20th century that warfare 
fully engaged with the sky above.  
 
The landscape of the UK and the design of its cities would be irrevocably altered by 
aerial warfare, and ultimately the sky itself would become as delineated and 
subdivided as the land below. The years between 1908 and 1914 have become 
defined as a period of intense research and development in which the first tentative 
powered flights quickly turned into the mass production of functional, stable aircraft. 
                                                
47 ‘Land Holdings and Buildings’, Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA), 
<http://www.dasa.mod.uk/modintranet/UKDS/UKDS2009/c6/table601.html>, (accessed 9 
June 2010). 
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Huge companies such as, Armstrong-Whitworth, Vickers, Beardmore and Coventry 
Ordnance Works ‘were among the largest employers of manufacturing labour in the 
Edwardian years’,48 and what began in 1908 as HM Balloon Factory in Farnborough 
(Hampshire), quickly transformed into the Royal Aircraft Factory, attracting 
designers, engineers and aviators from around the world. The S.E (Scout 
Experimental) series of biplanes emerged during this period, as did the Sopwith Pup 
and its legendary successor, the Camel. As aircraft production increased during the 
build up to 1914, so did the growth in the number of aerodromes which peaked at 
215 by the end of the war.49 However, Mike Osborne records 400 locations involved 
in military aviation by November 1918.50 Many of these would relate to the 
manufacture and storage of airships such as those at Cardington (Bedfordshire), 
Mullion (Cornwall), Wormwood Scrubs (London), Luce Bay (Galloway), Capel (Kent), 
Barrow-in-Furness (Lancashire), Inchinnan (Glasgow), Longside (Aberdeen), 
Llangefni (Anglesey), Pulham (Norfolk), Polegate (Eastborne) and many other smaller 
support sites. German raids by Zeppelin airships and Gotha bombers required the 
rapid expansion of the Home Defence Scheme and the formation of defence fighter 
squadrons based at new aerodromes along the east coast of Britain, and 
improvised anti-aircraft guns also liberally studded the eastern side of the UK.51 By 
1918, Britain maintained a large aviation industry which now had the technological 
capacity to bomb Berlin ‘with new four-engined Handley Page bombers, and had 
already dropped more than twice the tonnage of bombs that the Germans had 
dropped on Britain in the whole war’. David Edgerton continues, 
 
Here was the shape of the things to come. An air force separate from the two 
traditional services, with an increasing emphasis on the bombing of civilians, a 
continuing association of aviation with right-wing politics and the right-wing 
popular press, and a deep concern on the part of the state with the 
economics of warfare.52 
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The interwar aviation sector detailed in Edgerton’s England and the Aeroplane, is 
one driven by a ‘liberal militarism’ with a technocratic vision of an ‘ideal’ type of 
warfare detached from the apparent barbarism of previous eras. This vision, 
however, would struggle against financial practicalities. A post-war fall in defence 
spending from £766m in 1919–20, to £189m in 1921–22,53 would temper the 
military’s association with the aviation industry - if only briefly.54 During the early 
1920s, the newly formed Royal Air Force (RAF) presided over just 27 active military 
airfields but continued to renovate existing sites and experiment with hanger 
designs. Examples of these can be still be found at Upper Heyford (Oxfordshire), 
Bicester (Oxfordshire), Catfoss (East Yorkshire), Pembroke Dock (South Wales) and 
Abingdon (Oxfordshire). As Child shows, the growth of military and civil aviation 
increased in the interwar years, and clearly accelerated during the rearmament 
years in the 1930s:  
 
In Britain, in 1928, there were no licenced municipal aerodromes: by 1932 
there were 13 with a further 14 planned, plus 68 licensed civilian airfields. 
Three years later, the UK had 60 military and 90 civil airfields. Rearmament 
intended the number of RAF stations to rise to 31 over the succeeding few 
years; in the event, it climbed by nearly 100 and, as the RAF expanded for 
war, it took over a number of civilian airfields. By the end of the first year of 
the Second World War, there were 280 military airfields in the UK, including 
110 civilian airfields which had been requisitioned by the Air Ministry. 
Expansion reached a peak in 1945 when 720 airfields were in existence in 
addition to 145 landing fields and flying boat stations mostly located in the 
southern and eastern counties.55 
 
The total area used as military airfields was, according to R.N.E Blake, in the region 
of 360,000 acres (145,686 ha), almost exactly the total land holdings (including 
rights and licenses issued) of today’s defence estate.56 The astonishing fact that the 
                                                
53 Paul Kennedy, The realities behind diplomacy : background influences on British external 
policy, 1865-1980, London: Fontana, 1981, p.231. 
54 ‘RAF procurement expenditure increased between 1924 and 1932, from £6.9 to £8.7 
million, while in the same period naval and army procurement had decreased’, Edgerton, 
Warfare state: Britain, 1920-1970, p. 43, 
55 Childs, The military use of land : a history of the defence estate, p.148. 
56 R.N.E Blake, 'The Impact of Airfields on the British Landscape', Geographical Journal, Vol. 
135, no. 4, December 1969, pp. 508-28. 
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British landscape could accommodate 720 airfields is matched only by the numbers 
of British, American and allied personnel occupying them. East Anglia alone 
absorbed ‘several hundred thousand of the American service personnel of the 
United States Eighth Air Force, the majority of whom were stationed at over 60 
newly constructed airfields’.57 At the height of what became known as the 
Expansion Period of the RAF estate, a new airfield was opening roughly every three 
days. Each new bomber airfield required approximately; 
 
20 miles (32km) of drains, six miles (9.6km) of water main, four miles (6.4km) 
of sewers, ten miles (16km) of conduit, and another ten miles (16km) of 
road. 4.5 million bricks were used, and 400,000 tonnes of earth had to be 
excavated.58  
 
Rubble was be carried by train from the bombed cities to build runways, and the 
construction of giant aircraft hangers became a familiar site in the landscape. The 
history of this militarised landscape and Expansion Period Britain is one which is 
familiar to a whole generation, and its impact on the development of the British 
landscape is still visible for all to see. Less familiar perhaps is the parallel 
development of airspace as a component of the manufactured landscape, as a 
technology for regulating civil and military aviation. 
 
It is striking that while aviation has had such a profound effect on international 
travel, urban and rural planning, and has changed the fundamental character of 
warfare, airspace itself remains relatively under-researched by the academic 
community, remaining instead, within the province of territorial governance and law. 
The invisible parameters of international aviation have shaped the flows of civilian 
travel and military activity since the first powered manned flight at the turn of the 
20th century. Before this, however, it was Queen Elizabeth who declared in 1580, 
‘the use of sea and air is common to all’. Even she, however, could not envisage 
the explosion of international aviation 350 years later, and the spectre of mass 
destruction that would accompany it. Ironically, it was the British authorities who 
first objected to ‘freedom of the air’ advocated by certain early aviators, by 
                                                
57 Sam Edwards, ‘Ruins, Relics and Restoration: The Afterlife of World War Two American 
Airfields in England, 1945–2005’, in Militarized Landscapes: From Gettysburg to Salisbury 
Plain, eds. Chris Pearson, Peter Coates, Tim Cole, London: Continuum, 2010,  p.211. 
58 Mike Osborne, Defending Britain, p.128. 
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suggesting that ‘the presence of any vehicle overhead was always a source of 
danger to the land and waters beneath’.59 In the absence of an international 
agreement, ‘Britain enacted regulations in 1913 prohibiting foreign aircraft from 
flying over the country without advance permission’.60 The idea of the ‘enclosure’ of 
airspace is perhaps not so far removed from the delineation of land in a country 
which has a contentious history of subtracting land from ‘common’ use. 
 
Events overtook policy, however, when the First World War exposed the defensive 
vulnerability posed by aviation. Aerial bombing of British cities by Gothas and 
Zeppelins proved more alarming than destructive (certainly when compared to the 
level of devastation wrought by the carpet bombings and fire storms of the Second 
World War). A year after the war, in 1919, the International Air Navigation 
Conference adopted the provision that individual states assert the sovereignty of 
airspace above their respective territories. Later, in 1944, the Convention of 
International Aviation (also known as the Chicago Convention or occasionally as the 
‘Magna Carta’ of international air law), required the 52 contracting states to 
‘collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity’ in standards, 
procedures and regulations.61 In addition, the convention empowered the 
International Aviation Authority (IAA) to adopt international practices, recommend 
procedures in relation to air traffic control and the identification and registration of 
aircraft. From this point, individual states would exercise sovereignty over the air 
above their territory and territorial seas. The airspace over the high seas, however, 
would be an aerial highway open to all traffic. The two World Wars proved beyond 
doubt that the struggle to control the air was as critical as the battle for land, and 
that the destructive possibilities of aerial warfare would mean mass civilian 
casualties on an unprecedented scale. The world wars also proved that shifting the 
parameters of sovereign territory to include airspace does not prevent conflict - it 
simply projects the national border into an invisible continuum. It describes an 
invisible wall through which the uninvited must not pass.  
 
                                                
59 John A. Eubank, 'The Doctrine of the Airspace Zone of Effective Possession ', 12 Boston 
University Library Review, 1932, p. 414. 
60 Stuart Banner, Who owns the sky?: the struggle to control airspace from the Wright 
brothers on, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008, p.62. 
61 Kay Hailbronner, 'Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea', 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 77, no. 490, 1983. 
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The increase in air traffic in the post war period compelled governments to strictly 
regulate Air Traffic Control (ATC) and establish an internationally recognised 
airspace classification system. For example, classes A-E would be designated as 
controlled airspace while F and G are generally uncontrolled by ATC. Curiously, the 
UK introduced two additional classifications: Aerodrome Traffic Zones (ATZ) and 
Military Aerodrome Traffic Zones (MATZ). These are radial volumes extending up to 
3000ft above the airfield to regulate the critical moments of takeoff and landing. One 
could speculate that the historical basis for these additional classifications relates to 
the high number of military and civil airfields functioning in the British landscape after 
the Second World War.  
 
The development of nuclear weapons by the British Government after the Second 
World War created other unusual anomalies in airspace policy and specification. In 
the early 1960s, a Low Flying System was designed for the UK to accommodate 
under-the-radar training for long-range strategic V-Bombers built to deliver nuclear 
weapons to Soviet bloc countries. This system linked airspace zones across the UK 
over areas with low population densities and varied topography, particularly over 
national parks and mountainous terrain. In the mid-1970s and early ‘80s, the 
intensity of activity increased with the introduction of a new generation of fast jets 
(Jaguars, Tornados and Buccaneers), and the Low Flying System was reordered in 
favour of ‘sharing any potential impact of this training activity as fairly as possible 
across all the population’.62 Excepting major conurbations, the whole of the UK 
became, and remains to this day, a military low flying area.  
 
Within the British and international classification system a subcategory of Special 
Use Airspace (SUA) was developed, defining areas as Prohibited, Restricted or as 
Danger Areas depending on the nature of activity within them. Again, within these 
there are further subcategories such as Military Training Areas (MTA), Aerial Tactics 
Areas (ATA), Areas of Intense Air Activity (AIAA), Air-to-Air Refueling Areas (AARA) 
and Temporary Reserved Areas (TRA). Many of these were implemented during the 
1970s and ‘80s in response to changing operational requirements during the Cold 
War and the need to separate hazardous military activities from the increasingly 
                                                
62 ‘UK Military Low Flying – An Essential Skill’, Ministry of Defence, 
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/22A9CEDC-4069-4E68-AE77-
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dominant commercial sector. Technically, the above categories are not classified as 
‘military airspace’, since they are not ‘owned’ by the MoD, but managed and 
regulated by civil authorities under the aegis of the Department for Transport. 
However, these volumes become ‘militarised’ in the course of being used for 
military activity. In addition, because the National Air Traffic Service (NATS) has 
adhered to the European Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) concept since 1996, these 
segregated volumes open and close at specific times to allow for a more efficient 
use of airspace. By 2001, the UK was more advanced than any other European 
country in a coordinating military and civilian aviation and airspace design.63 The 
Directorate of Airspace Policy (DAP), an integrated civil-military body was 
established to manage the regulation and the design of the airspace in the UK. This 
is an example of the armed services maintaining a strong influential presence in the 
face of an overwhelmingly commercial sector. So whilst the total numbers of military 
aircraft may have dramatically reduced over the last 50 years, ‘the performance and 
training requirements of modern aircraft and weapons systems demand greater 
volumes of airspace’.64 The form and function of militarised airspace in the UK will 
be addressed throughout this thesis as an under-researched but highly significant 
extension of military activity and spatial territorialisation. 
 
3.5 . Conclusions 
This chapter described how the expansion of the defence estate began in a time of 
civil unrest and national crisis. The barracking system was an attempt to 
simultaneously encourage a cohesive identity in the military and an attempt to 
remove it from revolutionary fervor during the early years of industrialization.65 It is 
curious that once the army had been detached from the obligation of civil control in 
the 19th century there began a trend towards buying land for training, and 
expanding (if somewhat haphazardly) across the landscape: as power over the civil 
population diminished, the amount of land owned and used by the military 
increased. This trend could be read as an inverse expression of the domestication 
                                                
63 'Status of Civil-Military Co-ordination in air traffic management',  Eurocontrol, October 
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of the armed services, or equally as a consolidation of power in the face of 
diminished social responsibility. Either way, it is easy to imagine the acquisition of 
land as a reflexive instinct for an institution hardwired for territorial control. However, 
during the 20th century, the role of global politics and international conflict 
undoubtedly spurred the most significant increase in military land use in the UK. The 
retention of land after these conflicts remains problematic. The review of military 
land by Lord Nugent in 1973, highlighted an excessive and inefficient use of land, 
and only partially succeeded in persuading the armed services to relinquish what 
they clearly did not need. The number of serving military personnel may have 
significantly declined since the end of the Cold War but this change was not 
reflected in the size of the defence estate. In fact, despite significant reductions in 
RAF stations around the UK and the sale of other redundant MoD sites, the army 
training estate increased by over a third between 1985 and 1996 (if one includes 
the purchase of rights and licenses to use land for training). From then until 2010, 
the size of the freehold and leasehold estate has remained relatively static at around 
240,000 ha. However, the purchase of rights and licenses to use land has also 
increased steadily, a fact which is only partly mitigated by increased public access 
to previously closed areas of the defence estate and a growing (if contentious) 
commitment to environmental management.  
 
The increasing use of land by the military must also be measured against a 
somewhat more complex use of airspace.  Aviation added a new dimension to 
warfare in the 20th century, and redefined the notion of sovereign territory in 
volumetric and spatial terms. However, military aviation was quickly overtaken by 
the commercial sector in an increasingly overcrowded sky. As post-Second World 
War airspace began to be subdivided and stratified along the principles of sovereign 
territory, large parts of the sky were segregated for military training and defence. 
Military low flying would become commonplace in some remote parts of rural 
Britain, a feature of training and defence that would eventually extend over much of 
the country by 1979. Today, commercial flights far outnumber military training 
sorties or operational flights, but the former has an arguably disproportionate impact 
on the regulation and use of Special Use Airspace (SUA) in the skies of the UK. 
Chapter 9 will detail the complexity of British airspace and the scale of SUAs for 
military activities.  
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The transformation of the British landscape over the last half millennia is a history of 
changing agricultural methods, the enclosure of land by the state and the 
monarchy, mass deforestation, industrialization and urbanization. Into this less than 
bucolic picture of hardship, labour and migration, the military has inserted itself with 
increasing assurance; first as a rabble drawn from the people and residing amongst 
the people, next as an instrument of oppression segregated in barracks, then as 
owners of land, and latterly as pioneers of the air. In this respect, the defence of the 
British nation and its aspirations as an Empire has an alternative history of control in 
the British landscape, one which is still evident in the strategic distribution of 
barracks around the country, the acres of land (sometimes taken under duress), the 
areas of national parks that remain inaccessible to civilians because of hazardous 
military activities, and the large volumes of British airspace reserved for training 
sorties.  
 
If this brief history has principally focused on the increasing use and acquisition of 
land by the armed services, it has also tried to introduce airspace into a broader 
picture of defence and control of the British landscape. In the coming chapters, 
airspaces, danger areas and low-flying zones will define the military presence in the 
UK as a spatial phenomenon which transcends the obvious distinctions between 
military and civil realms.  
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          Figure 4.1. Hazards and byelaws, the Wash,  
          Lincolnshire. Photograph: M.Flintham. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4. The legal constitution of military space in the Untied Kingdom. 84 
 
4.1 . Introduction 
Central to this thesis is the proposition that military space is somehow different from 
that which surrounds it. The following chapters will describe the many ways in 
which a site or space can become militarised; from permanent possession and use 
by the Armed Services to more temporary and ambiguous methods of occupancy. 
Arguably, presence is sometimes enough to define a place as militarised: the 
presence of an armoured convey on a motorway, for instance, implicitly suggests a 
whole world of activities from which civilians would or ought to be excluded. Even a 
simple, static sign such as in Figure 4.1, can denote military presence in the most 
rigid terms. It is possible to find ones journey interrupted for no obvious reason by a 
sign invoking, if necessary, the powers of the Secretary of State for Defence and 
threatening prosecution for transgressors. At this point most people go no further 
fearing not only the law but some form of hidden or immanent danger, usually of 
military origin. The sign signifies a zone of difference which is constituted on a set of 
legal principles laid down by the government on behalf of the Crown. The purpose 
of this chapter then, is to explore those laws which set the military institution apart, 
which invest certain spaces with the power to exclude.  
 
4.2 . Mi l i tary  Law. 
Today, the foundation of British military-owned land is the military institution itself, 
which is, in turn, regulated by Military Law. Military service personnel in the UK are 
subject to the same laws and rules of evidence described in English Law as any 
civilian.1 The former are, however, are subject to a parallel judicial process, the 
Military Criminal Justice System, which, according to the Adjutant General, is 
‘necessarily separate and universally deployable’.2 The justification for this rests on 
the following historical and social factors:  
 
1/ The requirement that a system based on English Law can be applied to 
individuals serving abroad beyond the jurisdiction of the UK courts.  
                                                
1 While the Military Criminal Justice System is based on English Law, the laws of the United 
Kingdom are defined by English Law (which also covers Wales), Scottish Law and Northern 
Irish Law.  
2 Lt Gen F. R. Viggers, ‘The Military Criminal Justice System: Supporting Operational 
Effectiveness in the Military Environment’,  The British Army,  
<http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/military_criminal_justice_system.pdf>, 
(accessed 14 August 2009). 
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2/ Service personnel operate within a strict hierarchical system and are subject to 
unique regulations such as disobeying a lawful command or being absent-without-
leave (AWOL). These rules are ultimately in place to mitigate danger to others and 
as such any breach is penalised in a manner that would not be appropriate in a 
civilian environment. Other punishable regulations amongst many include 
‘Malingering’, ‘Failure to suppress a mutiny’, ‘Desertion’, ‘Failure to escape [when 
presented with the opportunity] etc’, ‘Misconduct towards a superior officer’ and 
curiously, ‘Annoyance by flying’.3 
 
Another major difference in the military judicial system is that the decision to 
proceed with a disciplinary or criminal process rests with the Commanding Office 
(CO) of the accused. The CO then decides whether the case against the individual 
should go before a Summary Hearing (generally used for less serious offences), 
whether the Service Police should be engaged to investigate the offence, or 
whether a Summary Court Martial (for more serious cases) should be convened. As 
with the civilian judicial process the accused has the right to a defending solicitor 
and the Court Martial court is open to the public. A small number of serious criminal 
offences, such as murder, rape and manslaughter, if committed in the UK, are 
beyond military jurisdiction and are dealt with in the civil courts. Certain civilians 
such as contractors and the families of serving personnel can be subject to military 
jurisdiction if they are serving or based abroad. 
 
A parallel legal system based on the principles of discipline and the diminution of 
danger in hostile environments is one that promulgates an order of ‘difference’ and 
‘exception’, a partially self-regulating warrior class that is legally separate from other 
social groups. It is, however, a difference that many societies have encouraged to 
such a degree that the civil and military orders have developed a co-dependence in 
relation to their countries constitutional structure. Most countries deem it necessary 
to maintain parallel judicial systems. Historically, the British military have never 
attempted to overtly depose an elected government but they remain a powerful and 
influential part of the state apparatus. They are also most notably invested with the 
hierarchical structures associated with the aristocracy and the Crown. The current 
legal parameters of the British military judicial system rests on the Army Act of 1955 
                                                
3 Armed Forces Act 2006, c.52,  
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but were recently modified in the Armed Services Act of 2006 to take into account 
the legal discrepancies between the three services and the growing emphasis on 
joint service activities in the UK and abroad. 
 
4.3 . Byelaws and spatial segregation. 
Discipline and the possibility of danger or violence are enshrined in this alternative 
legal code, one that follows the military order of ‘exception’ wherever they may go.4 
To varying degrees, the places and spaces that the military inhabit are also invested 
with this code. Buildings and fields are set apart from civil society, fences are 
erected, boundaries are drawn, holes are dug and walls are built. A process of 
segregation disconnects and conceals certain activities from the civil realm, 
activities that can often appear violent or dangerous. Other activities are violent and 
dangerous, and the spaces defined by them become hazardous by association. 
The spaces defined by industrial and manufacturing processes, by contrast, can be 
equally dangerous but here danger is a by-product and is not actively sought for its 
own sake. Exposure to danger and violence is an intrinsic part of military training, a 
process of preparation before entering ‘harm’s way’, an inevitable condition of 
combat. Within UK training areas, however, danger is sporadic and instantaneous 
but the provision to restrict the general public on the grounds of safety is, more 
often than not, a permanent condition.  
 
The annexation of land for military purposes has been enshrined in law for little over 
a hundred years. Currently ‘under the provisions of the Military Lands Act 1892 
(s14), the Secretary of State for Defence is empowered to make byelaws to regulate 
the use of land being used for military purposes’.5 Accessing land protected by a 
byelaw is a criminal offence and can result in a substantial fine or imprisonment. 
 
Byelaws do not only define areas. Many incorporate an altitude restriction above the 
prohibited area thereby creating a volume of restricted space. The byelaw for 
Stanford Training Area in Norfolk, for instance, states that it is an offence for any 
                                                
4 The notion of ‘exception’ was most recently mentioned in the Countryside and Rights of 
Way Act 2000, in which military areas protect by byelaws were designated as ‘Excepted 
Land’ along with twelve other types of land use. Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, 
s17. 
5 Military Lands Act 1892, s14. 
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civilian aircraft  to fly under an altitude of 7,500 feet over the area.6 Interestingly, 
some byelaws dating from the first half of the twentieth century simply state that 
‘firing will cease’ when an aircraft passes over the range in the normal course of 
navigation. Even as late as 1941 when the byelaws for Manorbier Anti-Aircraft 
Artillery Range where drawn up, aircraft were only alerted to the danger beneath 
them by signals from the ground and gunners were directed to continue firing 20 
degrees either side of it.7 The integration of airspace into military byelaws seems to 
coincide with the regulation of international airspace during the 1950s and ‘60s and 
continues to this day with prioritised review of byelaws relating to key military 
installations in the UK. They will, presumably, incorporate very specific restrictions 
relating to nuclear installations including measures to impede protests around sites 
and updated restrictions on airspace to take into account perceived threats from 
the air after the 11 September terrorist attack. There is, however, considerable 
confusion surrounding those sites where byelaws are no longer extant or where 
they are not specific enough to cover the variety of current military activities or the 
complexities surrounding the protection of ‘visiting forces’. For this reason, amongst 
others, the military-owned ‘nuclear licensed’ sites8 together with certain RAF bases 
used by American forces9 and other key military installations10 are now covered by 
the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA).11 These sites are now 
defined by Statuary Instrument to specify areas where SOCPA is enforceable, 
where police and armed security can exercise unprecedented powers of arrest and 
detention. SOCPA is a highly contentious piece of legislation that was later 
amended to include the Terrorism Act 2006 to extend and augment the criminal 
offence of trespass on protected sites.12  
 
The methods by which byelaws were created and land subtracted from civil or 
common territory bears a comparison to the processes of enclosure which have 
shaped and torn the British Isles over the course of the last 800 years. The state-
                                                
6 Stanford Training Area Byelaws 1970, SI no.909. 
7 Manorbier Anti-Aircraft Artillery Range in the County of Pembrokeshire Byelaws 1941, SI 
1941/158. 
8 Military Nuclear-licensed sites include MoD Aldermaston, MoD Burghfield, HMNB 
Devonport, HMNB Clyde and HMNB Coulport. 
9 These include RAF Menwith Hill, RAF Croughton, RAF Lakenheath, RAF Mildenhall, RAF 
Feltwell, RAF Fylingdales, RAF Fairford and RAF Welford 
10 These include RAF Brize Norton, SMC Marchwood and JSU Northwood. 
11 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. 
12 Terrorism Act 2006. 
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sanctioned militarisation of the British landscape, with its genesis at the end of the 
nineteenth century, is perhaps the swiftest and least expected chapter in the history 
of enclosure. As we enter the 21st century, the many evictions and public protests 
that accompany the annexation of land for military purposes are being forgotten. 
The generation of tenants and landowners that were evicted during the century of 
compulsory purchase are, by and large, no longer with us but groups such as the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Trident Ploughshares and The 
Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases (CAAB) amongst others, 
continue to challenge the physical boundaries of military sites and the legitimacy of 
their legal constitution. The case of Tabernacle v Secretary of State for Defence 
(2009), for example, tested the details of the revised Atomic Weapons 
Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston Byelaws 2007.13 These were rewritten to include 
a series of specific prohibitions including ‘camping’, ‘causing a nuisance’ and 
attaching things to ‘surfaces’ amongst many others. The original 1986 byelaw 
distinguishes between ‘Protected Areas’ (inside the site perimeter) and Controlled 
Areas (adjacent to the AWE site). The Aldermaston Women’s Peace Camp (AWPC) 
had effectively been camping and protesting on controlled MoD land but outside 
the AWE site perimeter for 23 years without major incident.14 The new byelaw was 
clearly an attempt to shift protestors away from the MoD land and this was 
confirmed when Kay Tabernacle and other members of the AWPC were arrested 
for violation of the revised byelaws. Despite the charges being dropped by the MoD, 
Tabernacle successfully pushed the case to the Court of Appeal were the bylaws 
were deemed to violate the human rights of the AWPC protestors.15 The right to 
freedom of expression as a basic human right was preserved at the controlled area 
in question, and that ‘there is absolutely no evidence that the presence of the 
AWPC over many years has been incompatible ‘with the operational requirements 
of the establishment’’16. In making this remark, Lord Justice Wall added that the 
case for the Secretary of State ‘comes nowhere near demonstrating a ‘pressing 
                                                
13 Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston Byelaws 2007, SI 2007/1066. 
14 For an analysis of the case in relation to the wider debate on the function and value of 
‘gendered’ protest see; Ralph Sandland, 'Poetic Justice', Feminist Legal Studies, 17/2, 
2009, pp. 219–28. In it, Sandland states that the ‘byelaws prohibit or regulate activity, but 
really or also, they are an attempt to delimit the contours of discourse and therefore identity, 
to remove the conditions of possibility for some subject positions, namely those of the 
AWPC members […] The ‘interference’, with the human rights and the psychic space of the 
AWPC members, cannot be classified, as the MoD sought to do, as ‘weak’’, p.226. 
15 Tabernacle v Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWCA Civ 23; [2009] WLR (D) 35 
16 Ibid., Para 48. 
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social need’’.17 
 
The so-called ‘carry on camping’ case clearly demonstrates that the legal 
constitution of military space is one that can be challenged on the grounds of 
freedom of expression and that these spaces can be defined and redefined through 
protest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 Tabernacle v Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWCA Civ 23; [2009] WLR (D) 35, 
para 49. 
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    Figure 5.1. Controlled explosion at the MOD Shoeburyness 
    proving ground. Picture:  Crown Copyright/MOD 2009. 
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5.1 . Introduction 
The extraordinary death of Ministry of Defence (MOD) scientist Terrance Jupp on 20 
August 2002 pushed the little-known island of Foulness reluctantly into the national 
spotlight.1 As details of disastrous experiments with simulated ‘dirty bombs’ made 
with off-the-shelf chemicals leaked out onto the broadsheets, and with the curiously 
low-key manslaughter trial that followed, the island itself continued to resist 
interrogation. This is ultimately because Foulness Island is part of MOD 
Shoeburyness, which is owned entirely by the MOD for the development and 
evaluation of weapons and the decommissioning of unstable and out-of-date 
incendiaries. As a military–scientific complex, MOD Shoeburyness is unique in the 
British Isles: at the centre of this permanently restricted zone a small community of 
civilians continues to live and work alongside the military, having done so already for 
over a century. The small village of Churchend not only sits at the very heart of the 
island but also remains central to the organization of regional military activity. 
 
If we wish to understand the full extent of military influence on Foulness, it is 
necessary to recognize the MOD (and associated private-sector organizations) as 
producers of space, and space in this context is defined and delineated in an 
almost unlimited number of ways. The multidisciplinary framework used here 
accepts the heterogeneous nature of military activity, and recognizes that their 
spaces can be defined in ways that are physical (fences, roads, buildings, barriers, 
infrastructural services), invisible or immaterial (sound, airspaces, danger areas, 
pollution, electromagnetic transmissions, surveillance), instantaneous (projectiles, 
static explosions, vehicle movement) and social (economic dependence, military–
civilian relations). Many of these can occur simultaneously within a given set of 
parameters. For instance, a projectile can be fired within a fixed danger area, or a 
sound can emanate from the source of a static explosion over a measurable 
geographical region. It is not the purpose of this chapter to track or measure every 
military/scientific activity at MOD Shoeburyness or on Foulness, but to offer some 
specific examples and to suggest the possibility that military space is continually 
evolving in ways that are far from obvious. 
 
                                                
1 Ian Cobain, ‘Curious case of the dead scientist and the bomb experiment’, Guardian, 24 
March 2008, pp.1–3. 
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This chapter draws on fieldwork and interviews undertaken on the island of 
Foulness. While Foulness should not be considered emblematic of military–civilian 
interaction across the United Kingdom, the chapter aims to show, among other 
things, examples of how domestic militarised space is conceived and produced in 
three dimensions and how it exists in parallel with civilian space. In addition it will 
ask: where does the vulnerable civilian body reside in an environment which is 
regulated in this unique manner and where danger is constantly implied? By way of 
response it will propose that the civilian body (both human and social in this context) 
is a central agency in defining the limits of domestic military space and how, in turn, 
the body can be defined by it. 
 
MOD Shoeburyness encompasses a small area of the mainland and an archipelago 
of islands on the northern edge of the opening to the River Thames. There are 
approximately 25 military testing and disposal facilities at various points within the 
enclosure, connected by spur lanes to a spinal road running through the middle of 
Foulness , Havengore Island and down into mainland Shoeburyness. Both islands 
together measure roughly five miles from the north-east tip to south-west toe and 
about three miles across at the widest point. The low, even landscape is almost 
without topographical features and the only defence against permanent flooding is a 
sea wall around each island. The nearest mainland village is Great Wakering and the 
nearest large town is Southend-on-Sea, eight miles away. 
 
Shoeburyness has been associated with military activity since 1847, when 
developments in longer-range ballistics led the War Ministry to establish an 
experimental firing range there for the Royal Artillery and School of Gunnery.2 The 
ministry subsequently began buying more and more land on Foulness with a view to 
establishing a larger weapons-proving ground. This move was resisted only by the 
majority landowner, George Finch, who had previously provided the 640 residents 
with housing and a standard of living hitherto unknown on the island.3 By the end of 
the First World War, the entire island had been bought, with the exception of the 
church, the mission hall and the school. However, much of the civilian population 
was allowed to remain as tenants of the War Ministry, and between the wars the 
                                                
2 Childs, The Military Use of Land, p.116. 
3 J. R. Smith, Foulness: A History of an Essex Island Parish, Chelmsford: Essex Record 
Office Publications, 1970, pp.39–40. 
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vast majority of land on the island was still used for agricultural production. Most of 
the military facilities in use today appeared immediately after the Second World War 
and required the requisitioning of approximately 202 hectares of tenant farmland. 
 
At the last census, in 2001, Foulness had a diminishing population of 212 people, 
and it currently has five resident tenant farmers. Yet the last informal headcount 
revealed that the population had shrunk to around 160 people. It is doubtful 
whether the steady decline in population over the last century-and-a-half can be 
attributed solely to the military presence, but the fact remains that only the most 
resilient would choose to live in such an isolated and potentially hostile environment. 
Today, roughly half the island is used for arable farming, and the fallow land around 
the old Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE), in the south-west, is 
regularly used for grazing sheep. For non-residents, access to the island is strictly 
controlled: visitors must be invited either by a resident or by the MOD/QinetiQ. The 
gatehouse must have the names and addresses of visitors in advance and car 
registrations details are taken before entry. In 2002 and 2003, the management of 
the island was passed to QinetiQ Group PLC, the controversial public–private 
partnership company created by the MOD from its Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratory (DSTL) to handle certain elements of its Research and 
Development (R&D) and land management.4 The extent of the MOD-owned 
enclosure is approximately 3,035 hectares, with an additional 14,164 hectares of 
tidal sands. 
 
5.2 . Mi l i tary  science, death and decommissioning. 
Traveling up the single military road on Foulness, over twisting tributaries and past 
reclaimed marshland and arable fields, one sees signs to such places as Avocet, 
New England, Fleet, Roman, Small Gains, East Wick Battery, Rugwood Battery, 
Church End Battery, Jerrywood and, more ominously, X3 and Z2. These are 
military–scientific facilities, each with a distinct purpose, none more remarkable than 
an alleged Anglo-American research programme which took place at Newlands 
                                                
4 On QinetiQ, see, Twenty–fourth Report of Session 2007–08: The Privatisation of QinetiQ, 
House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, London: The Stationary Office, 2008. 
The degree to which a private sector organization can produce a ‘militarised’ environment is 
open to debate. As Foulness is still owned entirely by the MoD and is still subject to the 
bylaws that define military enclosures and danger zones, I classify it as a militarized zone in 
the broadest sense. There is little doubt that the private sector will exert more and more 
influence on MoD land and as such will redefine the very notion of military space. 
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Battery, at the far north-east tip of the island. 
 
The near fever pitch of public and institutional anxiety after 11 September 2001 led 
Western governments to urgently reassign their research and development budgets 
in anticipation of asymmetrical attacks by terrorists. One fear was the creation of an 
explosive devise using chemicals and materials that anyone could buy in the high-
street, and that such a device could be used to scatter radiological material over a 
wide area – a so-called Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD). According to the 
Guardian, the DSTL had conducted a series of secret experiments with the US 
National Laboratory in New Mexico.5 Back on Foulness, it is understood that 
Terrance Jupp was involved in parallel RDD trials and, on this occasion, had mixed 
a number of 10-kilogram charges containing three types of commercially available 
ingredients. One spontaneously ignited, creating a lethal fireball that engulfed him. 
Sixty to ninety per cent of his body was burned and he died six days later from the 
injuries.6 
 
Jupp’s family had no knowledge of his involvement with the MOD’s Forensic 
Explosive Laboratory, a division of the DSTL, but hoped that an investigation by the 
Health and Safety Executive and the MOD Police would shed some light on the 
matter. Eventually, the investigation led to criminal charges being brought against 
two employees of the DSTL. However, a lengthy court case was dropped suddenly 
in early 2008 after new information was brought to the attention of the Crown 
Prosecution Service. The exact nature of this information remains restricted, and it 
is understood that the American and British military authorities continue to be 
nervous about releasing such sensitive information into the public realm even if it be 
in the public interest to do so. 
 
It is not known whether radiological material was ever used in the so-called dirty-
bomb trials on Foulness. What is known, though, is that between 1998 and 2003, 
the UK decommissioned many of its Chevaline nuclear warheads and WE177 free-
fall bombs.7 This process generated two types of radioactively contaminated 
                                                
5 Cobain, ‘Curious case of the dead scientist.’ 
6 Antony Barnett, ‘Case dropped over defence scientist’s death’, Observer, 18 March 
2007, p.24. 
7 The Environment Agency, Decision Document and Authorization Notice: Application by 
AWE plc under the Radioactive Substances Act 1993 for a variation to its authorization to 
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warhead waste: the security-sensitive weapon components and the tritium-
contaminated high explosives.8 The former were transferred from Atomic Weapons 
Establishment (AWE) sites at Aldermaston and Burghfield to the MOD sites at 
Aldermaston and Burghfield, together with any uranium-contaminated waste, while 
the latter were transferred to Foulness for open-hearth incineration, or cage-
burning. MOD Shoeburyness is one of the few sites in Britain with enough space to 
engage in this method of weapons decommissioning, also known as ‘Demil’ in the 
industry. The Environment Agency sought to reassure the public by stating that 
levels of tritium radiation dispersed into the atmosphere during the process were 
many times lower than everyday background radiation, and that the resident 
islanders, also known as ‘THE CRITICAL GROUP’, would not receive ‘anywhere 
near the pessimistic dose’, which, furthermore, would be ‘much too small to 
measure and of no radiological significance’.9 
 
While the immediate danger to life during the decommissioning process comes 
perhaps from the vulnerable high explosives rather than the tritium itself, it is ironic 
that the millions of pounds invested in Britain’s nuclear deterrent should end as a 
bonfire on the Essex marshes. Between 1998 and 2001, ten to twenty 
consignments of tritium-contaminated high explosives were delivered from the AWE 
sites at Aldermaston and Burghfield, and between 2001 and 2003, two more. Each 
of these AWE-managed consignments would have been bound by the strict 
regulations that govern the passage of radiological and explosive materials across 
the UK, meaning that the routes between sites could be considered temporary 
corridors of militarised space. 
 
While there is no suggestion that the two programmes outlined above were in any 
way linked, the aim here is to show how Foulness continues to be the focus of 
highly contentious, politically charged activities, the effects of which can be felt 
around the world. The network of social, political and geographical spatialities may 
converge on a concrete platform in a damp field on Foulness, but when the ‘events’ 
                                                                                                                                 
dispose of radioactive waste,  
 <http://nuclear- awarenessgroup.org.uk/files/AWE%20DD%20Issue%2001V1.pdf>, 
(accessed 29 September 2008). 
8 Tritium is a weakly energetic beta-emitting radionuclide and is used in nuclear weapons to 
enable the fission process that precedes detonation. 
9 Environment Agency, Decision Document 139. ‘THE CRITICAL GROUP’ 
is capitalized in the original document. 
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take place, the effects can radiate out once again in new, perhaps more lethal, 
configurations. 
 
5.3 . Prov ing, static t r ials,  random noise 
Is it really quietest in the eye of the storm? Foulness can be an unnervingly silent 
place for a visitor, removed as it is from major traffic networks, low-flying aircraft and 
the sheer density of human activity typical of many parts of Britain. The silence is 
almost supernaturally enhanced by unusual bird calls, the abundant drone of heavy 
insects and the particular sound wind makes as it sweeps across a flat landscape. 
This range of sounds, and the physical environment itself, seems to have shaped 
the community that lives here in unquantifiable ways. While many villagers seem to 
relish the quiet isolation that island life provides, the sudden jarring crack of a static 
detonation or the gloomy, war-tainted thud of shells exploding in the distance would 
seem to undermine the supposition. The perception of military-generated noise on 
Foulness is one of stoic acceptance. It even makes an unusual addition to the roster 
of village conversation topics, in the same register as the weather or the price of 
wheat. However, although residents play ‘guess what made the noise’ when they 
meet at the shop or pass in the street, many are generally unmoved by the sounds, 
having entered into an alliance – albeit an uneasy and often faltering one – with 
QinetiQ. 
 
Residents are clearly willing to accept a degree of military noise in exchange for 
unparalleled security and privacy. This attitude is in stark contrast to the barrage of 
complaints received by QinetiQ and the MOD from residents and businesses in the 
nearby coastal towns and villages on both sides of the Thames estuary. Noise from 
MOD Shoeburyness has regularly been a Parliamentary issue.10 Many residents in 
the region have commented on earthquake-like blasts that have cracked windows 
and fractured walls.11 These people, in contrast to the islanders, have nothing to 
lose; they have no tenancy agreement with the MOD to worry about or landlord to 
placate. What is clear, though, is that noise is an issue for residents and non-
residents alike. It is being produced every day, radiating out from the facilities on 
Foulness and at Shoeburyness, and defining a geographical region with each 
                                                
10 For instance, see Hansard, HC, cols 462-122, (11 July 2007). 
11 The pressure group Citizens Against Shoeburyness Explosions is very active 
in galvanizing support for its cause. 
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detonation – another invisible signifier of military activity extending beyond the 
boundary of the physical enclosure. This military acoustic presence is not, however, 
uniform in its radial emanations; it can be affected by any number of determinants 
such as topographical irregularities, physical obstacles, wind direction and other 
meteorological variables. Decibels and levels of pervasiveness can be measured 
but, as we have seen, reception can also be defined by subjective interpretation. 
One person’s irritation is another’s earthquake. It literally seems to depend on which 
side of the fence the individual is on. 
 
The source of these emanations is weapons at various points in their life cycle. A 
weapon may have three possible opportunities to ‘visit’ MOD Shoeburyness: during 
development, batch-testing and destruction. In its development stage, a weapon 
may arrive from the manufacturer for testing and evaluation. A typical example is the 
ongoing subtle adjustments to large-calibre artillery projectiles involving 
performance trials (firing and recovery, ageing, environmental and fragmentation 
testing) and hazard assessments (fuel fires, bullet attack, etc.).12 Firing regularly 
takes place over Maplin Sands, where a shell can be retrieved by a recovery team 
for examination and disposal. MOD Shoeburyness Environmental Test Centre (ETC) 
is used for all stages of environmental assessment. The ongoing development of 
Explosive Reactive Armour, new materials and vehicles also takes place on 
Foulness, a process which often involves static trials with the kind of explosives 
likely to be encountered in current and anticipated conflict zones (See Figure 5.1).13 
Trials of the Armtrac 100, an armoured tractor developed for clearing mines, took 
place during 2002 at Shoeburyness. Several different types of landmine, including 
anti-personnel, fragmentation and anti-tank, were employed to test the resilience of 
the vehicle under operational conditions.14 
 
After the weapon has entered mass production, a certain percentage from each 
                                                
12 V. Fung, et al, ‘High Performance IM Compliant Artillery Projectile With Enhanced 
Throughlife Survivability’, BAE conference poster, 2006, 
<http://www.imemg.org/res/imemts2006_Fung_Poster.pdf>, (accessed 29 September 
2008). 
13 Information on weapons testing and evaluation at MoD Shoeburyness is available at the 
following QinetiQ website,  
<http://www.qinetiq.com/ix/defence/test_and_eval_and_training_support/singlesitefacilities/
shoeburyness_facilities.html>, (accessed 29 December 2008). 
14 C. A. Leach, ‘Armtrac 100 Trial Report’, April 2002, 
<http://www.itep.ws/pdf/Armtrac_Report.pdf>,  (accessed 29 September 2008). 
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batch produced are expended and analysed to maintain quality control. A wide 
variety of tank and artillery shells are fired over the various ranges at MOD 
Shoeburyness and out to sea over Maplin Sands and Pig’s Bay. Farmers regularly 
have to inspect their fields for shells and anti-tank artillery sabots (a sabot is an alloy 
sleeve that falls to the ground once the projectile has been fired from the muzzle of 
the weapon). Shells and sabots come in a range of sizes and can do serious 
damage to a harvester or plough. 
 
Finally, when a weapon has exceeded its use-by date, it is destroyed. 
Demilitarization is probably one of the most profitable forms of revenue for QinetiQ 
since there is so much to be disposed of in the UK alone.15 The ongoing 
decommissioning process of Second World War and Cold War RAF bases in Britain 
continually turns up quantities of decaying and vulnerable ordnance. A recent 
commission to dispose of 150,000 Cold War bar mines over an estimated 20 
months must have been highly lucrative for the organisation.16 In this instance, so as 
not to risk a further deluge of complaints about noise, QinetiQ opted for open 
incineration rather than destructive explosions. This process, though, is not without 
its hazards or inconveniences; the smoke generated is considerable, and during a 
previous mine-burning exercise QinetiQ personnel failed to heed the warning of a 
tenant farmer about burning in unfavourable wind conditions. Consequently, the 
farmer’s adjacent field was scorched and a crop partially ruined.17 High explosives 
and the deployment of ballistics define space in a manner unique to the armed 
services. Manuel De Landa separates the projectile-firing engine into three stages: 
 
(1) the propulsion stage, comprising of the processes by which impulse and 
direction are imparted to a projectile; (2) the ballistic stage, relating to the 
events that effect a missiles trajectory during flight; and (3) the impact stage, 
                                                
15 Since the UK has recently signed a treaty banning the use of cluster bombs, it is now left 
with a stockpile of 28,000,000 explosive bomblets. A. Crawford, ‘“30 m” to destroy cluster 
devices’, BBC,  
<http://news.bbc. co.uk/1/hi/uk/7602933.stm>, (accessed 29 September 2008). 
16 For more information on the burning of bar mines, see, ‘Potential relief from noise and 
vibration in St Osyth’, St Osyth Parish Council, 12 December 2007, 
<http://www.stosyth.gov.uk/default.asp?calltype=burningmines>, (accessed 29 November 
2008). 
17 Interview with tenant farmers, Foulness, 14 April 2008. Farmers are continually incensed 
that QinetiQ doesn’t employ their knowledge of local geographies, as the MoD did when it 
managed Shoeburyness. 
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regarding the effect of the projectile on the target.18 
 
But while De Landa attributes most theoretical importance to the propulsion stage, 
the production and definition of space relates most directly to the ballistics stage, 
the passage of the projectile. The interruption of this at the impact stage, however, 
also produces a multitude of simultaneous spaces of varying configurations, such 
as an impact explosion or fragmentation, an impact sound heard over a 
geographical distance, and the injury or death of a person. While many other 
production processes in agriculture, industry and transport systems have obvious 
dangers associated with them, the testing of weapons and training for warfare have 
their own designated danger areas. These larger spaces act as safety buffers 
around the near instantaneous and potentially lethal spaces produced during the 
three firing stages described above, as well as those formed during static 
detonations and by the movement of military personnel and vehicles across the 
landscape and through the skies. Contamination hazards, unsound structures and 
unexploded ordnance can also define space in instantaneous and unpredictable 
ways. 
 
The larger danger areas, however, may vary in size according to the social and 
geographical specificities of the region, the nature of the activities undertaken within 
them and pressure from special-interest groups. They rarely correspond to the limits 
of the military enclosures themselves or to land owned by the MOD (see Figure 5.2). 
It is true that large, permanent danger areas within the UK are designated on 
Ordnance Survey maps, either within clearly marked boundaries or simply by radial 
markings over a vaguely defined area. But many other danger areas regularly 
extend over public-access land, either at prearranged times or at very short notice 
depending on the nature of the military operations concerned. The limits of these 
temporary zones are usually manifest in the sudden appearance of red flags, 
lanterns or closed stop-gates blocking access to tracks or roads - the 
disappearance of these signals can be just as sudden. For civil pilots they are 
identified as altitudes and coordinates on a map. Such is the fluidity of military 
activity that theorizing about it, or indeed tracking it over a fixed period of time, is a 
                                                
18 Manuel De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Zone Books, 1991, p.25. 
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challenge rarely undertaken by geographers or those working in related fields.19 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Area owned or controlled by the MoD (in pink). Source: Ordnance Survey. Crown 
Copyright, modified by M. Flintham. 
 
 
The four designated air Danger Areas around MOD Shoeburyness are known as 
D136, D138, D138a and D138b (see Figure 5.3). These four connected volumes of 
space extend 3,658 metres up (and potentially as far as 18,288) and encompass 
MOD Shoeburyness in its entirety, stretching nearly 28 miles (45 km) over the island 
and tidal sands. They define the limits of the regional ballistics hazard, and are 
closed to civilian aircraft and shipping from Monday to Friday, 6 a.m. until 6 p.m. 
Any aircraft entering the Thames gateway during these times must fly round or over 
them. 
 
These volumes suggest how space defined within the militarised landscape extends 
                                                
19 Geographic Information System (GIS) technologies allow the visualization of military activity 
and its relationship to civil space. Among others, Eyal Weizman employs GIS to convey the 
fluid power structures that currently shape the West Bank and the Palestinian Territories; 
see Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation. Many Google Earth users are actively 
building models of military airspace and no-fly zones around the world using airspace 
authority coordinates. 
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way beyond the physical boundaries we recognize and into the invisible realm of 
airspace, ballistics hazards and the electromagnetic spectrum. Just as it is almost 
impossible to conceive of the British landscape without its capricious weather and 
dramatic skies, so is it meaningless to theorize about the current military landscapes 
in Britain without considering the immaterial and technologically enabled parameters 
just described. The sky above Britain is no longer an unregulated continuum. It has 
become a space of elaborately crafted vectors and invisible, restricted architectures 
in an increasingly overcrowded sky. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. The island of Foulness and surrounding Danger Areas. Google Earth images with 
additional graphic modeling by by M.Flintham. 
 
 
5.4 . Why are we sti l l  here? 
The collision of military science and pastoral village life is a fictional experience for 
many, limited as it is to the rich clichés of literature, film and television; a genre 
driven by anxiety-borne narratives that derive, at least in part, from the race for 
technological superiority immediately after World War Two.20 These fictions may 
                                                
20 It is almost possible to assemble a loose genre of post-war British literature based on 
anxieties about a military–scientific ‘other’. See, for example, Rex Warner, The Aerodrome, 
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have mutated in recent years to incorporate fears of nuclear-industrial 
mismanagement, terror threats or surveillance fears, but essentially the model still 
has cultural currency. It may well be based on a polarized, romantic view of a 
benign, distinctly ‘British’ landscape which is somehow corrupted by military 
ideology or infected by scientific meddling, but it would be a mistake to interpret 
Foulness, the so-called Secret Island,21 using the framework of these fictions or to 
allow them to colour the seriousness of weapons development or the tragedy 
described above. It may also be tempting to regard the presence of a quasi-military 
research organization on the island in similar terms but truth, as they say, is often 
stranger than fiction. The encounters that occur every day across Britain between 
civilians and military personnel are shaped by local specificities on the one hand and 
military ideology on the other, which are indeed the basis for many of the fictional 
narratives in the genre just outlined. The military–civilian encounter is played out 
hour by hour on Foulness, producing a complexity of spatial and social relations 
that may challenge conventional views of what it means to permanently live with a 
military presence. 
 
The village of Churchend is situated at the centre of the island and less than a 
kilometre from many of the test facilities and firing ranges. While the core of the 
village dates back to medieval times, a more recent expansion represents an 
attempt by the War Ministry to pull the scattered civilian population into one 
settlement. The housing developments of 1922 and the demolition of outlying 
homesteads accelerated the coalescence of islanders towards the centre of 
Foulness and in doing so fashioned a more manageable civilian community.22 Much 
of the housing from the 1922 development is sympathetic to the Essex vernacular 
style: red stock brick or black and white weatherboard properties are set back from 
the road with ample front and rear gardens. These few houses form part of a short 
linear development that follows the military spinal road south but stops abruptly a 
few yards from Churchend Battery, where a firing range fans out due east for 3.2 
km as far as the sea wall. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
London: John Lane, 1941; John Wyndham, The Midwich Cuckoos, London: Michael 
Joseph, 1957; George Mackay Brown, Greenvoe, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972. 
21 ‘Is the secret island slowly dying’, Southend Echo, 3 April, 2008, p.1. 
22 Foulness Churchend Conservation Area Appraisal and Management Plan, 
Rochford District Council, October 2007. 
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Luckily for the tenants of Churchend, the village was designated a conservation 
area in March 1992, being defined as an Area of Special Architectural or Historic 
Interest.23 There is also rich archaeological evidence of continuous settlement on 
Foulness, with artifacts from the Romano-British era, the medieval period and more 
recent times on display at the Heritage Centre in Churchend. This institution, 
established in 2003 with a donation from QinetiQ, is a testament to the 
resourcefulness and enthusiasm of local historians, archaeologists and 
conservationists. None of these facts, however, prevents the village from being 
slowly drained of basic amenities; the recent closure of the village pub, the village 
hall and the primary school are just three examples. Nor can they be expected to 
stop the population diminishing further or the village becoming a latter-day 
Tyneham, Imber or Mynydd Epynt.24 All three of these settlements were 
permanently expropriated by the War Office for military training before or during the 
World War Two, many hundreds of people being displaced or forcefully evicted in 
the process. In some cases, promises to return property and land after the war 
were rescinded or postponed indefinitely. Remarkably, Churchend escaped this 
acquisition process, and for the moment this island within an island seems 
protected from total military encroachment. But life would be a lot simpler for the 
MOD and QinetiQ if there were no civilian tenants on Foulness. The mystified tenant 
farmers are fully aware of their precarious position and continually ask themselves, 
‘Why are we still here? Why are we still tolerated?’25 The answer seems to lie in a 
combination of factors, the most obvious of which is that tenants are a continued 
and stable source of revenue for the MOD. This is perhaps more significant in an 
age when the MOD is increasingly asked to justify the land it owns and to increase 
independent revenue. The MOD is also encouraged to strengthen its links with local 
communities and forge stronger ties with tenant farmers.26 Another obvious 
answers could be that in the absence of tenant civilians, the MoD or QinetiQ would 
have to manage the land themselves. 
 
                                                
23 Foulness Churchend Conservation Area Appraisal and Management Plan, p.2. 
24 A further six villages in the Stanford Battle Area, near Thetford, Norfolk, were requisitioned 
during World War Two. 
25 Interview with tenant farmers, Foulness, 14 April 2008. 
26 The Defence Estate Strategy 2006: In Trust and On Trust, Ministry of Defence, 2006, pp. 
22-25. Its tacit message is clear: if the MoD wishes to maintain its current levels of land use, 
it has to be perceived as a benevolent custodian of the British landscape and it has to 
address recruitment and retention issues by reaching out to the surrounding communities. 
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So how does the present community of 160 people manage to negotiate the day-
to-day hazards of living and working in the middle of this vast danger area? How do 
tenant farmers plough and harvest fields that double as firing ranges and ballistics 
hazards? QinetiQ’s answer is computer-assisted planning. The whole island 
operates as an arrangement of connected spatial units that open and close so as to 
control the flow of activity within them, much like the flow of electricity across 
different parts of a circuit board. Every month tenant farmers are forwarded dozens 
of amended Ordnance Survey map printouts of temporary danger areas around 
which they have to organize their agricultural schedules, and changes can be faxed 
or emailed at any time. A unit may be a field, a group of fields, a firing range, a road 
or a test facility. Access to, and flow in and out of, each unit is controlled by a 
system of stop-gates that are manually opened and closed accordingly but 
organized using Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping technologies at a 
central facility. To a large degree farmers have to work around the planning 
schedule imposed on them by QinetiQ, which can entail working in the evening and 
at night to harvest fields closed to them during the day. However, the transposition 
of a military geographical planning system (determined by ballistics hazards and 
static explosions) onto an agricultural landscape seems less fraught with 
incompatibilities than one might imagine. Both parties are dealing with geographical 
units that are clearly either in use or not in use. There are also incentives to conform 
to these uniquely restrictive, systematized structures. The benefit for the islanders 
and tenant farmers is the continued security and favourable isolation that they feel 
military occupation provides. For the MOD and QinetiQ the value of not accidentally 
killing a civilian is self-evident. These disjointed constraints are there to prevent injury 
or death to civilians but effectively the tenants’ working lives are inseparably 
entwined with military geographic planning. There are problems, though: QinetiQ’s 
sophisticated planning techniques do not seem to extend to the civilian 
infrastructure of the island. According to the tenants, the landlords are no longer 
looking after the crumbling sea walls. 
 
GIS-assisted planning is one of the key technologies that conspire to create a 
regional spatial system in which the civilian body is a relatively benign but influential 
agency. Danger to the human body, and the civilian body in particular, is a decisive 
factor in arranging the fluid parameters of this complex. These parameters are 
specifically designed to exclude the civilian body whenever and wherever possible, 
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not only to remove it from danger but also to control its movements and limit its 
somewhat troublesome behaviour. Civilians habitually fraternize with each other 
without informing the proper authorities; they spontaneously gather in small groups. 
Young people are particularly resistant to authority and subject to unpredictable 
acts of free will. In short, these unstructured acts of transgression are tolerated and 
contained within pockets and corridors of quasi-civil space. The island is 
simultaneously an embattled rural community, an agricultural resource and a military 
proving ground. Somewhere in between, however, the civilian body is an integrated 
component of the planning mechanism, and risk, danger and death are forces of 
friction to be understood and incorporated early in the planning process. 
 
5.5 . Conclusions 
Foulness Island, like any place in the world, is a point of convergence for many 
physical and invisible spatialities. This essay has concentrated on only a few such 
aspects of Foulness: its role as a home to some, as a working environment to 
others, and as a forge for the armed services and the defence industry. The last of 
these exercises the most dominant kind of control, projecting its many lethal forms 
across the landscape and into the skies and fashioning the most convoluted 
structures to protect and deliberately restrict the movements of a civilian 
community. On Foulness, there are no pockets of civilian-owned land or public 
highways cutting into the military landscape, as we find in other militarised areas of 
the UK. This environment is a highly concentrated, atypical expression of civilian–
military relations. It is also one that is partly organized around the vulnerabilities of 
the human civilian body. The death of Terrance Jupp in 2002 reminds us, however, 
that death is often random and chaotic in nature and will always reveal the inherent 
weaknesses in military structures. It also exposes for a moment their true and 
ultimate expression. 
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                       Figure 6.1. A FIBUA village near Imber, Salisbury Plain.  
                            Photograph, M. Flintham. 
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6.1 . Introduction. 
For many Salisbury Plain epitomises a certain kind of British wilderness, somehow 
infused with romanticism and touched only lightly by human intervention. J.M.W 
Turner’s Stonehenge (1828), is scorched by heavenly fire, repelling cowering beasts 
from the inferno at its centre where a single needle of lightning strikes the fallen 
Sarsen stones. John Constable’s slightly later take on the subject, by contrast, is 
struck by two vast roving arcs of light, one lands somewhere to the left while the 
other falls in the centre of the ancient henge, illuminating it from within. But while 
Constable’s scene may appear cataclysmic or even revelatory in some sense, the 
drama is a sign not from God or the supernatural but simply a product of the 
inclement weather. In the absence of historical certainty or hard facts about their 
subject both painters employ a supercharged sky to interrogate those objects 
which curiously still persist in a British landscape being redrawn by industrial 
modernity. And while Stonehenge remains the focus of these paintings it is the sky 
that activates them and is revealed to be an essential component of the landscape 
itself. On a recent trip to the region a walker suggested that ‘half of Salisbury Plain is 
the sky’. This chapter will demonstrate that the same is true of the military presence 
on the Plain which not only projects itself across the landscape but also draws the 
sky into a vast three dimensional spatial complex.  
 
For twelve days in the summer months of 2008, Salisbury Plain Training Area 
(SPTA) was the stage for one of the UK’s largest military exercises, or more 
precisely, a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) that would prepare 5,800 troops 
from across all three services for an imminent tour of duty in Afghanistan. Local 
papers were alerted to the possibility of increased noise levels, air activity and 
armoured vehicles crossing public roads.1 A spokesperson from Exercise Control 
asked local people for “[…] their co-operation and understanding to ensure that the 
Armed Forces maintain their genuine operational effectiveness”, and Lieutenant 
Colonel Mike Beard, Commandant of SPTA remarked that “[…] horse owners 
should take extra care when there is low flying”. For the residents of Andover, 
Tidworth, Upavon, Burbage, Pewsey, Devizes, Everleigh, Lavington, Tilshead, 
Durrington, Bulford, Amesbury and the dozens of other smaller villages that 
surround the Plain the military presence is an everyday fact of life. It permeates the 
                                                
1 'Major military exercise to be held on Salisbury Plain', Andover Advertiser, 15th July, 2008. 
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most unlikely aspects of daily existence. A low-flying Apache helicopter drowns a 
conversation in a local library, a single gun shot sets a nervous dog howling for a 
couple of minutes or a wake of diesel smoke is drawn after a convoy of 
camouflaged vehicles. For most, however, these unexpected and often residual 
intrusions have become part of the texture of life in this area. For some the effects 
of the military presence have become normalised, for others they are simply normal. 
For newcomers and visitors, however, they can be annoying and sometimes 
frightening acts of  personal intrusion. But the absence of a popular movement 
against the military presence speaks of an institution that is utterly embedded in the 
social fabric of the region. The era of mass land appropriation and local community 
action seems to be over. In fact, for many, particularly those within the military, the 
armed services are custodians of the historic landscape, preserving it against 
intensive agriculture and the encroachment of modern developments. The degree 
to which Salisbury Plain has been spared the exhaustive spread of industrial, 
agricultural and infrastructural forms will be assessed in the following chapter in 
relation to the supposed ‘greening of the MoD’ and its brand of  ‘Khaki 
conservation’.2 Is the MoD simply paying lip service to the green lobby and the 
heritage industry by promoting ‘token’ or perhaps even inadvertent successes like 
the thriving Fairy Shrimp or the recent reintroduction of Great Bustards on to 
Salisbury Plain? Are the numerous vestiges of historic settlements that litter the 
plain being cared for in a systematic way or have they simply become obstacles to 
tank training? The following chapter will demonstrate that these emotive issues are 
once again, inextricably linked to the rigorous subdivision of space and the 
technologically-enabled management of this vast region of the British countryside. 
Salisbury Plain is managed as a complex. Its planning is controlled by a single 
agency for the purpose of simulating warfare. Each element within the complex, 
including the land itself, the movement of soldiers and armoured vehicles across it, 
the management of the airspace architecture, helicopter and fast jet activity, live 
firing and long range artillery training, parachute drops, barrack accommodation, 
administration and the myriad of infrastructural services are all controlled for the sole 
purpose of training a continuous influx of soldiers for battle. The Great Bustard 
reintroduction project, the thriving population of Fairy Shrimps and the 2,300 
                                                
2 Rachel Woodward, 'Khaki conservation: an examination of military environmentalist 
discourses in the British Army', Journal of Rural Studies, Vol. 17, no. 2, 2001, pp. 201-17. 
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archaeological sites are not external to this systematic subdivision of space. They 
too are incorporated as elements within an ever adaptive complex. The following 
chapter will examine how this is achieved and to what aims. It will also analyse the 
interconnection of some of the key elements within the overall complex, united as 
they all are by the articulation of militarised space. What follows is a spatial 
interpretation of Salisbury Plain, one which will address the extreme and diverse 
military presence in the region, how it is distinct from the area that surrounding it but 
also how it intersects with civilian space. The chapter will also show that while the 
notion of ‘Salisbury Plain’ may mean different things to different people, the MoD’s 
conception of the region is very much as a collection of connected spaces and 
processes that form a single, cohesive military complex. This conception of 
Salisbury Plain may be one of many but it happens to have primacy as the 
dominant and most controlling ideology in the region.   
 
6.2 . Geographies 
Salisbury Plain is the United Kingdom’s principal area for training personnel from all 
three military services. It also acts as a training ground for NATO troops and those 
allied to British or NATO interests. As a designated Site of Special Scientific Interest 
(SSSI) Salisbury Plain ‘supports the largest known expanse of unimproved chalk 
downland in north west Europe’.3 The total area of the plain is 19,689 ha (48,655 
acres) which the MoD acquired in its entirety plus large sections of the surrounding 
farmland. The total area of land owned by the MoD for military use is 38,000 ha 
(93,900 acres), or approximately 40km by 16km (25 miles by 10 miles) and 
occupies one ninth the area of Wiltshire. The training area is roughly divided into 
three sections with the A345 public road following the river Avon between the east 
and central sections, and the A360 bisecting the central and western sections. With 
the Pewsey Vale to the north and the river Wylye Valley to the south, the plain rises 
to an plateaux of undulating grassland hills and rich dry river valleys. A wide variety 
of grasses and other flora support many rare species of butterflies, moths, bees, 
and many of the temporary pools formed by tank tracks are home to endangered 
crustaceans such as the Fairy Shrimp. The plain is also a breeding ground for birds 
such as the Hobby, Quail, Nightingale, Stonechat, Whinchat, Buzzard, Corn 
                                                
3 ‘County: Wiltshire/Hampshire: Site Name: Salisbury Plain’ English Nature document,  
<http://www.english-nature.org.uk/citation/citation_photo/1006531.pdf>, (accessed 08 
June 2009). 
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Bunting, Stone Curlews and on occasion, Montagu’s Harrier. After being extinct in 
the UK since the 19th century, a recent project saw the successful reintroduction of 
the Great Bustard to Salisbury Plain using birds from Saratov, Russia.4 Salisbury 
Plain may well be a significant focus point for troops around the world but these 
patterns of globalised behaviour also extend to the world of flora and fauna. While 
migrant birds and insects habitually move around the planet according to the needs 
of their species, and seeds drift on the prevailing winds, the first generation of 
Russian Bustards were undoubtedly selected because this high corner of Britain 
shares the same latitude as the Saratov Steppe. The irony of allowing these Russian 
émigré the free run of a British military training complex is not entirely lost on the 
army community.  
 
Aside from the many villages that surround the plain, the other major population 
centres are Andover to the east, Amesbury and Salisbury so the south, Devizes to 
the north across the Pewsey Vale, and Westbury and Warminster on the edge of 
the plain to the west. Salisbury Plain Training Area is also served by three major 
garrison towns: Larkhill in the central section, Bulford in the south of the east 
section and Tidworth, also in the east. Netheravon and Lugershall (both in the 
eastern section) also have a high percentage of military residents. Warminster, on 
the western edge of the plain is home to the Land Warfare Centre which 
coordinates training for every army range in the UK. Westdown Camp in the central 
section is the administrative heart of SPTA where major exercises and training 
activities are planned and coordinated. In many ways, this camp, though small and 
lacking sense of permanence, is largely responsible for the direction and forms of 
military activity in the region (see Figure 6.2).  
 
                                                
4 The Great Bustard Group, is a registered charity and a consortium of universities, 
conservation groups and government agencies. See their website for more information, 
<http://www.greatbustard.com/>, (accessed 08 June 2009) 
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Figure 6.2. Military Garrisons and camps, Salisbury Plain.  
 
 
The historic growth of these military towns will be described in greater detail below, 
but suffice to say that population density and urban developments in the region are 
broadly defined by the changing British military capability and its role in global 
conflicts. However, despite the fluctuating military presence over the last century 
(including the growth and subsequent removal of large camps on Salisbury Plain 
around the two world wars), the growth of the three main garrison towns has 
remained constant. Nowhere is this more evident than in the eastern section of the 
plain where the area will gain ‘Super Garrison’ status over the next five years. This 
fact is consistent with the main themes of this research which is to track the 
geographical shift and spatial consolidation of military sites in the UK.  Upavon, 
Tidworth, Lugershall and Bulford will all experience increased development to 
accommodate an influx of repatriated troops from British garrisons in Germany. 
Currently, however, the main garrison towns of, 
 
Tidworth, Bulford, Netheravon, Perham Down, Larkhill and Warminster 
Garrisons […] are home to around 10,000 military personnel, in mainly 
infantry and artillery units, and approximately 9,000 of their dependants.5  
 
These figures are expected to increase by 5,400 before 2012. The economic 
impact of the military presence in the area is evident both in sustained employment 
                                                
5 Sally Hunter, ‘Military Presence and Economic Significance in the South West Region’,  
Wiltshire Council, March 2009, p.27. 
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in the defence sector and a degree of localised social deprivation: figure 6.3 shows 
a ‘local economic area’ defined by Wiltshire County Council where, 
 
military personnel constitute around 2% of the total population, with direct 
military and civilian defence employment accounting for around 4% of total 
employment […]. As indicated above, these percentages increase 
significantly in the areas immediately surrounding the bases, particularly 
Tidworth, Bulford and Larkhill. The employment profile within the local 
economic area is dominated by base, business services and local 
commercial services sectors, largely reflecting the trends within the main 
urban centres. In the immediate vicinity of the bases, employment in 
commercial services is strongly influenced by the defence presence, with a 
large proportion of employment in this sector providing services to the 
military bases.6 
 
Tidworth also benefits from military investment in infrastructure and extensive leisure 
facilities for civilian use. But, as Woodward suggest, nationally ‘there is a basic lack 
of easily accessible data on the economic and financial contribution of military 
establishments to their localities’,7 and broader social effects of a military presence 
may well be detrimental to the civilian community or the dependents of military 
personnel. At Tidworth, for instance:  
 
Skills levels are below average, with 12% of Tidworth CA population 
educated to degree level or above, compared with 21% for the county as a 
whole. The profile identifies low skills levels, poor self-esteem and a lack of 
suitable local employment as a particular problem amongst military 
dependants. Despite lower than average class sizes, education 
achievements at Key Stage 3 and GCSE level are significantly lower than the 
average for Wiltshire.8 
 
 
 
                                                
6 Hunter, ‘Military Presence and Economic Significance in the South West Region’,  p.29. 
7 Woodward, Military Geographies, p.44 
8 Mark Temple, Julia Hawley, Andy Frost, ‘Impact of the Military on the Agricultural Sector in 
Wiltshire’,  Wiltshire Council, May 2008, p.9. 
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Figure 6.3. Defined local economic area around the Salisbury Plain garrisons. The Salisbury 
Plain Training Area is highlighted and the Super Garrison bases shown in red. Source: 
Wiltshire County Council.  
 
 
While these facts are difficult to attribute to military presence alone and economic 
research in this area remains very limited, the negative anecdotal evidence of crime 
and deprivation in garrison towns across the UK still prevails. Education levels, 
employment statistics, and the limited indices of social deprivation point to the 
military presence in the region as a highly significant social influence. Every town 
may be unique and may depend on their particular dominant local employers, but 
garrison towns are unique because of their direct association with nearby military 
sites but also because they represent a  place of civilian and military interaction. For 
better or worse, garrison towns are places infused with the markers of military life 
and the mundane, fearful expectancy of war. 
 
Chapter 6. Case study 2: Salisbury Plain Training Estate 
 
114 
6.3. Histor ies of  reconnaissance and archaeology 
The territorial control of Salisbury Plain may have increased with fits and starts over 
the course of the 20th Century, but during this process of expansion the landscape 
was continuously mapped and remapped – every inch of military land understood in 
terms of its value as a resource. It is well known that mapping has always been 
central to territorial expansion and the control of space, but the former is dependant 
on many different forms of reconnaissance. While adapted Ordnance Survey maps 
may have been sufficient for military planners to manage training activities on 
Salisbury Plain, the aerial reconnaissance techniques developed in the First World 
War were continued over the landscape of southern England: great swathes of the 
countryside were photographed between the wars by the British Army and the RAF 
as part of navigation and reconnaissance training. The military conception of the 
British landscape is one that has, somewhat reluctantly, come to incorporate 
elements of historical and archaeological heritage but it was principally the work of 
O.G.S Crawford and his associates that drew the two seemingly incompatibly 
worlds together.   
 
A veteran of the Givenchy trenches and committed archaeologist, O.G.S Crawford 
seized an opportunity to exploit the hundreds of aerial photographic negatives 
languishing in drawers at the Old Sarum Airfield near Salisbury Plain, and set about 
studying them for geographical irregularities.9 He was struck by the unusual 
shadows cast in the early and evening light of features that would ordinarily be 
invisible to the earth-bound archaeologist. These photographs of barely perceptible 
patterns in the landscape suggested human settlements of various kinds: hill forts, 
old pathways, burial mounds and field systems. Using this method Crawford 
established the exact location of the Eastern branch of the Stonehenge Avenue, 
evidence of which was, quite literally, thin on the ground. This victory was by no 
means an accident: Crawford, an Oxford graduate in Geography, already saw the 
potential of aerial photography having undertaken a number of reconnaissance 
fights over the Western Front. He also astutely realised that if ‘aerial archaeology’ 
was to have a credible future it had to establish itself quite conclusively from the 
outset, and Stonehenge itself was the perfect popular catalyst. In the spring and 
summer of 1924 Crawford undertook a aerial survey of Berkshire, Dorset, 
                                                
9 For more on O.G.S Crawford see Kitty Hauser, Bloody Old Britain: O.G.S. Crawford and 
the archaeology of modern life, London: Granta, 2008. 
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Hampshire, Somerset and Wiltshire, looking out for possible archaeological 
remains. The photographs and accompanying commentaries were published as 
Wessex from the Air in 1928, a book that would reinvigorate the disciplines of 
archaeology and geography. Despite Crawford’s assertion that Salisbury Plain had 
been so damaged by military activity that archaeological research should be 
concentrated on Marlborough Downs, his discoveries on Salisbury Plain let to many 
subsequent land surveys and archaeological investigations culminating with Simon 
Crutchley’s comprehensive report for English Heritage in 2000.10 As an employee of 
Ordnance Survey, Crawford also expressed a critical view of the State’s destruction 
of its own archaeological heritage, and describes how, 
 
[…] in the name of something (misleadingly in his opinion) called defence, 
aerodromes, barracks, and other buildings pepper the countryside including 
areas of great archaeological interest like Salisbury Plain […], Lulworth Cove 
in Dorset, and Pembrokeshire Coast.11 
 
Crawford’s observation, however, was supplanted by the irony of future 
developments: Marlborough Downs would be given over to intense agriculture 
which would destroy evidence of historical sites and the British military would come 
to remodel themselves as responsible custodians of Salisbury Plain’s ancient 
heritage, defenders against urban encroachment.  
 
Crutchley’s survey acknowledges Crawford’s contribution to aerial photography 
and goes on describe a landscape saturated with historical evidence. A total of 
4261 sites were subsequently recorded with many more areas of the Plain yet to be 
examined. Of the 50 Neolithic sites catalogued five were identified as henges but 
the majority were barrows and mortuary enclosures. Stonehenge, of course, dates 
from this period as does the adjacent Greater Cursus which, at 9,090 ft in length is 
one of the largest ancient sites on Salisbury Plain. The vast majority of the 1186 
catalogued Bronze Age sites were identified as funereal barrows are ritualistic sites 
of some kind. A small number, however, seem to be defensible enclosures while 
others are quite clearly linear ditches or so-called ‘ranch boundaries’. The Iron Age, 
                                                
10 Simon Crutchley, ‘Salisbury Plain Training Area: A report for the National Mapping 
Programme’,  English Heritage; 2008, Series Aer/3/2000. 
11 Hauser, Bloody Old Britain, pp.201-202. 
Chapter 6. Case study 2: Salisbury Plain Training Estate 
 
116 
by contrast, only yields 60 identifiable sites. While this may seem surprisingly few, 
the report states that many more probable site are categorised simply as ‘Unknown 
Prehistoric’ when it is not possible to attribute a identifying period with any certainty. 
Of the Iron Age sites eight are well known hill forts of considerable size. Battlebury, 
Scratchbury, Bratton Camp, Casterley Camp, Sidbury, Yarnbury (Main) and 
Yarnbury (Early), Knook and Chisenbury Trendle all occupy elevated positions with 
commanding views across much of the Plain. Six of them are the ‘largest features 
dated to the Iron Age, all over 100,000m2’.12 These enormous defensible sites are 
some of the finest remaining examples in the United Kingdom which, arguably, 
would not be here today if it were not for the military presence. Access to some of 
these hill forts remains restricted, however. There are a small number of field 
systems attributed to this period and many small Iron Age enclosures (defensible or 
otherwise) distributed around the plain, most of which are roughly a hectare in size 
or larger. The presence of defensible sites such as these is testament to a long 
history of battles and military activity in the UK and it is curious to reflect that they 
are situated within (and to a degree, defended by) the much larger military zone of 
Salisbury Plain itself.  Chisenbury Warren accounts for 44 of the 91 sites attributed 
to the Roman period, the majority of which are settlements that would have 
consisted of a number of individual houses. All that remains are rectilinear 
undulations in the landscape, foundation platforms for villas perhaps. While the 
village of Imber is often regarded as the most notable deserted community on 
Salisbury Plain, Crutchley’s report records a total of 13 villages and tofts, deserted 
during the Medieval period, with associated boundaries, field systems, fish ponds 
and trackways. Dozens of other field systems are evident: 85 lynchets, 74 blocks of 
ridge and furrow and 26 examples of stock enclosure also date from this period.  
 
Its is interesting that Cructhley and English Heritage have chosen to catalogue sites 
from the modern era which almost entirely consist of vestiges of military activities, 
architecture, camps, vehicles and weapons. While these sites (approximately 10% 
of the of the total number of sites catalogued) undoubtedly constitute an important 
part of the historical fabric of Salisbury Plain Training Area, it is remarkable that this 
impact should have happened in the relatively short time frame of one century. 
                                                
12 Crutchley, ‘Salisbury Plain Training Area: A report for the National Mapping Programme’, 
p.31 
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What O.G.S Crawford glimpsed and what subsequent analyses have revealed is a 
palimpsest of human activity, history inscribed on a bare landscape that has 
remained exposed to the sky for centuries. Almost everything around it, however, 
has been erased by intensive farming, industrial production, urban development and 
an inexorably subdividing transport network. 
 
In a great leap of  imagination, the invisible ‘shadow sites’ of Salisbury Plain were 
revealed by O.S.G Crawford and his application of a burgeoning military 
reconnaissance technology: aerial photography.13 Aerial and satellite photography is 
taken for granted today but intelligence gathering during the First World War was 
extended into a new realm by the elevation of human vision, a major shift in the 
‘logistics of perception’, as Virilio puts it.14 This was a technology that captured 
images of the land below for the purpose of strategic dissection and territorial 
control. Into this calculating and systematised perception of the landscape 
Crawford introduced the boundless depths of historical interpretation. By subverting 
the strategic spatial delineations of aerial photography in this manner, he 
transformed the technique into something more than a tool for future 
archaeologists, geographers and environmentalists, something more than an 
objectifying tool for scientific enquiry. He introduced the possibility that it could 
become art. The pristine objectivity of the aerial photograph was a quality that 
transferred easily to Crawford’s earth-bound shots of buildings and weathered 
advertising hoardings; scenes of social cohesion and capitalist intrusions. Scenes of 
archaeological sites are equally immaculate. It is not clear if Crawford ever 
considered his photographs to be works of art. What we find, however, is that 
across his whole corpus there is both a simple, formal brilliance and an almost 
faultless simplicity to his compositions. Above all, it is one that simultaneously 
recognised the beauty of the landscape, its historical and social constitution, and its 
ongoing transformation. This is a perspective at once severed from the logic of 
power and control from which it came.  
 
6.4 . Histor ies of  appropriat ion. 
                                                
13 Kitty Hauser, Shadow sites: photography, archaeology, and the British landscape, 1927-
1955, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
14 Paul Virilio, War and cinema: the logistics of perception, London: Verso, 1989. 
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There is a sense in which Salisbury Plain has always been under military control. 
Like Stonehenge itself, the military cast a permanent and commanding presence 
across the chalk downs. The red flags, lanterns, stop-gates and warning signs that 
surround the danger areas seem to reside in that curious register of British 
anachronisms along with red telephone boxes, Brighton rock and Little Chefs. To 
subtly infuse the landscape with military warning markers may or may not be a 
deliberate appeal to a sense of historical lineage, but the effect is one of subliminal 
authority and almost patriotic acquiescence. To defy the signs would not only be 
foolhardy, it would be a rejection of the inalienable permanence of the military 
institution.  
 
In fact, the Army arrived somewhat in desperation, at the end of the 19th century. 
Large scale manoeuvres had been held at various sites around the country, 
including Salisbury Plain, but the logistics of supplying accommodation, transport, 
food and water to temporary training areas on private land was an ongoing burden. 
The decision to acquire land was facilitated by the Military Manoeuvres Act of 1897, 
described in Chapter 3, and in the same year 303.5 ha (750 acres) were purchased 
at Bulford for the price of £7,500.15 By 1902 a total of 16,996 ha (42,000 acres) had 
been purchased by the War Office Salisbury Plain committee. While the owners of 
the land may have changed, the resident agricultural community were offered new 
rents and new terms depending on where they were situated in relation to the 
intensity of military activity. These areas become known as Schedule I, II, or III. 
 
Under Schedule I, full agricultural tenancies were granted on land principally 
around the training estate’s periphery, where livestock could safely graze. 
The areas were clearly marked, to prevent troops from disturbing them. 
However, the war office reserved the rights for troops to use these areas 
whenever failure to do so would create an artificial tactical situation. In this 
event, compensation would be paid to the farmer for any damage caused. 
The war office required that Schedule II land should be kept as permanent 
grassland […] Schedule III land covered the remaining estate, where troops 
could manoeuvre at any time.16 
                                                
15 Henry Buckton, Salisbury Plain: home of Britain's military training, Stroud: Phillimore, 
2008, p.1. 
16 Buckton, Salisbury Plain, p.5. 
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Despite having grown considerably, this regime of land management is still largely in 
effect today with the different types of land classifications clearly marked on recent 
military maps of the region. Schedule I land still acts a kind of buffer between the 
hazardous military landscape (Schedule II and III) at the core of SPTA and the 
surrounding British countryside.  
 
Tidworth camp was quickly establish over two abandoned villages but it wasn’t until 
1904-5 that permanent barracks blocks were built with associated accommodation 
for officers, roads to link them, a sewage works and an isolation hospital. The 
template for a permanent British Army garrison town had already been established 
at Aldershot but photographs of Tidworth from this period convey the sense of a 
town at the frontier of human civilisation surrounded by a benign wilderness, or 
perhaps a town isolated from the rest of humanity for some unspecified reason. The 
leap from the almost timeless model of a military community under canvas, transient 
and temporary in the landscape, to an almost pioneerist model of land annexation 
and permanence was quickly taking shape. Bulford camp followed next, growing 
quickly to the east of Bulford village and spreading over to Durrington on the 
western side of the river Avon. Eight lines of wooden barracks were initially built, 
each for a separate unit with ‘guardroom, regimental offices, messes for both 
officers and sergeants, and married quarter for officers and all other ranks’.17  
 
The War Office’s initial intention was to purchase land only east of the Avon. 
However, developments in artillery and new rifles such as the Lee-Enfield extended 
the hazardous range of army ballistics. In 1898, all 7,813 acres of the Nethervon 
Estate had been bought and the Cavalry School was established at Netheravon 
House, with additional with additional barracks around the estate. Rifle ranges 
began to appear all around the Plain and Larkhill was chosen as the principle long-
range artillery training area. The range was again extended to the Salisbury-Devizes 
road, and later in 1911 a new tract of land was purchased at West Down near 
Tilshead. A number of small camps were established before the First World War 
such as Pond Farm Camp on West Down, Durrington Camp, Fargo Down Camp, 
Rollestone Camp, Hamilton Camp and Bustard Camp, but it was Larkhill that would 
                                                
17 Buckton, Salisbury Plain, p.15. 
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emerge as the third garrison town on the Plain after the School of Gunnery moved 
there from Shoeburyness in 1914.  
 
In just 15 years the eastern section of Salisbury Plain had been bought or annexed 
for military activities, but the Army’s expansions were not only anchored to the 
surface of the plain. Their relationship with the sky began with the balloon trials 
which it used as a form of aerial surveillance. Balloons had already been deployed 
for reconnaissance at the end of the 19th century in operation across the African 
colonies, and the Balloon Company of the Royal Engineers held several trials and 
training courses at Larkhill and across Salisbury Plain. Larkhill, however, had 
suddenly become the focus for production and trials of the aeroplane. The 
increasing realisation that airpower would redefine future warfare led to the creation 
of the Royal Flying Corps in 1912 (split into military and naval wings) and the 
construction of a dedicated airfield at Upavon Down.18 Two more airfield at Upper 
and Lower Netheravon followed quickly after, bringing Salisbury Plain to the 
forefront of experimental aviation. Edgerton’s England and the Aeroplane brilliantly 
dismantles the myth that Britain was in some way backward in identifying the 
military application of manned flight: the fever pitch efforts at Salisbury demonstrate 
that Britain was at least as able at developing the technology necessary to establish 
an aerial capability as any other major global power.19 During the First World War 
further airfields were built at Stonehenge (used by the School of Navigation and 
Bomb Dropping), Lake Down and Red House Farm, later known as Boscombe 
Down - an airfield which continues to be integral to the development of British and 
US military technologies. The Key airfields of Larkhill, Upavon and Netheravon 
experienced continued growth during this period, and finally at the end of the war 
the Royal Flying Corp and the Royal Naval Air Service combined to become the 
Royal Air Force. 
 
During the First World War, Salisbury Plain saw a massive influx of troops, not only 
from Britain but Canada, Australia and New Zealand, all requiring training in one 
form or another. Their arrival necessitated a massive expansion of the existing 
camps, some of whose streets now bear names such as a Wellington Lines, 
                                                
18 Buckton, Salisbury Plain, p.26, ‘When the airfield was created on Upavon Down 
archaeologists were invited to watch the levelling of a Bronze-Age barrow which was 
obviously regarded as a hazard to aviators landing and taking off’. 
19 David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane, Macmillan, 1991. 
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Canterbury Lines, Auckland  and Otago Lines. Thousands of bell tents were raised 
to accommodate those troops not lucky enough to be billeted or barracked. 
Conditions were harsh without the basic amenities of the built camps. Diseases like 
tuberculosis and meningitis spread easily, and this was before the troops even 
made it to battle. More camps were hastily built: Bustard Camp, Sling Camp, West 
Down South and West Down North camps, and Pond Farm Camp were thrown up 
quickly by visiting troops. Large military hospitals were built at Sutton Veny, Fargo 
Plantation, Punch Bowl Bottom, Codford and Bulford, and the main camps saw 
improved leisure facilities – all as a drive to hastily improve the general conditions for 
the flood of international soldiers. However, by December 1914 there were still 
11,000 troops under canvas on Salisbury Plain so the decision was taken to billet 
them in the surrounding towns and villages until permanent provision could be 
made for them. Between 1914 and 1929 the infrastructure of the main garrisons 
continued with the expansion of the Larkhill Military Railway which conveyed troops, 
artillery and goods between camps, firing ranges, hospitals and airfields. 
 
In addition to more traditional field exercises such as rifle practice and hand to hand 
combat training, practice trenches were dug at many locations, a fact which 
emphasised the changing face of modern warfare and the ongoing need to 
replicate different types of built environments. This methodology continues to this 
day with simulated urban environments or FIBUA villages (Fighting in Built Up Areas) 
such as the ersatz Cold War era Bavarian village and ‘middle eastern’ streets on 
Copehill Down and Imber (see Figure 6.1). 
 
After the end of hostilities and the remaining overseas troops had left, the dozens of 
temporary camps were dismantled and the villages of Codford and Sutton Veny 
could return to normal life again. A consolidation of the three garrison towns began 
with new accommodation, better leisure facilities, football and polo pitches, and the 
first Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes (NAAFI) bars and canteens were 
established. The army had by now grown used to training on so much of the 
surrounding Plain, particularly in the west where a number of temporary camps had 
to be relinquished after the war. Between 1929 and 1932 the War Office 
controversially purchased the whole of the village of Imber and the surrounding 
estates for approximately £400,000 excluding the church, the school, the Baptist 
chapel and the village inn. A total of 27,158 acres were bought from the various 
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estate owners and the land was effectively leased back to them for farming under 
Schedule I or III terms. However, the 130 tenants of Imber were evicted in 1943 on 
the understanding that they would be allowed to return in six months.20 Despite a 
public enquiry in 1962 and repeated public protestation, Imber remains a ghost 
village, overgrown and damaged beyond repair. For a few days a year the MoD 
allows limited access to Imber for memorial services and for graves to be tended, 
but effectively the village has simply become one of the many thousands of 
historical sites across the Plain, managed and mostly avoided by the armed 
services.  
 
 
The incremental annexation and transformation of Salisbury Plain continued 
throughout the Second World War with the establishment of permanent tanks 
ranges. These armoured mobile weapons had been a sporadic presence across the 
plain, particularly at Perham Down, since 1922.21 ‘A very effective tank lobby which 
made Britain the leading tank power of the 1920s’ ensured that land was 
purchased around Warminster for the exclusive use of the tank.22 Village roads 
around Salisbury Plain were strengthened with concrete to take the extraordinary 
weight of these vehicles, hangers and barracks were built at Warminster, Tidworth 
and Perham Down to accommodate the influx of units from the Royal Tanks Corps. 
Above all, armoured warfare had irrevocably altered the character of training on the 
plain: tanks units were now fully integrated into training programmes and exercises, 
huge clouds of chalk dust and smoke would be visible from miles around and the 
monstrous churning of advancing squadrons would be felt across the downs. 
However, the disastrous ‘Battle of Hungerford’ training manoeuvre of 1934 exposed 
doubts that tanks could effectively dominate future warfare. During this apparent 
fiasco the tanks were over-reliant on infantry and extensive logistical support, they 
slid backwards down hills spraying burning petrol in the air or they ungainly flipped 
over before bemused onlookers. In Royal Tank Corp circles ‘the Battle of 
Hungerford, was long remembered as the event that discredited mechanisation and 
set back the modernisation of the British Army for years’.23 Major General J.F.C 
                                                
20 WO 32/17163, Imber Training Area, Salisbury Plain: acquisition of village and proposed 
maintenance programme, 1947-1973. 
21 Buckton, Salisbury Plain, p.72. 
22 Edgerton, Warfare state: Britain, 1920-1970, p.45. 
23 Patrick Wright, Tank: the progress of a monstrous war machine, London: Faber, 2001, 
p.186. 
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Fuller’s ‘occult’ vision of a fully mechanised army leading to an ‘epoch-making 
“Reformation of War”’24 was undone by the pragmatic need for flexible battlegroups 
and strategies, something which the tank could only ever be a part of.  The tank 
lobby was in retreat and as the Second World War approached, Chamberlain 
redirected the defence budget towards anti-aircraft and home defence. 
Nevertheless, experimentation and training with armoured vehicles continued 
throughout and after the Second World War on Salisbury Plain. Today, the tanks 
and armoured vehicles are extensively used across the plain by many regiments 
including the 2nd Royal Tanks Regiment based at Tidworth. The movement of tanks 
is one of the most obviously visible and destructive form of military activity on the 
plain. During the period between 1945 and 1990, tanks and other armoured vehicle 
have contributed to a sustained reduction in the chalk grassland across SPTA with 
an ‘average annual increase in bare ground since WWII […] in the region of 
25.5 ha’.25 Despite the implementation of the Integrated Land Management Plan by 
Defence Estates, more recent studies have concluded that vehicles such as the 64 
ton Challenger II tank can still create significant long-term damage to vegetation and 
soil communities across the plain.26 Satellite images from 2002 convey an almost 
alien landscape, criss-crossed with hundreds of chalk-white lines intersecting 
across the rolling plains. These lines, in turn, connect to the main hardened transit 
routes around the circumference of each major section and to the hangers in the 
garrisons. Repeated training patterns leave distinct traces (which can take years to 
disappear) and form new layers within the historical palimpsest of Salisbury Plain. 
Amid shifting mud banks and sodden thickets of vegetation the tank crushes and a 
blasts its way across the downs. In this precarious and unlikely landscape its 
occupants prepare for battle in the desert regions of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
6.5  Spaces o f archaeo logy 
As we have seen, the current military geographies of Salisbury Plain Training Area 
have a history that stretches back over a century, a history that is defined almost 
                                                
24 See Wright, Tank, for a comprehensive account of Fuller’s dubious role as a military 
intellectual. Aside from his standing as a fascist sympathiser and as an acolyte of the mystic 
Aleister Crowley, the validity of Fuller’s criticisms of the British Army and its apparent 
resistance to the mechanisation during the inter-war years has been largely downplayed.  
25R.A Hirst, R.F Pywell, P.D Putwain, 'Assessing habitat disturbance using an historical 
perspective: The case of Salisbury Plain military training area', Journal of Environmental 
Management, Vol. 60, no. 2, October 2002, pp. 181-93. 
26 R.A Hirst, R.F Pywell, R.H Marrs, P.D Putwain, 'The resistance of a chalk grassland to 
disturbance', Journal of Applied Ecology , Vol. 40, no 2, April 2003, pp. 368-379. 
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entirely by changing military strategies and technologies. While the surrounding 
landscape was being shaped by industrial modernity, increases in population, 
changes in modes of transport and intensive agriculture, Salisbury Plain was left 
exposed only to the intensities of modern warfare. The systematic delineations of 
twentieth century agriculture may be visually apparent in modern field systems, but 
the effects of military activity are much harder to quantity because of their transitory 
and often instantaneous manifestations. In addition, military zones by their very 
nature resist access and interpretation. This section of the chapter aims to show the 
spatial diversity, complexity and intensity of military activity at SPTA and the 
surrounding areas by referring to recent exercises, conservation strategies, and the 
use of airspace as defining factors within a highly structured spatial complex.  
 
A cursory glance at recent satellite images of SPTA would seem to confirm military 
conviction that its three primary areas have largely been spared the transformations 
of the modern era. The plain appears to be an almost unadulterated oasis in an 
increasingly manufactured British Landscape, a beleaguered wilderness in an age of 
monoculture and nebulous conurbations. Closer inspection, however, reveals a 
landscape criss-crossed with vehicle tracks, pock-marked with impact craters and 
studded with unknown buildings and facilities. Cross-referencing these images with 
current military maps shows a terrain divided into twenty five major areas with many 
other smaller subdivisions.27 Figure 6.4 shows the overall configuration of these 
boundaries which are determined both by the topography of the landscape and a 
designated training function. For example, the central region is divided into two 
artillery impact areas (areas 15 and 16) for tank training and live firing. Within each 
area there are scatterings of firing points, datum points for coordinated targeting 
and observation posts positioned around the periphery. This area is littered with 
over a quarter of a million unexploded pieces of ordnance, from small mortars to 
1000 lb air-dropped bombs.28 It is also regularly swept by an ordnance disposal 
team who remove live ammunition where possible. At high resolution (Figure 6.5) a 
satellite photograph from 2002 reveals a large formation of tanks progressing in a 
northerly direction from the bottom of the impact area. An everyday occurrence on 
                                                
27 ‘United Kingdom Training Areas map 1:25,000, Salisbury Plain (West) and Salisbury Plain 
(Centre and East)’, Ordnance Survey (produced under the direction of Defence Geographic 
Centre and effective from January 2008). 
28 From an interview with Richard Osgood, head of the Historic Environment Team at 
Defence Estates (MoD), 9th October 2008. 
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SPTA, they seems to be heading for a circular subdivision within the impact area 
known as a Range Danger Area. However, transposed over this area of Charlton 
Down is another designated subdivision: an Environmental Site roughly two 
kilometres across. This is one of the best preserved Roman villages in the UK and 
as such is one of the 306 protected scheduled monuments on SPTA. Dozens of 
connected cropmark traces can be seen on aerial and satellite photographs, and 
over 200 house platforms are thought to be embedded in that part of the chalk 
down.29 Curiously, the site is also liberally pock-marked with small craters and a 
scattering of armoured vehicles can also be seen on the satellite image. This 
designated historic site (and the dozens of Iron Age tumuli in the immediate vicinity), 
highlights the paradox at the heart of Salisbury Plain: how is such an intensive and 
seemingly destructive form of military training conducive to the protection of this 
historic environment?  
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Salisbury Plain, internal military subdivisions. Source: Google Maps with 
additional data by M. Flintham based on current military maps of the region. 
 
                                                
29 Crutchley, Salisbury Plain Training Area, p.36. 
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Figure 6.5. A formation of armoured vehicles moves across Salisbury Plain. Image from 
Google Earth. 
 
This chapter previously looked at the physical effects of tanks trials on the 
landscape. The early 1990’s saw the greatest destructive impressions left by military 
activities - exacerbated, in part, by some of the wettest winters in decades. 
Conservationists were ‘appalled by the scale of destruction across the plain's 1,800 
barrows, field systems and ancient settlements’.30 Jocelyn Stevens, the chairman of 
English Heritage partly blamed ‘a breakdown in discipline - the failure of 
commanders to educate troops’. In many ways these scathing criticisms exposed 
an attitude oblivious to the historic environment and misjudged the supposed 
priorities afforded to military training. Today, while tanks trials still persist on SPTA 
the Historic Environment Team based at Westdown camp on SPTA maintain that 
military transgression into archaeological or environmental sites is extremely rare.31 
In addition, the team apparently work very closely with the MoD to preserve 
Scheduled Monuments in a variety of ways including the implementation of 
accepted environmental policies. Practically this means building timber palisade 
enclosures around many designated sites and restricting access to whole areas if 
necessary.32 However, because the raison d'etre of the Defence Estate Historic 
                                                
30 Peter Dunn, 'Tanks carve up heritage sites on Salisbury Plain’, Independent, Friday 29 
April 1994. 
31 According to Richard Osgood, the vast majority of damage done to archaeological sites is 
by rabbits and badgers. Water erosion is also a considerable problem for historic and 
environmental sites.  
32 Driving timber palisades into or around an archaeological site is a destructive process 
which could damage historic evidence. It also the one of the few methods available to 
ensure that infantry and armoured vehicles avoid the boundary of the site.  
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Environment Team is ultimately not to protect the historic sites but to ‘facilitate 
military training’, there is a will to actually integrate the archaeological and 
environmental elements into the  military exercise planning process.33 So rather than 
impede military operations, these sites actually augment training at SPTA. For 
example, the Roman linear ribbon development on Chapperton Down in the 
western section of the plain is out of bounds to military training because of its 
importance as an archaeological site. Rather than let this encumber army exercises 
the site has been incorporated as a ‘minefield’ into TESEX and armoured vehicle 
training exercises.34 In addition, a causeway has been built to allow non-destructive 
movement over the site during training. Other archaeological sites become 
‘obstacles’ to  be encountered and avoided on manoeuvres. British and 
international troops are apparently briefed on the locations of archaeological and 
environmental sites before the exercise begins and any anticipated military digging 
(foxholes, trenches, etc) must first be cleared with the Historic Environment Team.  
 
SPTA has a wide variety of soil types and densities, and experiences the full range 
of British weather. In order to gauge the moisture saturation level of a particular area 
and its suitability for heavy vehicles, the British Army has planted solar powered 
moisture probes across SPTA that can be remotely interrogated from a central 
control point. In this way the military landscape can be read as data which can be 
assessed against the weighting factor of particular vehicles. Once again SPTA is 
interpreted as a mutable, shifting environment whose changes must be carefully 
monitored and incorporated into military activities.  
 
The integration of archaeological and environmental sites into the overall training 
complex at SPTA is in line with shifting military conceptions of space. Where once 
space for training had to be simply acquired (and often brutalised in the process), 
now it must first be understood and interpreted; chaotic and entropic elements 
must be incorporated into an adaptive, evolving system. Archaeological and 
                                                
33 From an interview with Richard Osgood, head of the Historic Environment Team at 
Defence Estates (MoD), 9th October 2008. 
34 TESEX stands for Tactical Engagement Simulation Exercise – a form of training  that 
utilises laser-tag technology and blank rounds. When an individual or vehicle is shot or 
enters into a restricted area, their weapons are immobilised and warning lights flash to signal 
their status. Amongst other examples of archaeological sites that have been incorporated 
into military training, the Cursus near Stonehenge which cuts through the Royal School of 
Artillery boundary, is designated as a ‘minefield’ during TESEX and armoured vehicle training 
exercises. 
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environmental sites now constitute an additional layer in the expanding strata of 
geographical information to be assimilated during training and combat. Vestiges of 
historical events and places of cultural significance become integrated into this 
emergent power structure. The increasing focus on cultural heritage sites in warfare 
and training was highlighted in the recent Bosnian, Afghan and Iraqi conflicts where 
many sites were accidentally destroyed while others were deliberately attacked or 
targeted with the sole purpose of erasing cultural identity. While the USA and the 
UK claim never to have deliberately targeted such sites, they have yet to formally 
ratify the 1954 Hague Conventions and its associated protocols on the protection of 
cultural assets. However, in 2005, the UK declared its intention to ratify the 
Convention, citing that to not do so would damage the international standing of the 
United Kingdom.35 The UK’s hesitancy seems in some way linked to the 
particularities of limiting their impact on sites ‘situated near important military 
objectives’ which should be ‘placed under special protection’.36 This provision 
applies as much to the hundreds of heritage sites owned and occupied by the 
armed services in the UK as it does to those within international combat zones.  
 
6.6 . Spaces o f  management and rationa l isation 
Archaeological and environmental concerns undoubtedly shape the arrangement of 
functional training spaces on SPTA. The current subdivisions shown in Figure 6.4 
are defined by these and many other social and geographical factors, but each is an 
intensively used unit within a broader spatial arrangement. Indeed, each area is 
over-subscribed to the point where new technological management systems have 
been introduced to accommodate the increased training requirements. In 2002 
Landmarc Support Services (LSS) were awarded the contract to provide a range of 
services for the entire Army Training Estate (ATE), including facility management and 
range maintenance, accommodation, catering, radar surveillance, targetry and the 
implementation of a new nation-wide training range booking system named IRIS 
                                                
35 ‘Consultation Paper on: The 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two Protocols of 1954 and 1999’,  The 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport, 6 September 2005. 
<http://www.culture.gov.uk/> (accessed 20 June 2010). 
36 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with 
Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954, Chapter 2, article 8. 
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(Integrated Range Information System).37 The same system is implemented by 
DynCorp International for use by the US Department of Defence.  
 
The original [UK] system only operated on a regional basis and so did not 
provide a national overview. Furthermore, the accuracy and availability of the 
information was patchy, making it difficult to arrive at informed decisions.38 
 
While a new intranet booking system may seem mundane and not exactly worthy of 
serious critical attention, it may yet have far reaching implications for military land 
management.  The use of IRIS for the rationalisation of land-use across the entire 
11 Army Training regions is further evidence of the continued interconnection of the 
UK defence estate. Furthermore, the out-sourcing of land management across the 
defence estate centralises the administration of army training sites as a profit-driven, 
private sector concern.39 This aspect of military land-use rationalisation will be 
address in greater depth in Chapter 8, 9 and 10 but it is interesting to note that the 
relinquishment of range management by the British Army at SPTA to Landmarc is 
evident in increased land usage, from 600,000 person-days per annum to 
750,000.40 
 
6.7 . Airspaces 
The ‘militarised’ airspace of the UK is a highly regulated continuum of invisible but 
complex architectures. Many exist for only a few minutes at a time, others exist for 
fixed durations but many more are permanently off-limits to passing civilian aircraft. 
The intersection of permanent aerodrome volumes, bombing ranges, temporary 
NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) zones, Air Tactical Areas (ATA) around the coasts and 
                                                
37 ‘Annual Report 2002/3: Facilitating Training and Protecting the Environment’,  Army 
Training Estate, 2002/3, pp.11-12, 
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/57B9124C-5B67-4069-A58E-
46A2C1D4F290/0/dte_ann_report_0203.pdf>, (accessed 12 June 2010). 
38 'Landmarc Update: Progressing with ATE', Focus, no. 12, August 2005, p.8, 
<http://www.interserveplc.co.uk/Images/focusissue12august20091.pdf>, (accessed 10 
June 2009). 
39 ‘Public-Private Partnerships in United Kingdom Defence: Opportunities and Risks’, Royal 
United Service Institute, 2006, 
<http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Public_Private_Partnership_in_UK_Defence.pdf>, 
(accessed 10 June 2009). 
40 Mark Temple Julia Hawley, Andy Frost, 'Impact of the Military on the Agricultural Sector in 
Wiltshire',  Wiltshire County Council, May 2008, p.3, 
<http://www.wiltshire.gov.uk/communityandliving/militarycivilianintegrationprogramme.htm>, 
(accessed 12 June 2010). 
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low-fly zones combine to form a uniquely managed environment, one that 
coordinates a high volume of mixed air traffic.  
 
Being the largest military training area in the UK, SPTA has a uniquely complex 
arrangement of airspace volumes, each of which differ in size and altitude.41 Their 
unusual facetted shapes are determined by the activities that predominate within 
them. For instance, the Everleigh and Bulford Danger Areas rise to an altitude of 
14,00 feet because the eastern section of SPTA is principally used for helicopter 
exercises, ‘dry training’42 and small calibre ballistics only. With advanced notification 
the Danger Area altitude can rise to 50,000 feet to accommodate fast jets and 
Hercules aircraft.  By contrast, the vast Imber and Larkhill Danger Areas are set at a 
standard altitude of 50,000 ft because of the proliferation of large caliber ballistics, 
pilotless target aircraft, fast jet activity and freefall bombing. The Lavington Danger 
Area is a limitless column that rises between the Imber and Larkhill areas and has a 
radius of one and a half nautical miles.43 According the National Air Traffic Service 
(NATS) the column is used for ‘vertical firing’ and is quite possibly used by the 
Cranfield University Ordnance Test and Evaluation Centre (COTEC) which lies at the 
centre of the Danger Area, for testing various missiles and pyrotechnics including 
‘white phosphorous’.44 These five Danger Area volumes partially overlap two 
additional Military Air Traffic Zones (MATZ) above AAC Middle Wallop and MoD 
Boscombe Down allowing free transit of helicopters and other aircraft into SPTA. 32 
km (20 miles) to the north is RAF Lyneham which supplies Hercules transporter 
aircraft for parachute training. Fast jets from bases across UK and Europe also take 
part in coordinated land and air exercises at SPTA. Airspace volumes at SPTA will 
also be studies in detail in Chapter 9. 
 
                                                
41 The Civil Aviation Authority designation for each SPTA danger area is as follows: Imber: 
EG D123, Larkhill: EG D125, Everleigh: EG D128, Bulford: EG D126, Lavington: EG D124, 
Porton: EG D127. Although not strictly within the boundary of SPTA, Porton remains integral 
to military training operation in the area. See, ‘ENR 2 – Air Traffic Services Airspace’, Civil 
Aviation Authority,  
<http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-
B88E6002A6E7055DF02EFBA98BB946F2/7FE5QZZF3FXUS/EN/AIP/ENR/EG_ENR_2_1_e
n_2010-06-03.pdf>, (accessed 10 June 2010). 
42 ‘Dry training’ denotes training without live fire arms and ballistics.  
43 While the Danger Area structures are permanently in place they can be accessed by 
certain anticipated civil or military aircraft depending on the nature of the present hazard. 
44 Cranfield University Ordnance Test and Evaluation Centre (COTEC) website, 
<http://www.cotec.org.uk/what_we_do.htm>, (accessed 01 April 2010). 
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This architecture may be unusually complex and necessarily accommodating to a 
range of ballistics hazards and airborne activities but it is also one that currently 
resists Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). The CAA has strict guidelines regarding the 
use of UAVs for military or civilian use. It stipulates that UAVs over 7kg can only 
operate in UK airspace which is segregated (temporarily or otherwise) from that of 
manned aircraft.45  While this may, in part, be the impetus for developing smaller 
UAVs for domestic applications in urban environments, it also places considerable 
constraints on the MoD’s burgeoning UAV Watchkeeper program. Judging from a 
recent application to extend its military airspace to the region south of Salisbury 
Plain (Figure 6.6), the MoD must be having considerable difficulties in integrating 
these drones into training and Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRX). The 
Watchkeeper’s medium range capabilities are constrained by the existing airspace 
architecture at SPTA which itself is heavily regulated and highly dangerous in equal 
measure. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Proposed segregated airspace for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Source: 
Ministry of Defence and Ordnance Survey. Crown Copyright.
                                                
45 ‘Unmanned Aircraft System Operations in UK Airspace – Guidance’, Civil Aviation 
Authority,  
<http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/cap722.pdf>, (accessed 8 June 2009). 
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The design of this new segregated military airspace and the ensuing consultation 
process are being managed by QinetiQ on behalf of the MoD, and the opinions of 
local and national stakeholders organisations are also being solicited as a 
requirement of CAA procedure. But whether the new space will become a semi-
permanent Danger Area such as the ones currently in place over SPTA and many 
other sites around the country remains to be seen. If this were the case, however, 
another block of the sky would be appropriated by the MoD for training activity and 
another section of the civilian landscape will presided over by military/surveillance 
technology. The final go-ahead from the CAA may be some months away and as 
QinetiQ point out, the airspace design may be subject to changes.46 But however 
complicated and drawn-out this stakeholder procedure may seem, it is something 
that should be valued for its potential to expose the utility of the technology in 
question and any further incursions of military activity into the civilian realm. The 
projection of power into the skies continues with a similar proposal to segregate an 
area of airspace for drone activity over Aberporth, Wales (see Chapter 9). However 
benign the packaging (in this case job opportunities for the defence sector and the 
creation of a ‘centre of excellence’ for Wales) this migration of military surveillance 
technology from the combat zones to domestic airspace constitutes an alarming 
development in the continuing transformation of the defence estate.47 
 
6.8 . Conclusions 
It is possible that no other part of rural Britain is quite as intensively mapped and 
surveyed as Salisbury Plain. The intensity of geographical scrutiny, as we have 
seen, dates back to the arrival of the military before the First World War and 
continued with aerial surveillance photography throughout the Twentieth Century. 
O.G.S Crawford’s application of this technology for archaeological research 
invigorated interest in the region as a treasure trove of historical sites and academic 
speculation. The War Ministry’s gradual acquisition of the entire plain inadvertently 
spared it the homogeneous effects of intensive agriculture and saved the hundreds 
of ancient archaeological sites from destruction by the plough. This scenario later 
                                                
46 ‘MOD Airspace Change Proposal for Unmanned Aircraft’,  QinetiQ, 
<http://www.qinetiq.com/home_salisbury_uav.html>, (accessed 10 June 2010). 
47 ‘Consultation on An Airspace Change to Establish Segregated Airspace for The Wales 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Environment’, Welsh Assembly Government, 2009,  
<http://wales.gov.uk/docs/det/consultation/090507aberporthconsen.pdf>, (accessed 08 
June 09). 
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produced a somewhat unwelcome ‘catch 22’ situation in which the MoD now find 
itself the custodians of a ‘historic’ landscape, many elements of which will soon be 
protected under International law. The methods by which the MoD currently shields 
these sites from the destructive effect of military activity are incorporated directly 
into exercise planning procedures. The geographic particularities of the historic 
landscape are somehow fused with the destructive possibilities of modern warfare. 
Whether this elaborate but incongruous construction bares any relation to the 
chaotic realities of Helmand Province, for instance, is something only a returning 
soldier could answer. One element missing from this highly regulated structure is 
war itself; the chaotic unpredictability of battle and the imminence of death. 
 
Historically, the gradual acquisition of land for military use has mirrored the 
extending range of large caliber weapons and the requirement to accommodate 
mixed infantry, armoured and airborne units during large training exercises. Ballistics 
have always traveled through the air but the use of airspace for powered flight 
began almost as early as the first appropriation of land on Salisbury Plain. The 
establishment of Britain’s first aerodrome at Larkhill in 1909 began an experimental 
relationship with airspace that continues to the present day with the current 
Watchkeeper UAV programme. The recent delineation and appropriation of  
airspace for military use is perhaps just as significant as the mass acquisition of land 
for training during the twentieth century. At SPTA we find a rigorously controlled use 
of space which extends into three dimensions. The limits of its selectively permeable 
enclosures are not only signaled by quaint red flags and stop-gates but also by 
warning markers on aircharts. In addition, entry into SPTA airspace or associated 
MATZ would also be extremely unwelcome without prior arrangement and a very 
good reason. SPTA is very much a three dimensional military complex, much of 
which is camouflaged by increasing public access and media friendly exercises like 
the Great Bustard reintroduction programme. 
 
The Watchkeeper programme will go ahead - the future of the MoD’s  Network 
Enabled Capability (NEC) doctrine depends on it.48 The integration of unmanned 
airborne surveillance technology into networked military operations is a common 
                                                
48 ‘Network Enabled Capability’, Ministry of Defence, 2005, 
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/E1403E7F-96FA-4550-AE14-
4C7FF610FE3E/0/nec_jsp777.pdf>, (accessed 10 June 2010). 
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occurrence in contemporary warfare but the development of new systems occurs at 
domestic sites such as SPTA. The inevitable by-product of this situation is the 
segregation of more airspace for military purposes. In this way NEC is redefining not 
only the spaces of combat around the world but the spaces of training too. 
Ultimately, and rather worryingly, the CAA envisage a time when UAVs are fully 
integrated into all classes of airspace.49  
 
Salisbury Plain is unique not only because it is partly constituted on military training 
objectives. After all, the military have only been present on the plain for little over a 
hundred years, and as the numerous archaeological sites suggest, other human 
communities have been here for over five thousand years. The current annexation of 
land for military use may only be evident for future archaeologists as another curious 
layer in the archeological palimpsest. Perhaps it will reside in the category of 
‘defensible spaces’ along with Battlebury, Sidbury Hill, Scratchbury and Yarnbury 
Castle, or simply within a subcategory of anomalous enclosures. It may even seem 
remarkable that the area was largely spared the rigours of 20th and 21st century 
agriculture or that the remains of certain  ‘villages’ on the plain were totally devoid of 
human domestic artifacts. Future archaeologists may speculate, after unearthing 
hundreds of thousands of primitive ballistic projectiles, that the area was subject to 
the most intense machanised battles. The technologically-contrived complex as it 
stands today, the invisible castle in the sky, will collapse (or perhaps reconfigure), 
leaving only vestiges of a place that was once believed to be so critical to British 
military might. 
 
 
                                                
49 Plans are afoot to eliminate segregated airspace for drones and establish an integrated air 
traffic policy where manned and unmanned vehicles fly side by side. Industrial and military 
stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic seem to crave a future where UAV’s fill their 
domestic skies. In the USA, the Office of the Secretary of Defence stated in 2004, rather 
worryingly, that this must happen for the sake of national defence and homeland security. 
There is no reason to suspect that this strategy will change in the near future. Similar 
objectives are sought for the skies of the UK by a consortium of defence and aerospace 
giants called Astraea. Under license from the National Aerospace Technology Strategy, 
Astraea seeks to ‘reinterpret’ the current regulatory framework provided by the CAA. See 
Astraea website,  
<http://www.projectastraea.co.uk/?OBH=354>, (accessed 9 June 2009). 
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7.1 . Introduction. 
One of the basic aims of this research is to establish the ways in which space is 
defined by military activities, principles and governance. The focus here is on (but 
not limited to) the British military capability in the present era and to sites within the 
UK. There are many examples and case studies within this research of sites of 
various sizes, from clearly defined bases to whole islands, from flexible airspaces to 
infrastructural networks. This chapter, however, will concentrate on an entire city, 
one which has grown over the centuries around a diverse set of naval activities. 
Portsmouth has also become, by association, a significant centre of military-
industrial manufacturing. It is also necessary for this research to examine ways in 
which military activity extends into manufacturing processes which are today 
overwhelmingly provided by the private sector. In addition, this chapter means to 
consider another dimension in the seemingly limitless realm of military activity and 
production, the ways in which the coastal waters of the UK can be defined in 
military terms - as militarised spaces.  
 
Following the salient theme of this research, the city of Portsmouth and the military-
industrial presence within (and around) it will be studied in spatial terms. Portsmouth 
will be considered as a centre of naval power, a defended city, a military-industrial 
manufacturing base, but also as a city whose constitutive military parts have 
developed as a complex. Once again the spatial imperative in this research is driven 
by necessity since the military presence is not simply limited to the development of 
urban forms. It is apparent in everyday processes and events, in the 
electromagnetic spectrum, in the fluid dynamics of coastal navigation and in the 
projection of power through legislation and bylaws. 
 
Section 7.2 will broadly consider the variety of historical and current military spaces 
around the Portsmouth region. It will also consider how geographically defensive 
postures can change over time in relation to developments in weapons technology. 
It will demonstrate how the form and function of a military complex can change; 
how it can be a walled, consolidated unit or a collection of sites over a larger area. 
Like any strategically important place, Portsmouth’s defences are defined by any 
number of unique social, political and geographical factors. It will show how 
Portsmouth’s defences were prioritised around its dockyards which were 
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instrumental in maintaining British naval strength for the last 500 years. Section 7.3 
will study the geographical distribution of military-industrial sites in Portsmouth in 
relation to the development of the urban environment. It will do this in two ways: 
firstly, it will follow Raymond Riley’s study of the Naval presence in Portsmouth as 
the dominant urban organisational influence.1 Secondly it will draw upon recent 
work by the University of Portsmouth on the socio-economic impact of the regional 
military-industrial presence. Here the relevance of the dockyard will be considered 
as a continuing but less influential focus for the arrangement of military sites across 
the region. However, evidence of a broader manufacturing base and service 
provision industry will be assessed in its relation to the existing military sites, as will 
their relationship within a regionally diffused military-industrial dynamic. Section 7.4 
will assess the relationship between military port authority and the spatial dynamics 
of military training at sea. 
 
7.2 . The deve lopment o f reg ional  defence c lusters. 
The giant metallic edifice that presides over the city of Portsmouth does not appear 
to be of this world. Somehow it is neither a building, a weapon nor a vehicle, though 
it could conceivably be a fusion of all three (see Figure 7.1). The main hulk is roughly 
five or six stories high and clad in blue/grey riveted panels redolent of a late-20th  
century warship thrown together at short notice. At one end, however, extends a 
forbidding Dalek-like tower, perhaps 60 or 70 ft high, and crowned with a rotating 
ball spiked with antennas. In the land immediately around its base, an unusual array 
of masts, discs, balls and umbrella-like apparatus sprout like rhizomes. The whole 
threatening assemblage seems to have landed inside a heavily protected 
compound, or perhaps the razor-wired fences and gate houses were thrown up 
after the thing had landed to protect us from it. 
 
Maybe we had lingered too long (or maybe it was the sight of my companion 
squatting under the hood of his large-format camera), because security guards 
were rapidly on the scene and wasting no time in asking us to ‘voluntarily’ submit 
our names and addresses. The exchange was friendly but the request was absurd. 
It transpired that BAE Systems, the makers of this strange structure simply wished 
                                                
1 Raymond Riley, ‘Military and Naval Land Use as a Determinant of Urban Development – 
The Case of Portsmouth’, in M. Bateman and R. C. Riley, The Geography of defence 
London: Croom Helm, 1987. 
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to control the proliferation of images - of an object that was visible to just about 
anyone on either side of the chalk downs. In a surreptitious (but unsuccessful) 
attempt to take down my car details the guard caught up with us again at a mobile 
tea hut further down the road. This part of the BAE security/detective apparatus 
was friendly enough but warned us against further… looking. 
 
The Maritime Integration & Support Centre (MISC) on Portsdown Hill plays host to 
this weirdly retrogressive machine-building – actually a state-of-the-art radar 
commissioned by the MoD and destined for their new Type 45 Daring class 
destroyer ships.2 The Active Electronically Scanned Array (AECA) radar system, 
known as Sampson, is part of the Royal Navy’s new Sea Viper naval air defence 
system which is said to be able to track and destroy an object the size of a tennis 
ball travelling at Mach 3.3 Technologically, it more closely resembles the Phased 
Array system RAF Fylingdales in Yorkshire than it does a conventional pulse 
emitting radar.4 HMS Daring, the first of the Type 45s to be built, began Atlantic sea 
trials across the Benbecula rocket range in the Outer Hebrides during July 2006.5  
Beset by a whole range of financial problems (£1.5bn over its original budget for the 
fleet of six ships) and a host of departmental failings, HMS Daring entered service 
two years late on the 23rd July 2009 but will not reach full operational capability until 
2011 – or as Edward Leigh, Chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts put it, 
‘Here we have an Anti-Aircraft Destroyer which when it enters service will not 
actually be able to have any anti-aircraft capability yet’.6 
 
Presumably the trials of the Sampson radar prototype, stranded as it still is on 
Portsdown Hill, made full use of its strategic position. The views from this point 
stretch down to Portsmouth harbour, Gosport, the busy Spithead sea channel and 
across the Isle of Wight, nine miles to the south. The electromagnetic reach of 
                                                
2 ‘SAMPSON Multi-Function Radar’, Navy Matters,  
<http://navy-matters.beedall.com/sampson.htm>, (accessed 1 October 2009). 
3 ‘Britain Gets World’s Deadliest Destroyer’, Arab Times, Friday 30 January 2009. 
4 RAF Fylingdales is located on Snod Hill in the North York Moors and is part of the joint US 
and UK Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). AECA radars can broadcast 
signals or ‘beams’ on a number of frequencies simultaneously which can ‘hide’ within the 
normal register of background ‘noise’. This makes the signal relatively hard to detect and 
allows it to remains ‘stealthy’.  
5‘Type 45 Destroyer’ BAE Systems,  
<http://www.baesystems.com/type45/>, (accessed 5 October 2009). 
6 Ministry of Defence, Type 45 Destroyer: Thirteenth Report of Session 2009-10,  House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, The Stationery Office, 23 June 2009, p.21. 
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Sampson defines space hemispherically, detecting aircraft flying high above but 
also the approach of surface skimming objects and missiles. Scientists and 
operators inside BAE’s MISC installation undoubtedly spent countless hours and 
days fine-tuning their electromagnetic gaze over the region, refining the vision of this 
future weapon system over the bays, coves and tributaries of this South Hampshire 
coast. Its range is greater even than this: during recent trials Sampson was able to 
‘track and plot a firing solution for every aircraft arriving or leaving from Heathrow, 
Charles de Gaulle, Schipol and Frankfurt airports’.7 This ‘passive’ targeting mirrors 
the somewhat more aggressive tactics used by low-flying RAF jets who habitually 
select cars and houses as practice ‘targets’ across the Highland of Scotland.8 
 
The development of radar as an electromagnetic, dematerialized barrier, has its 
origins in the Second World War. The defence of Portsmouth as a significant naval 
port was, in part, provided by RAF Ventnor and RAF St. Lawrence on the Isle of 
Wight, both vital links in the Chain Home radar system that extended Britain’s vision 
across the English Channel. While radar gave Britain a significant new tool to defend 
itself, it did not prevent Portsmouth from suffering heavy bombing on several 
occasions during the war.  
 
The naval significance of Portsmouth relates, of course, to its geographical shape 
as one of the few sizable natural harbours on the south coast of the UK along with 
Poole, Southampton, Plymouth and those within the Thames estuary. Portsmouth 
Harbour, together with neighbouring Langstone and Chichester Harbours are three 
large concave ria; drowned river-valley landforms notable for their inter-tidal 
mudflats and tributaries. Portmouth harbour, however, is the most developed with a 
dense urban population concentrated on Portsea Island and extended conurbations 
and transport networks around the region. For nearly two thousand years the 
harbour has provided shelter and calm waters for both military and commercial 
enterprise. The Romans felt the area was significant enough to protect it against 
Saxon raiders and built a substantial stone fort at Portchester, part of their extensive 
‘Saxon Shore’ command structure. Portsmouth quickly became a centre for 
commercial trade and private shipbuilding, and later in 1495, Henry VII established 
                                                
7 David Robertson, 'BAE begins trials of next-generation destroyer', The Times, July 16, 
2007.  
8 Rob Edwards, 'MoD admits fighters use cars and homes as 'targets'', The Herald, 21 Jun 
2008. 
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a military garrison and the first Royal Dockyard as a permanent facility for the Navy. 
Henry’s instinct that Portsmouth would become of vital strategic importance was 
borne out by successive efforts to fortify and protect the area. The subsequent 
creation of this and other Royal Dockyards across Britain is undoubtedly central to 
the development of the British Navy but the historical impact of the private sector 
should not be underestimated. Royal Dockyards often ‘served as outfitting facilities 
for military ship hulls built in private yards’.9 As a commercial port, Portsmouth has 
for centuries played a significant role in international trade. Wheat was regularly 
exported to France and Spain during the 13 and 14th centuries. The trade in wool 
was considerable as were imports of wine, wax, woad and iron from France. 
Leather came from Spain and a variety of goods were traded with Holland, while 
later in the 17th century, the merchants of Portsmouth opened trading routes with 
New England and attempted to monopolize the import of tobacco into Britain. While 
wine remained the chief import, other goods significantly boosted customs duty for 
the region.10 After a number of devastating attacks by the French during the 
Hundred Year War trading began to deteriorate and duties were levied to wall the 
town, to defend it against further attacks. The sacking and seizing of Portsmouth, 
Southampton, Plymouth, Hastings, Harwich, Gravesend and others, undoubtedly 
accelerated the fortification of many coastal ports and the establishment of the 
worlds first dry docks on Portsea Island during the reign of Henry VII in 1495. Later, 
however, the most strategic value was placed on the large military garrison adjacent 
to the dock, a fact proved by its almost total enclosure with a trace italienne (a 
polygonal structure with complex arrow-shaped bastions) fortification in 1690. 
Designed by Bernard de Gomme, its scale and complexity was unmatched 
anywhere in the Britain at the time. 80 years later even larger fortifications were 
begun which eventually delimited the entire Naval docks on Portsea to the north 
and the urban areas that had developed around it (see figure 7.2).  
 
                                                
9 J. L. Birkler, Differences between military and commercial shipbuilding: applications for the 
United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence, Santa Monica: Rand, 2005, p.86. In addition, ‘The 
subcontracted products and services were widely used elsewhere in the economy of the 
times; this external demand helped temper the swings in order quantity that have always 
typified commercial shipbuilding’. 
10 ‘A History of the County of Hampshire: Vol. 3’, British History Online, <http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=41952>, (accessed 13 October 2009). 
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Figure 7.2. Bernard de Gomme’s garrison fortification of 1690. 
 
 
Mirroring de Gomme’s design for Portsmouth garrison the new extension had 
‘angled bastions project[ing] from the ramparts to ensure that the entire face of the 
outer walls could be raked with defensive fire from some other point’.11 Enormous 
V-shaped ravelins also projected out facing potential attack from Landport and 
Southsea in east. Irregular earthen glacis slopped down into the surrounding 
government-owned land. The many barracks, officers quarters and semi-urban 
areas increased in density throughout the 19th century. Henry VIII’s South Sea 
Castle already protected the entrance to Portsmouth harbour and in 1748 work 
was completed on Fort Cumberland, a pentagonal star-shaped structure which 
could hinder a landing in Langstone Harbour. Hilsea lines, a mile-long earthen 
rampart was also raised along the northern reach of the Portsea Island to protect 
against incursions from the mainland.  
 
                                                
11 Riley, Military and Naval Land Use as a Determinant of Urban Development, p.57. 
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The growth of the naval port and the military community was most pronounced in 
the 18th century. However, Riley’s extensive research suggests that the subsequent 
growth of the town around it in the 19th century, (and the infrastructures and 
transports networks associated with it) were all indisputably moulded around these 
substantial fortifications. ‘Fringing the glacis was a ring of roads whose spatial form 
was entirely determined by the shape of the glacis itself, a pattern which in 
Portsmouth has persisted unchanged’.12 Riley also remarks on the unique manner 
in which the presence of the glacis produce middle class residential enclaves 
encouraged by the presence of officers housing in the land to the east of the 
garrison fortification.  
 
This period would mark the apogee of Portsmouth as a fortified city. In fact, no 
sooner had this state been reached than the complex of  walls, glacis, ramparts and 
ravelins that so dramatically defined the town where rendered redundant by 
developments in artillery technology. It had been known since the 15th century that 
by incorporating a helix-shaped channel into the barrel of a gun, a technique known 
as rifling, the fired conical projectile would twist through the air, greatly increasing its 
accuracy, range and stability. However, the technique only reached large-scale 
production in the mid-19th century when it also became combined, to devastating 
effect, with a breech loading mechanism (where the projectile could be placed in 
the rear of the barrel as opposed to the muzzle).13 The case of Portsmouth 
demonstrates that these and other developments in weapons design played a 
significant role in altering the arrangement of urban growth: quite suddenly the 
decision was taken to demolish the entire fortification except those protecting the 
harbour entrance. Between 1860 and 1870, the entire fortification was razed to the 
ground. Not only did this provide space for new road networks through Portsmouth 
                                                
12 Riley, Military and Naval Land Use as a Determinant of Urban Development – The Case of 
Portsmouth, p.60. ‘ […] it is arguable that without the demands from the officers class for 
his and his imitators houses, central Southsea would never have become that largest middle 
class enclave in present day Portsmouth’. 
13 William Armstrong’s Rifle Breech Load (RBL) system was adopted in a number a sizable 
weapons, and in the case of the 40 pounder, doubled its range to 8,000 yards. In addition, 
the incorporation of explosive shells into the French Paixhans guns changed entirely the 
conditions of siege and naval conflict. Wooden ships could be smashed to pieces with a 
single hit and maritime fortifications could be seriously undermined by attack from the sea. 
In response, the Anglo–French arms race shifted up a gear with the introduction of iron 
cladding to battleships (La Gloire, launched 1859) followed very quickly by hulls made 
entirely of iron (HMS Warrior, launched 1860). The latter remains a centrepiece in 
Portsmouth’s repertoire of historic ships and museums.  
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and Portsea but it allowed existing barracks to expand. Rubble and bricks from the 
demolition were almost certainly used to created the new docks and basins in the 
harbour to accommodate the construction of new iron-hulled vessels. By 1876 the 
Admiralty had effectively trebled the area of the dockyard and by 1895 two new 
islands had been created on the tidal mud flats: Whale Island (now known as HMS 
Excellent) became a gunnery school and Horsea Island in the north of the harbour 
was used to test self-propelled torpedoes. Riley extensively maps this dramatic 
reconfiguration of land use but also remarks that the demolition of fortifications 
could have led to ‘much of the land being sold on the open market, yet in practice 
almost three quarters of the land remained in control of the Crown’.14  
 
The Royal Commission on the Defence of the United Kingdom, fearing that French 
invasion was imminent, proposed that the capital and the ports be protected with a 
major system of new fortifications. By 1852 the refortification of the entire English 
coast was underway and by 1869 a Commission report lists 85 new and refitted 
batteries, forts and citadels with countless smaller redoubts and gun 
emplacements.15 Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight eventually received an expansive 
complex of fortifications including the four sea forts protecting the Spithead 
approach to harbours, five forts to defend the western approach on the Gosport 
side of the harbour, a line of five forts and batteries on the south Portsmouth coast, 
and five major forts along Portsdown Hill (see figure 7.3).  
 
For Viscount Palmerston (head of the Royal Commission, twice British Prime 
Minister and principal architect of British colonial expansion), the city’s greatest 
threat might also conceivably come from inland. Portsdown Hill, the seven mile 
chalk ridge that encloses the city and harbour could, he imagined, offer an invading 
force the perfect platform from which to launch a lethal artillery barrage on the naval 
dock. Palmerston commissioned a line of five large polygonal forts to be built along 
the length of Portsdown Hill to protect against an attack by the forces of Napoleon 
III who might logically land further up or down the coast and move upon the city 
                                                
14 Riley, Military and Naval Land Use as a Determinant of Urban Development – The Case of 
Portsmouth, p.67. 
15 Report of the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Construction, Condition and Cost 
of Fortifications Erected in 30, 31 Victoria and Previous Statutes, Together with minutes of 
Evidence, 1869, cited in The Palmerston Fort Society, 
<http://www.palmerstonforts.org.uk/royalcommission.htm>, (accessed 20 June 2010).  
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from inland.16 Forts Wallington, Nelson, Southwick, Widley and Purbrook are all 
significant feats of military engineering: made from brick, earth and chalk, each is 
unique in design but follows either a six or seven sided polygonal trace. Their high 
walls are concealed from the northern and eastern approach by earthen banks and 
deep ditches which achieves a deceptively low profile in the landscape.  This meant 
that they would also have been devoid of the symbolic value associated with the 
castles and forts of previous eras. While not as architecturally elegant as certain 
trace italienne ‘star forts’ in the UK or Europe, many of the Palmerston forts were 
conceived by the demands of function and largely devoid of aesthetic 
considerations. As such they adhered to the accelerated rationalisation of militarised 
space within and beyond the structure. Changes in weapon technologies once 
again changed the technology of military architecture and shifted the tacit networks 
of power from the local to the expanded regional level. The Palmerston forts of 
Portsmouth were not only considered as individual units but also as components in 
a much larger defensive network. This defensive system represents an overlooked 
but highly significant moment in the evolution of defensive space in the UK. It marks 
the transition from larger citadel-like defensive structures (variations of the trace 
italienne) to more geographically dispersed clusters of sites which effectively cast a 
wider net of militarised space utilising ever more powerful artillery. Paul Hirst argues, 
however, that as cities became larger and weapons became more devastating so 
their defensive measures became less coherent.17 Hirst offers the case of Belgium 
in the First World War when the substantial fortifications around Antwerp simply 
became ‘obstacles’ to be smashed by heavy artillery as the Germans marched to 
outflank the French. Childs draws similar conclusions in his study of large 
casemated gun-towers in the Crimean which ‘made excellent targets for naval 
artillery’.18 With this in mind, it is doubtful whether the Palmeston Forts could have 
resisted a Napoleonic attack of Portsmouth or indeed a mass invasion of Britain, 
and would have been even less effective in subsequent wars. Nevertheless, many 
such forts across the UK were refitted during the First and Second World Wars and 
                                                
16 This strategic principle accounts for the direction in which the forts are facing and also 
counters the persistent erroneous belief that they were built the wrong way round - hence 
‘Palmerston’s Follies’. 
17 Hirst, Space and power, p.196. ‘Most of this vast effort and expense [fortress building] 
had been in vain, a last attempt to ensure the traditional defence of places. In effect, the 
new forts were large concrete targets, regular in shape, plotted on maps, and easy aiming 
points for controlled artillery fire’. 
18 Childs, The military use of land, p.65. 
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served as effective costal defences. It is also true that, whilst they were never put to 
full use, these forts may have provided a degree of deterrence and hence 
discouraged the possibility of invasion by Napoleon’s forces. Palmerston’s ‘Follies’ 
as they became known, are the expression of an uncertain period between the end 
of the era of traditional ‘siege craft’ and the beginning of industrialised warfare.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.3. The distribution of ‘Palmerston’ fortifications built during the latter half of the  
19th century. Source: The Palmerston Fort Society. 
 
 
This sudden geographical expansion and diffusion in the arrangement of military 
spaces was determined not only by advances in weaponry but also by the highly 
volatile, dynamic realignment of power across the European continent and beyond. 
The specificities of local geography also played an important role in determining the 
relative position and strategic importance of each component within the complex 
and at its heart was the Royal Dockyard. Unlike its 21st century variant, the 19th and 
20th century naval-industrial complex was as much about the defence of naval 
assets as it was about manufacturing processes. Portsmouth dockyard was, after 
all, one of the principal forges of the industrial revolution and as such its defence 
was paramount to preserving British naval supremacy. Like the newly developed 
processes for manufacturing artillery shells, naval ship building was at the forefront 
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of industrial mass-production: the mills at Portsmouth turned 130,000 rigging 
blocks a year in the first decade of the 19th century using mechanized processes 
that significantly reduced the need for skilled labour.19 Before long, the collusion of 
scientific research and accelerated production methods was responsible for the 
most advanced iron-hulled steam-driven ships on the seas.20 The corolla of 
fortifications and gun emplacements that appeared across the region throughout 
the 19th century were protecting a military-industrial powerhouse, an almost 
experimental project that put industry at the heart of military ambition.    
 
The possibilities of aerial warfare in the 20th century would render any traditionally 
defended place vulnerable to attack. During the Second World War bombing raids 
would devastate cities across Europe and Portsmouth was not spared the full force 
of The Blitz. However, the city’s military-industrial dynamic would again reconstitute 
itself. The following section will explore the current configuration of spaces and their 
growing dependence on private sector manufacturing and service provision. 
 
7.3 . Current regional  defence clusters 
The latter half of 2009 sees the UK in the midst of, arguably, the most severe 
economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930’s. The defence sector 
does not seem to be immune from the strictures of an accelerated and somewhat 
unexpected wave of government rationalisation.  At the time of writing the British 
government has yet to decide which area of military spending will be cut but it 
seems likely, (despite doubts about the value of expeditionary warfare in this era of 
asymmetrical attacks and counter-insurgencies), that at least one (if not both) of the 
two 65,000 ton ‘super carriers’ commissioned for production in the near future will 
be spared the axe. Portsmouth will be home to the carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth 
and HMS Prince of Wales, and their production will be managed by BVT Surface 
Fleet Limited, a combined division of BAE Systems and VT Group. Further growth is 
expected after the Maritime Change Programme (an extensive review of the British 
naval capability) recommended that the three operating bases be ‘optimised’ for the 
                                                
19 Kenneth Lunn and Ann Day, History of work and labour relations in the Royal Dockyards 
London: Mansell , 1999, p.ix. 
20 HMS Warrior, launched in October 1861, represented the convergence of a number of 
leading technologies including an armour plated iron hull, rifled breach loading guns, steam 
driven engines and a propeller drive. For a few short years it was the front runner in the 
Anglo-French naval  arms race. 
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21st century. In effect, this means that after a long period of uncertainty HMNB 
Portsmouth will not only continue to be the principal base for the British navy but it 
will expand to accommodate more of the Navy’s capability. A significant number of 
services and ships (including the 11 Royal Navy frigate war ships) will relocate to 
Portsmouth from HMNB Devonport, and HMNB Clyde will become the dedicated 
site for the UK’s fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. All this, however, could lead 
to a possible loss of 10,000 jobs in the Plymouth area.21 The ‘devastating’ impact of 
this rationalisation will be, of course Clyde and Portsmouth’s gain but the case 
serves to emphasise the high economic dependence that characterises the 
military/industrial relationship in these areas.   
 
During the build up to the Maritime Change Programme the University of 
Portsmouth produced a report investigating the broader economic impact of naval 
activity in the Portsmouth area and the possible effects of three rationalisation 
scenarios: no change to current activity; minimisation of the base (if services 
transfer to HMNB Devonport); and expansion (due to the minimisation of 
Devonport). The report concluded by revealing that the Portsmouth Naval Base and 
associated activities currently supports: 
 
• A total of just under 35,000 jobs within South Hampshire – consisting of: 
• 13,300 Service jobs and 
• 21,600 Civilian jobs 
• These jobs account for 8% of all jobs located in the sub-region and for the 
employment of 6.2% of people living within the area. 
• 15% of people living in Gosport, 10% of those in Portsmouth and 8% of 
those in Fareham are in ‘defence dependent’ jobs 
• This employment and the spending of defence firms generates an income 
of £680m for the local economy.22 
 
                                                
21 ‘Naval move would ‘devastate’ city’, BBC website, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/devon/8000058.stm>, (accessed 2 December 2009). 
22 Socio-Economic Impact Assessment of Portsmouth Naval Base, The Centre for Local and 
Regional Economic Analysis and University of Portsmouth Business School, University of 
Portsmouth, 2007, p.5. 
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The report was presumably commissioned by Portsmouth City Council as a 
defence of the city and its military-industrial base in the face of an uncertain future.23 
It bluntly and uncritically  demonstrates the extent to which the city is dependant on 
the defence sector for revenue and, importantly for this study, it reveals the unique 
geographical dispersal of military-related sites across the South Hampshire and 
Portsmouth sub-region.24 Research by the South East England Development 
Agency (SEEDA) (Figure 7.4) also shows the distribution of aerospace and defence-
related companies across the south east of England (excepting London) and clearly 
shows a high concentration of companies clustered within and around the South 
Hampshire/Portsmouth sub-region. 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Major Aerospace & Defence Companies in the South East. Source: SEEDA 
 
 
Figure 7.5. shows the distribution of military-owned land and defence-related sites 
across the Portsmouth area. Whale island, to the north of the dockyard is home to 
HMS Excellent, a shore training establishment and HQ for the entire Royal Navy. 
                                                
23 ‘Long term future of Portsmouth naval base secure’, Portsmouth City Council,  
<http://www.portsmouth.gov.uk/business/9345.html>, (accessed 3 November 2009). 
24 Socio-Economic Impact Assessment of Portsmouth Naval Base, p.6. The report 
estimates that the financial impact of base closure and subsequent job losses would be in 
the region of £350m to the local economy. 
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HMS Sultan and HMS Collingwood are both sizable sites in the Gosport area which 
have both expanded as other training sites around the country have closed down or 
been rationalized.  DARA Fleetlands25 and the DSDA Gosport26 are also sites of 
considerable size.  However, the dockyard with its 15 working dry docks, continues 
to be at the centre of military-industrial production but since its privatization in 1998 
it builds and refits both military and commercial ships in direct competition with 
other dockyards. Within the military-owned site which is roughly 300 acres in size, 
BVT Surface Fleet manage the production of new vessels and the repair of older 
ones. Inside the larger naval base perimeter there are other companies such as: 
 
Serco, Thales, Tighe, and Ably Access as well as many others. Many of 
these firms act as sub-contractors to one of the ‘big three’ [Vosper 
Thornycroft  (VT), Fleet Support Limited (FSL) and BAE Systems but now 
known collectively for the purposes of shipbuilding as BVT Surface Fleet] 
and provide essential services such as painting, building maintenance and 
harbour tug services.27 
 
However, while other smaller companies are based within the military enclosure 
many are effectively second or third tier military contractors and are dependent 
exclusively on defence contracts for their survival. BVT Surface Fleet, by contrast, is 
known as a DIRECT first round recipient of defence contracts and was formed 
specifically in response to government ‘pressure’.28 Confusingly, both VT and BAE 
Systems are also separate recipients of defence contracts for other products and 
services in and around HMNB Portsmouth. Beyond the base and the dockyards 
private sector contractors are clustered in and around other military sites across the 
sub-region (see figure 7.6): Portsdown Hill Technology Park is run by Qinetiq but the 
                                                
25 DARA (Defence Aviation Repair Agency) Fleetlands provides helicopter maintenance for all 
three military services. However, Vector Aerospace Corporation recently agreed to acquire 
DARA and to provide similar service provision for the MoD. This sale is very much in line with 
the recent defence strategy to divest itself of those businesses not directly related to 
providing a defence capability.  
26 DSDA (Defence Storage And Distribution Agency) Gosport is a 500 acre site used for 
storing munitions. While many MoD sites are managed by Landmarc, DSDA Gosport is 
maintained  by One Complete Solution (OCS), property support services. 
27 Socio-Economic Impact Assessment of Portsmouth Naval Base, p.17. 
28 BVT Surface Fleet was formed after publication of the government’s Defence Industrial 
Strategy White Paper of 2005 in which it recommends that the major ship builders should 
provide a consolidated service with better value for money or it would take its contracts 
abroad. See, Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper, Ministry of Defence, 
London: The Stationary Office, 2005, p.70. 
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MISC radar facility perched on the hill (described in Section 7.2) is developed by the 
BAE Systems subsidiary - Integrated System Technologies (Insyte); Qinetiq also 
operate a site at Haslar in Gosport, dedicated to marine propulsion; VT Flagship is 
contracted to provide naval training at HMS Collingwood, HMS Excellent and HMS 
Sultan; BMT Group LTD, operating from Gosport, are responsible for designing the 
new sea channels architectures for Portsmouth harbour (to accommodate new 
generations of warships and ‘super carriers’; in Hilsea, Wellman Defence provides 
atmosphere management systems for ships and submarines; at Portchester 
Shipyard, VT Halmatic produce smaller high-speed ships for the RN.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5. The current distribution of defence sites across the Portsmouth region.   
Source: University of Portsmouth with additional information and graphics  
by the M. Flintham. 
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Figure 7.6. Current distribution of major defence-related companies across the Portsmouth 
region. Source: University of Portsmouth with additional information and graphics  
by M. Flintham. 
 
 
This list is by no means exhaustive. In fact, it represents the tip of the defence-
manufacturing iceberg in the South Hampshire and Portsmouth sub-region. There 
are, of course, innumerable tiers of sub-contractors radiating out across the region 
from the principal manufacturers who themselves are subdividing, forming alliances 
and changing identity at an alarming rate. For this reason mapping the current 
defence supply and service network is like chasing a chimera. Nevertheless, there is 
value in attempting to geographically track their shifting movements because they 
represent a new spatial dynamic in the field of military-industrial relations. Never 
before have services (and hence, responsibility and accountability) been outsourced 
to such a degree. Never before has technological innovation relied on so many 
complex component sets, all requiring networks of specialised manufacturing 
companies. Never before have so many organisations embraced the production of 
military technology. 
 
7.4 . Flu id Dynamics. 
So far this chapter has concentrated on the geographical distribution of RN and 
defence-related sites across the Portsmouth region. However, the influence of the 
RN extends, most obviously, across the seas, and it is this spatial transition, from 
land to water, that the following section will concentrate on. The numerous docks, 
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marinas, quays and jetties around Portsmouth harbour provide mooring points for a 
whole range of leisure, commercial and military ships. In fact, the harbour sees 
117,000 shipping movements every year, and for this reason the waters are a highly 
regulated but potentially dangerous environment. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
regulatory authority for these waters is military: the Queen's Harbour Master (QHM), 
Portsmouth’s ‘primary purpose is to protect the Port, the Royal Navy and its vessels 
and other government assets’.29 What does seem remarkable, however, is that the 
QHM’s authority covers not only movements within the harbour but also a total of 
50 square miles out across the Solent (see figure 7.7).30 
 
The management of these restricted waters and the control of movements therein 
bears more than a passing resemblance to air traffic control procedures. The  
Dockyard Port of Portsmouth Order 2005, states in no uncertain terms who 
controls the waters: the directions, movements, speed and moorings are all clearly 
defined by the regulations -  as are very specific exclusion zones around military 
vessels under pain of prosecution. The QHM also has a duty to protect private and 
commercial vessels whilst in designated waters. The Order is enforced by the 
Ministry Of Defence Police Marine Unit who, interestingly, are a civil police unit 
protecting Crown assets.31 Curiously, nowhere in The Dockyard Ports Regulation 
Act 1865 does it state that those working for the QHM should be serving naval 
officers.32 Tradition dictates, however, that they always are. This is another instance 
of an age old legal ambiguity favouring the Crown and the military.  
 
                                                
29 ‘About the Queen's Harbour Master’, Queen's Harbour Master (QHM), Portsmouth,  
<http://www.qhmportsmouth.com./about/>, (accessed 10 November 2009) 
30 The Dockyard Port of Portsmouth Order 2005. 
31 MoD Police have a protective role at many Defence Estate sites in the UK but do not 
normally police the general public. At HMNB Clyde, the Fleet Protection Group Royal 
Marines offer an additional level of security, a ‘Final Denial’ of access to nuclear weapons. 
32 The Dockyard Ports Regulation Act 1865. 
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Figure 7.7. Limits of the Queen’s Harbour Master authority. Source: Queen’s Harbour 
Master Portsmouth. 
 
Of the 50 or more naval vessels based at HMNB Portsmouth (approximately two 
thirds of the British Naval capability),33 many would undertake exercises in the 
sovereign waters of the UK using some of the vast off-shore restricted Danger 
Areas described elsewhere in this thesis. Just 13 miles from Portsmouth and 3 
miles from the Isle of Wight lies one such area, or volume to be more precise, since 
the restriction extends up to 55,000 feet in some sections (see figure 7.8). Naval 
exercises in these waters can include live firing of artillery targeting stationary rafts or 
buoys and unmanned aircraft. The movement of a Type 23 frigate or a Type 42 
destroyer through the water, displacing 5,000 tons of water as it goes, represents 
an unparalleled spatial process: with their massive turbines and enormous hulls they 
not only alter the chaotic flux of the sea but simultaneously dislocate everything 
around or under them. Their state-sanctioned presence has priority wherever they 
                                                
33 These include three aircraft carriers, six Type 42 destroyers, six Type 23 frigates, eight 
Hunt-class minehunters, three Offshore patrol vessels of the Fishery Protection Squadron, 
Antarctic Patrol Ship, HMS Endurance and Falklands Patrol Vessel, HMS Clyde. 
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go, bristling as they are with missiles, heavy artillery and armour plating.  Their 
disciplined and subtle manoeuvres within the naval port are managed to precision, 
as is the explosive violence they exercise within the nearby designated Danger 
Areas. These degrees of control, power projection and violence, while uniquely 
defined in this case by the specificities of the naval environment, typify the diversity 
of forces at work in the creation of military space in the UK. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8. Designated Danger Areas in relation to the Isle of Wight. Source: Google Earth 
satellite image with additional modelling by Lloyd Bailey. 
 
 
7.5 . Conclusions 
It would be incorrect to describe Portsmouth as a military city. There are, after all, 
innumerable factors that have shaped the development of the city and the people 
within it, the majority of whom have no connection to the Royal Navy or the defence 
industry. Nevertheless, there is no denying the pronounced military presence in the 
region, from the many subtle markers in the high streets to the grey imposing ships 
in the harbour. The historical growth of Portsmouth, as this chapter shows, began 
as a fortified military settlement which subsequently defined the structure and 
growth of urban settlements across the region. By the 16th century Portsmouth was 
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both a centre of international trade and a royal naval base supported by a prolific 
dockyard. It was the 19th century, however, which saw the greatest concentration of 
military-industrial activity in the island of Portsea and beyond, with De Gomme’s 
fortifications acting as a containment device. The inexorable advancements in 
weapons design quickly rendered these defences useless, leading to their rapid 
clearance. A series of defensive forts and redoubts were establishes around the 
peripheries of the town and along Portsdown Hill but the demise of de Gomme’s 
fortification led inevitably to an encroachment of civilian urban areas into the military-
industrial zones and vice versa. Many new forts and garrisons were built in response 
to an ever-imminent invasion by the French but without the consolidating influence 
of the city walls and ramparts the fragmentation of the military-industrial base had 
begun. However, the introduction of armour cladding and metal-hulled ships 
spurred a reinvigoration of the dockyards. Tidal mudflats in the harbour were 
reclaimed to create new docks and wharfs, and an era of unparalleled industrial 
production began. Areas of urban growth had to ‘mesh into a predetermined spatial 
pattern, very much in the fashion of an urban population coming to terms with 
pockets of uninhabitable terrain’.34 The early 20th century saw a period of intense 
urbanisation in Portsea but Hilsea to the north of the island had effectively become 
a militarised zone and the coastal areas to the south remained firmly under military 
control. The 20th century also saw significant reductions of military land use across 
the island of Portsea leading to further urban growth and improved transport 
networks. However, there was effectively a migration of military activities into the 
Gosport area where large training areas were retained and new sites expanded. 
Ironically, the current distribution of military sites across the region reflects the force 
of urban growth and renewal after the devastation of WWII – growth inspired, in 
part, by the persistent military-industrial presence.35 Essentially, the 20th century 
saw Portsmouth readjust its defensive posture from a fortified city to a mixed urban 
environment with a pronounced military-industrial presence.  
 
The privatisation of the Royal Dockyards by the Conservative government during 
the 1980’s almost led to the total closure of Portsmouth dockyard. It was given a 
                                                
34 Riley, Military and Naval Land Use as a Determinant of Urban Development – The Case of 
Portsmouth, p.78 
35 The presence of high density urban areas spared Portsmouth the possibility of fitting and 
fuelling nuclear submarines which went to HMNB Devonport and Clyde.  
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reprieve, however, after working solidly throughout and after the Falklands War.36 In 
fact, when Devonport and Rosyth were privatised in 1987, Portsmouth was spared 
partly because the government wanted ‘to preserve a banker on which it could rely 
if things went awry elsewhere’.37 Despite the trend towards a reduction of the 
British naval capability, Portsmouth dockyards was finally offered up for tender in 
1998. Under VT Ltd and BAE, the dockyard is again building warships but at a 
significantly reduced rate. However, both companies have secured contracts to 
build parts of the two new ‘super carriers’. Seeing the writing on the wall the RN 
opened a significant portion of the base and dockyard to the heritage industry 
which continues to attract around 500,000 visitors a year. 
 
This new streamlined, semi-privatised naval base retains its functional components: 
its dockyard is still building ships, its munitions depot in Fareham over the harbour 
is well stocked, its sailors and officers are trained at various sites around the region, 
it preserves its authority over the harbour waters and the nearby seas, and its 
management is consolidated at HMS Excellent on Whale Island. Furthermore, as 
the Royal Navy’s principal base, its activities are due to increase in the coming 
years with the introduction of a new generation of destroyers and aircraft carriers. 
But Portsmouth has become something else in recent years; a product of the 
Strategic Defence Review of 1998 and the Defence Industrial Strategy of 2002. 
Both these directives emphasis the privatisation of non-core services, the creation 
of Public Private Partnerships (PPP’s) and Private Finance Initiatives (PFI).  Leaving 
aside the wisdom of this strategy, it is evident that the private sector has grabbed 
the opportunity and now supports naval activity in almost every conceivable area 
from training and R&D to manufacturing and facilities management. Furthermore, 
the spatial distribution of private sector operations and existing military sites shows 
an obvious spatial correlation but it also reveals the degree to which the service 
industries have become inseparably integrated into the regional military-industrial 
dynamic. This chapter has become a study of military privatisation - an alternative 
study might geographically pinpoint those elusive second and third tier recipients of 
military contracts within the South Hampshire and Portsmouth region. Portsdown 
                                                
36 Kenneth Lunn, ‘The way Forward? The Royal Dockyards since 1945’ in Kenneth Lunn 
and Ann Day, History of work and labour relations in the Royal Dockyards, (Mansell; London, 
1999). 
37 Portsmouth Royal Dockyard Historical Trust,   
<http://www.portsmouthdockyard.org.uk>, (accessed 12-11-2009). 
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Technology Park, which overlooks the city from the chalk-white escarpment is just 
one of many examples of defence space retained and re-occupied by private sector 
organisations. On the brow of the hill the prototype Sampson radar regards the 
surrounding landscape and skies with its hemispherical gaze, identifying and 
targeting dummy threats as they emerge, but this is just one component in a much 
broader arrangements of spaces, technologies and processes within an ever-
changing military-industrial city. 
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               Figure 8.1. Ground-to-air microwave  
  antenna, RAF Neatishead.  
  Photograph: M. Flintham. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8. Networked Landscapes 
 
159 
 
8.1 . Introduction 
The assessment of military land holdings in Chapter 2 established that there has been 
no significant disposal of defence land since the end of the Cold War (effectively after 
1990). It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the defence estate has 
remained unchanged for the last twenty years. This research has already outlined some 
of the significant ways in which the defence estate of the UK has been consolidated 
and rationalised since the end of the Cold War, but it is interesting to note, without 
irony, that this was effectively achieved without diminishing the total amount of land 
owned by the MoD. This chapter will detail some of the less conspicuous ways in which 
the MoD has connected and networked military sites as a way of effecting efficiency 
and consolidation. The seemingly mundane infrastructures of the defence estate will be 
discussed next to the emerging battlefield and training doctrine of Network Enabled 
Capability (NEC). One is embedded in the buildings and land of the defence estate and 
is incorporated into the planning of military sites from the outset, the other is reliant on 
mobile communication systems and networks of ‘sensors’ to shape and organise the 
theatre of war or the training environment. These two disparate and ostensibly separate 
aspects of the British military capability will be shown to be share certain 
characteristics: both are increasingly ordered and altered by the private sector and 
each is exercising an increasing influence on the form and structure of military space 
across the UK. They also represent different spatial formations within the defence 
estate: one physically connects sites across geographical distance, the other is 
reorganising the use of space within domestic training and battlefield environments. In 
one way or another the static forms of infrastructure and the mobile elements of NEC all 
connect sites, weapons, vehicles and individuals across the defence estate, 
consolidating geographically disparate elements in the UK and abroad.  
 
Section 8.2 will consider infrastructure; the hidden connections between military sites, 
the resources and utilities that connect defence and training spaces in the UK and 
provide basic services such as electricity, water, the removal of sewage and the steady 
supply of fuel. Many of these systems and services have been in place since the 
Second World War and run parallel to civil systems, others have evolved more recently 
as land management systems, logistical supply networks, radio and data transmitters, 
and secure telecommunication (land-line) networks.  This chapter will show how many 
of these networks and systems are now managed by the private sector or 
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public/private partnerships in an attempt to draw on the apparent efficiency of market-
let initiatives but also as a way of diverting potential litigation after the withdrawal of 
Crown Immunity from the armed services. More recent service and communication 
infrastructures will be shown to mesh with new MoD communication strategies and 
doctrines such as NEC. 
 
Section 8.3 will address the key tenets of Network Enabled Capability (NEC) as a 
variant of the US military doctrine Network Centric Warfare (NCW) which places 
advanced digital communication systems at the heart of military arsenals and battlefield 
strategy. The British version will be studied as a doctrine that not only defines combat 
operations abroad and training exercises across the UK but extends across the whole 
bureaucratic structure of the MoD and the armed services. Section 8.3 will also trace 
the evolution of NCW and its formation within the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) as 
a reaction against Cold War probability-determining ‘war games’. The relationship 
between NCW, NEC and corporate management systems will be examined as an 
attempt by military institutions to harness the apparent successes of the newly 
liberalised commercial sector. Section 8.2 will also critically assess the current value 
and limitations of network-centric operations in the war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
An examination of a recent military exercise on Salisbury Plain, Agile Thunder, will serve 
to illustrate  how NEC is shaping the fluid, three dimensional aspects of current military 
training at sites across the UK. 
 
8.2 . Land, networks and in frastructures. 
Chapter 3 described a number of Second World War and Cold War defensive systems 
across the UK, from nation-wide early warning and communication systems to the 
hundreds of sub-surface bunkers built to monitor radiation levels after a nuclear attack.1 
These parallel networks and systems emerged as the military sought greater self-
sufficiency and separation from civil society. As the British landscape was mobilised for 
warfare during WWII, military sites became tremendous consumers of food, water, fuel, 
munitions, electricity and other resources. In order to sustain this flow of goods and 
                                                
1 The Royal Observer Corp, for instance, transformed from a enemy aircraft spotting service 
(1925-1955) into a nuclear fallout analysis service (1955-1995). This latter role saw them 
periodically occupy 1563 underground bunkers built across the UK during the Cold War. 
Communication between clusters of bunkers and HQ bunkers was by diverted conventional 
telephone lines. Many such sites have since been purchased by telecommunication companies 
because of their strategic locations on higher ground. See Appendix 8.1.  
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services a complex series of parallel logistical supply chains would be established; 
infrastructural networks would be build and integrated into new and existing sites, and 
communication lines would be rapidly established between sites. The secrecy and 
paranoia of 20th century warfare and politics would later create a Cold War military 
institution that was increasingly hermetic and less willing to rely on civil structures to 
provide basic services. The relationship between service infrastructures and strategic 
defensive systems become blurred: the Cold War saw ever more expansive radar, line-
of-site and ground-to-air communication systems stretching across the UK and into 
Europe.2 While many of these systems formed network-like structures across the 
landscape the idea of ‘network’ as an organisational paradigm would only emerge 
during the late 1980s - it would take the emergence of digital technologies and an 
invigorated commercial sector to spark the military’s interest in decentralised 
management and communication structures. Before addressing NEC, however, the 
following sections will detail a number of currently active infrastructures; some date 
from the Second World War while others are more recently installed systems for 
managing communication and activities across the defence estate. 
 
8.2 .1.  Government Pipel ine and Storage Systems (GPSS) 
Among the countless defence networks developed across the UK during the Second 
World War, perhaps the most overlooked are those associated with fuel distribution. 
The allied invasion of Europe would have be logistically impossible without Operation 
Pluto (Pipe-Lines Under The Ocean) to connect ports, fuel refineries and reserves 
across the UK to the French mainland. While pipe lines were secretly laid across the 
channel floor, other supporting networks were already established in the early part of 
the war providing aviation fuel to all major the RAF and USAAF airbases across the UK. 
The rapid growth and efficiency of this ‘strategic defence asset’, or the Government 
Pipeline and Storage System (GPSS) as it became known, was such that it later served 
the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) sites at Burghfield and Aldermaston, served 
civil airports around the country and later became connected to private fuel pipe-line 
networks provided by companies such as Total, Shell and Esso (see Figure 8.1).3  
                                                
2 For a comprehensive survey of Cold War early warning systems, tropospheric communication 
networks and line-of-site microwave networks in the UK see, Wayne Cocroft, Roger J. C. 
Thomas, and P. S. Barnwell, Cold War: Building for Nuclear Confrontation 1946-1989, Swindon: 
English Heritage, 2003. 
3 ‘Fuelling the front line’, Ministry of Defence (National Archives),  
<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/FuellingTheFrontLi
ne.htm>, (accessed 29 July 2009). 
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Figure 8.1. Government Pipeline and Storage Systems (GPSS) distribution map. Source: 
<http://www.linewatch.co.uk/network.htm>, (accessed 11 June 2010). 
 
 
Today GPSS is managed by the Oil and Pipelines Agency (OPA) on behalf of the 
Secretary of State for Defence. Facilities are constructed and maintained under powers 
derived from the Requisitioned Land and War Works Act 1945 and 1948, and the Land 
Powers (Defence) Act 1958.4 The following is a general description of the network from 
the OPA accounts document 2005-2006: 
 
GPSS consists of some 2,500 kilometres of underground cross-country 
pipelines of differing diameters, together with storage depots, salt cavities, 
associated pumping stations, receipt and delivery facilities and other ancillary 
equipment […]. Most of the storage depots are connected to the pipeline 
ringmain, which in turn is supplied by the majority of the major refining centres 
and port areas in England. Other self-standing pipelines and depots are situated 
elsewhere in England and Scotland. The GPSS receives, stores, transports and 
delivers light oil petroleum products for military and civil users.5 
 
 However, according to Alan Turnbull,  
                                                
4 ‘The Government Pipeline & Storage System Standard Requirements for Crossing or Working 
Near to GPSS Pipelines’, Linewatch website,  
<https://linesearch.org/uploaded/documents/Standard%20Requirements%20for%20Working%
20near%20to%20GPSS%20rev%20Jan%202009.pdf>, (accessed 29 July 2009). 
5 The Oil and Pipelines Agency Accounts 2005-2006, The Oil and Pipelines Agency, London: 
The Stationery Office, 2006. 
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the whole of the MoD's GPSS network is controlled from the Defence Fuels 
Group at West Moors near Wimborne, Dorset. It is a tri-service fuel storage, 
distribution and training centre, designated the Defence School of Petroleum 
and also known as the Defence Petroleum Centre.6 
 
As an integral part of the infrastructure of national defence, GPSS has few visible or 
geographical manifestations. In this respect, it remains very much a part of the hidden 
military geography of the UK. Many large storage depots only began ‘appearing’ on 
Ordnance Survey maps within the last decade in response to a softening in the British 
government’s attitude to potentially sensitive geographic information. Recent aerial and 
satellite photographs reveal field-sized enclosures, sets of uniformly circular mounds 
and undulations suggesting buried tanks and sub-surface facilities. Some are quite 
pronounced such as the one at Killingholme, Humberside, within the Lindsey Oil 
Refinery complex, while others are small and barely discernable even from the air. 
Similarly, Padworth Common (which is adjacent to AWE Aldermaston), is studded with 
subtle undulations, tiny out-buildings and slip-roads that seemingly lead to nowhere. 
Like many military establishments they are accessed by prior invitation only. Rusty 
fences and padlocked gates usually prevent any unsolicited attention and some sites 
seem thoroughly neglected despite occasional visit from private security contractors. 
The existence of GPSS storage depots is not a secret but it is one of the most visually 
unobtrusive and least known aspects of military planning or infrastructure. The closure 
of a number of RAF and USAF airbases during the 1990’s means that some GPSS 
terminals, pumps stations and storage depots are actually not in use. These sleeping 
sites, while still owned by the MoD and maintained in some capacity by nebulous public 
and private sector organisations, hint at fluctuating levels of obsolescence in the British 
Defence Estate.  
 
Much of the information about GPSS in the public domain relates to Health and Safety 
since the environmental cost of accidentally hitting a high-pressure aviation fuel pipe-
line with a mechanical digger, for instance, would be enormous. For this reason the 
path of the pipe-lines are marked at various intervals by six-foot white posts crowned 
                                                
6 For a critically comprehensive study of the GPSS pipe-line infrastructure and a typological 
assessment of defence fuel storage depots see, Alan Turnbull, ‘Government Pipeline and 
Storage Systems (GPSS)’, Secret Bases,  
<http://www.secret-bases.co.uk/secret3.htm#GPSS>, (accessed 27 July 2009). 
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with slightly improbable yellow and black striped roofs. Another smaller post close-by 
gives general information about the pipeline and a contact number in case of 
emergency. These discreet markers pepper the edges of roads and byways like 
government issue bird houses or Beatlesque periscopes spying on passing surface 
dwellers. They barely hint at the complex infrastructural network beneath, stretching 
across the country and supplying major military bases with the fuel required to train 
aircrews and fly to war zones around the world. GPSS is the ‘hidden’ arterial system for 
the British defence capability, a buried network pumping fuel to sites around the 
country. 
 
8.2 .2.  Project  Aquatr ine. 
Another such hidden resource is the system that provides water to many military site in 
the country and removes sewage in accordance with government standards. According 
to a recent assessment,  
 
The MoD’s net annual consumption of water in Great Britain is estimated to be 
24.2 million m3.This water is used for many different purposes - domestic, 
office, industrial, aircraft washing, vehicle washing, swimming pools, testing 
tanks, and fire fighting including the testing of fire hydrants. Infrastructure on the 
defence estate includes a large number of water and waste water assets and a 
water distribution system equal in size to that of a small water company.7  
 
However, in recent years the MoD has admitted that its ‘historical management of its 
water and wastewater estate had not been efficient and that the use of the private 
sector would provide better value for money and improved management of 
environmental issues’.8 After the Strategic Defence Review of 1998, the MoD divested 
itself of many ‘non core’ services, those not directly related to providing the UK’s 
defence capability.9 In terms of water supply and waste management, the combined 
effects of the imminent ‘loss of crown immunity coupled with the ever tightening UK and 
                                                
7 ‘Sustainable Development in Government (SDiG). The Framework for Sustainable Development 
on the Government Estate. Strategic Statement: Water Consumption’, Ministry of Defence,  
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/87A1C520-A4A2-42ED-9C97-
A7B203DC000A/0/water_strat.doc.>, (accessed 10-08-2009). 
8 ‘Project Aquatrine – Southern & Western UK’ Earthtech, 
<http://www.earthtech.co.uk/generic/documents/projectaquatrine2_000.pdf>, (accessed 11-
08-2009). 
9 Strategic Defence Review, Ministry of Defence, London: The Stationary Office, 1998. 
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EU legislation left the MoD exposed to unprecedented risk [of legal action]’.10 In 
addition, ‘a lack of business focus, plus uneconomic management’ suggests that this 
area of Defence Estate service management was in a poor state. Rather than seeking a 
significant injection of capital from the government, the MoD followed recent 
government policy and deferred instead to the private sector. Project Aquatrine was 
established as a way of outsourcing all of the MoD’s water and sewage services to 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) consortiums and Private Finance Initiatives (PFI). The 
defence estate was divided into three ‘packages’ which were separately negotiated: 
Package A, covering the Midlands, Wales and South West England was awarded to 
Brey Utilities, a 25 year contract which commenced on December 2003.11 Package B 
covers Scotland and was awarded to Thames Water Nevis and commenced on March 
2005.12 Package C covers the North and East of England and was awarded to Coast to 
Coast Water (C2C) and came into effect in March 2005.13 An example of the scale of 
the network inherited by these organisations is evident in the list of ‘assets’ described 
by Brey Utilities in their Package A contract: 
 
Boreholes     104  
Impounding Reservoirs   6  
Service Reservoirs    134  
Water Pumping Stations   70  
Water Treatment Works   47  
Water Distribution Mains   922km 
Oil and Water Interceptors   797  
Wastewater Treatment Works  72  
Sewage Pumping Stations   300  
Sewers     1,045km 
Storm Drains     1,248km14 
 
                                                
10 ‘Project Aquatrine’, Defence Estate,  
<http://www.defence-estates.mod.uk/major_projects/proj_aquatrine.php>, (accessed 11 
August 2009). 
11 Brey Utilities is a consortium of Earth Tech Engineering, Yorkshire Water and Kellogg Brown 
and Root. 
12 Thames Water Nevis was acquired in November 2007 by Veolia Water UK and is now known 
as Veolia Water Nevis. 
13 C2C is a consortium of Severn Trent and Costain. 
14 ‘Project Aquatrine – Southern & Western UK’ Earthtech. 
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While the contract covering Scotland is likely to have fewer assets than those above, 
we can assume that there are comparable figures for Package C in Project Aquatrine. 
Once again the hidden military geography of the UK can be found in the mundane, 
peripheral networks buried underground or in the seemingly benign architecture of the 
water treatment industry. These are the reticular infrastructures that support the British 
military capability, the barely discernible, spatially diffused systems that feed and 
connect the defence estate. Like many defence utilities, information on the parallel 
water and sewage processing systems really only reached the public domain after they 
were offered to the private sector. Today what little information there is on the subject 
emanates from a host of peculiarly amateurish or opaque corporate websites that 
suggests a grudging obligation rather than a will to provide hard facts.  A few low-
resolution pictures of men in hard hats or a parade of cold grey water tanks barely hint 
at the enormity of the operation, the vast, fragmented resource that stretches the length 
and breadth of the country. 
 
8.2 .3.  Road and transport  networks.   
It is curious that one of the most significant networks that connects military sites across 
the UK is perhaps the least researched or measured. All mainland military bases are 
connected by public roads and this is the principal mode of transport for the British 
armed services. The dearth of quantifiable data on troop movement by public roads 
across the UK is not for want of evidence: if we consider, for instance, that there are, on 
average, 2,000 troops training on Salisbury Plain every day and comparable figures for 
Otterburn in Northumberland and Sennybridge in Wale, there must be a huge number 
of troops moving between barracks and training areas around the country every single 
day. There are ten major army training areas in the UK, 66 RAF bases, three Naval 
ports and numerous smaller firing ranges and training facilities. All are dependent on 
this fundamental civilian infrastructure. Transport by road is one of most frequent and 
least considered forms of military activity. Although it would be extremely difficult to 
measure military road use, it could potentially be the subject of an important and unique 
research project. In addition, the development and planning of the British transport 
network itself must have been influenced to a greater or lesser degree by issues of 
national defence - a subject which could also benefit from further research. 
 
8.2 .4.  In tegrated Range In format ion System ( IRIS) 
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The introduction of the IRIS software system to manage training over the entire defence 
estate by Landmarc Support Services (LSS) has already been examined in the chapter 
on the Salisbury Plain Training Estate but it is worth recontextualising it here as a 
national network (and an infrastructure of sorts) for rationalizing military land use across 
a set of geographical locations. Although not strictly considered a part of the range of 
digital technologies and hardware that combine to form the MoD’s Network Enabled 
Capability, IRIS is already beginning to have an impact on the management of defence 
training across the UK. Introduced in 2003, IRIS allows authorised users (predominately 
military commanders) to book sites and ranges for training, accommodation and 
catering for military units of any size. Double-booking and inefficiencies have apparently 
been significantly reduced: where the Army Training Estate once lacked a centralized 
management information system, Landmarc now provides a ‘clarity and consolidation 
of all training ranges and range assets’ across the ten administrative regions.15 All 
training facilities across the UK (including 170 small arms ranges, 124 field firing ranges, 
44 artillery/mortar/impact areas, 16 missile/helicopter/fighter ground attack ranges, 
multiple targetry systems, 477 dry training areas and 19 indoor/simulator)16 are 
bookable and accessible in a way that treats the military estate as a totality. The military 
obsession with mapping and geographic information is now twinned with corporate 
facilities management software to create an increasingly systematised vision of the 
defence estate.  
 
8.2 .5.  The Defence F ixed Telecommunications Service (DFTS) 
During the course of the 20th century the MoD and the armed services have used 
numerous communications systems to convey speech and information across great 
distances. Some networks were extremely secure and technologically complex, some 
less so, but all had a physical presence on (or under) the landscape. Today the British 
armed services have become just as dependent on instantaneous voice, data and 
video transmission as the rest of society. The issue of security, however, requires that 
the military fixed-communication systems are separate from civilian networks. Nortel 
and BT Group PLC provides this parallel network for the MoD and in 2005 undertook a 
commitment to build a combined digital communication infrastructure for all three 
                                                
15Jane Fenwick, ‘Landmarc on Target’, Premises and Facilities Management,  
<http://www.pfmonthenet.net/featuresarchive/article.aspx?ArticleID=13114>, (accessed 13 
September 2009), 
16 Ibid., 
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services.17 The Defence Fixed Telecommunications Service (DFTS) is a £3bn deal to 
provide Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) to 2,000 national and international sites, and 
ethernet connectivity to over 150,000 terminals.18 A dedicate test facility in Harlow, 
Essex, The Network Development Lab (NDL) is a replica of the actual MoD 
communications network. It tests the integration of current and experimental 
technologies to ensure a smooth transition and upgrade within the real network. It is 
hoped by BT that the facility will be both a centre for research into military data security 
and a forge for spin-off technologies that could benefit the private sector. The 
geographical, spatial reality of communication is often forgotten, as are the practical 
and infrastructural difficulties of implementing or upgrading such networks. The miles 
and miles of service conduits that have to be laid, the months of aggregated technician-
hours that are needed to link people behind desks are all part of the vast, deceptively 
mundane web of infrastructure that links the landlocked islands of the defence estate. 
 
8.3 . The mi l i tary  network paradigm 
The following section will outline the US military doctrine of Network-Centric Warfare 
(NCW) and the British variation, Network Enabled Capability (NEC) as they begin to 
influence both combat and training. The emphasis here, however, will be on NEC’s 
impact on domestic military geographies and the British defence estate. The British 
military is currently in line with most of the world’s powerful states in developing a so-
called networked capability, one which incorporates advanced digital communication, 
surveillance and imaging technologies into combat and training operations. It is 
commonly believed amongst military strategists that ‘networked warfare’ is the latest in 
a long line of paradigmatic shifts in the way wars are fought, where military might shifts 
‘from the industrial age to the information age’.19 The sheer impact of digital technology 
on the battlefield has been likened to the introduction of airpower at the beginning of 
the 20th century, the widespread use of gunpowder in the 15th century, or as 
                                                
17Nortel provide a similar service the US Department of Defence, essentially a private network 
under complete military control. See ‘U.S. Department of Defense Secures Voice Network Using 
Nortel Solution’, Nortel, 
<http://www.nortel.com/corporate/news/newsreleases/2005a/03_29_05_us_dept_of_defense.h
tml>, (accessed 21 September 2009). 
18 Andrew Donoghue ‘Military VoIP plans to benefit private sector’, ZDNet,  
<http://news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/0,1000000085,39201547,00.htm>, (accessed 25-
08-2009). 
19 Jeff Cares, Distributed Networked Operations: The Foundations of Network Centric 
Operations, Lincoln: iUniverse, 2005, p.1. 
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‘significant as the change from sail to steam in the 19th century’.20 Few military 
commanders would argue that defence is now totally dependent on a whole range of 
digital technologies and many of the world’s major powers are taking steps to organise 
their military capabilities around such technology. The Americans call it NCW, the 
Canadians have Network Enabled Operations (NEOps), and the Indian military, amongst 
many others, are following suit in acquiring technologies that enhance digital 
communication, satellite and aerial surveillance, and battlefield communication. The 
importance that the British military attaches to networked warfare is evident in the MoD 
handbook, Network Enabled Capability,21 which details its own version of NCW and 
outlines a plan of procurement and reorganisation for the next decade. It highlights 
examples where NEC is already orientating military operations in conflict zones around 
the world and how this will reorder the command infrastructure at strategic, operational 
and tactical levels. Leaving aside some notable criticisms for a moment, it is clear that 
NEC (and the very idea of ‘networks’ themselves) have become thoroughly embedded 
in the military consciousness and the effects of its practical application can be seen 
most prominently in Iraq and Afghanistan today (some of which will be assessed later in 
the chapter). 
 
Fundamental to NCW and NEC is an almost continuous upgrade of technology: the 
MoD are engaged in an ongoing procurement programme to introduce a number of 
new communication, imaging and weapons platforms into the British national arsenal. 
These include several interconnected mobile digital communication systems that will be 
incrementally introduced over the next five years.22 As well as being linked to each other 
they will be able to access a number of emerging aerial surveillance technologies 
including the Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) system mounted on the Sentinel R1 
aircraft and linked to mobile ground-based units, various UAV systems including the 
Reaper and Watchkeeper drones, and any number of orbital defence surveillance 
                                                
20 ‘Network Enabled Capability. JSP-777.’, Ministry of Defence, 2009, p.12, 
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/E1403E7F-96FA-4550-AE14-
4C7FF610FE3E/0/nec_jsp777.pdf>, (accessed 12 June 2010). 
21 Ibid., 
22 These include the Bowman digital radio system which is already in use throughout the British 
Army, the Reacher mobile satellite communication terminals which links directly to the Skynet 5 
constellation of satellites, the Falcon trunk communication system, described as a ‘battlefield 
internet’, which will replace the aging Ptarmigan field telephone system and the Future Infantry 
Soldier Technology (FIST) system for dismounted infantry, a tablet device that ‘will provide 
individual soldiers on the front line with a direct link to the network’, ‘NEC: Understanding 
Network Enabled Capability’, Ministry of Defence, Newsdesk Communication, 2009, p.60. 
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satellites. International communication is underpinned by the UK’s sovereign 
communication satellite constellations, Skynet 4 and 5. In addition, the many diverse 
information technology systems previously employed by the MoD are currently being 
replaced by a single ‘system of systems’ for all three services, the Defence Information 
Infrastructure (DII). In military operations a new system known as JOPWeb (Joint 
Operational Picture) collates incoming operational reports and builds battlespace 
‘pictures’ (Figure 8.2 is a pictorial representation of JOP). 
 
 
Figure 8.2. Representation of the Joint Operations Picture (JOP). Source: Ministry of Defence. 
 
 
This stratified representation is an idealised vision of battle in which information is 
gathered and reinterpreted in spatial terms. Cartographic data is just one layer in a 
three dimensional, extended theatre of war in which successive layers are gathered 
from disparate mobile and airborne sources. Information from many different events, 
places, technologies and people are reassembled to form a single contiguous picture of 
battle. Here, signal officers now tend banks of humming servers and the old plotting 
room with toy tanks and push sticks has been replaced by a darkened room full of 
laptops. 
 
Skynet 5 is a constellation of three military satellites launched in 2007-8 to transmit and 
relay secure voice and digital broadband communications to British armed forces 
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anywhere in the world. Unlike previous Skynet programmes, Skynet 5 was 
commissioned, and is currently run, as a £3.6b Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Built and 
launched by EADS Astrium, a subsidiary - Paradigm Services provides the 
communication service (Milsatcom). Paradigm also manages the ground stations at 
RAF Oakhanger in Hampshire and Colerne Airfield in Wiltshire, and provides ‘secure 
communication services to non-UK armed forces, governments, organisations and 
businesses’.23 Despite Skynet 5 being commissioned by the government of the UK, the 
MoD is in the peculiar situation of having to buy expensive digital bandwidth from the 
provider, Paradigm. Perhaps one day the MoD will be in the unenviable position of 
having to compete with allies or even adversaries for bandwidth in war zones. The 
electromagnetic delineation of space is defined, in this case by a ‘shapeable’ X-band 
beam transmitted from the satellite. Paradigm promotional material states that they can 
use the beam 
 
to generate up to seven hot spots within a single spot beam. That allows us to 
shape beams around a country or region. We can even shape the beam to the 
same size and shape as the coast of Africa. We can put a hot spot over Iraq and 
a hot spot over Afghanistan in the same beam but include no intervening 
countries […]. Because of the way we designed Skynet 5 for the military 
operational requirement, we can switch the same channel to a different shape 
that does include intervening countries in a matter of minutes […].24 
 
Skynet 5 is an integral part of NEC and enables an international communication 
network which extends around the world and into space. As a method of wireless 
communication it is unprecedented: the ability to open digital communication ‘hotspots’ 
anywhere in the world using geographically selective beams is particularly striking. More 
so, perhaps, is Skynet 5’s ability to provide the controlling links between RAF and USAF 
operators based in Nevada with Reaper drones over Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. 
This new level of military omniscience and power projection is in line with the 
development of ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’ envisaged by proponents of the US and 
                                                
23 ‘Secure Communications Services’, Paradigm Services,  
<http://www.paradigmservices.com/our_services/secure_communications_services>, 
(accessed 25 September 2009). 
24 Adam Baddeley, 'X-Band Advantage', Paradigm Services,  
<http://www.paradigmservices.com/files.paradigm/1810-x-band-advantage.pdf>, (accessed 25 
September 2009). 
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Soviet Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). It is also proof that ‘the will to endow 
machines with predatory capabilities has been institutionalised in the military’.25 
 
The theoretical framework for NCW, NEC and their wilful dependence on digital 
technology has its origin in an ever-imminent military ethos, the Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA). RMA emerged as a Soviet and US military doctrine during the 1980’s as 
a response to the inadequacies of Cold War methodologies, (namely attrition, war 
games and probability-determining technologies), in tackling popular insurgencies. After 
the Second World War, American defence policy was firmly focused on a possible war 
of attrition with the Soviet Union and the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal vast enough to 
match its opponents. Nuclear attack scenarios were played again and again by ever 
more sophisticated computer systems. These, however, created what Paul Edwards 
has termed a ‘closed world’ discourse in which the parameters of warfare planning are 
defined in ‘inescapably self-referential space[s]’.26 US Secretary of Defence, Robert 
McNamara’s disastrous application of business systems-analysis to the Vietnam war 
was very much a part of this closed world discourse. It quickly became clear that  
popular insurgencies do not share the same dynamic characteristics as wars of attrition 
or nuclear-inspired strategies. Despite the continued use of advanced computerized 
systems-analysis during the 1980s, it also became apparent to military strategists that 
new models would need to be developed which allowed the possibility of incorporating 
unpredictable, chaotic elements into military scenarios. In summarising the transition 
from ‘closed’ Cold War models of military strategy to more realistic, inclusive models 
that mirror the complexities of insurgencies and modern warfare, Antoine Bousquet 
conceptualises both paradigms as being respectively dependent on negative and 
positive feedback systems. The former unrealistically ‘necessitates a complete 
modelling of war in which all factors and parameters have been accounted for’ and 
where ‘all eventualities have been foreseen’.27 As an example of a positive feedback 
system Bousquet identifies John Boyd’s theory of the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act 
(OODA) ‘loop’.28 Originally conceived as a breakdown of the decision-making process 
                                                
25 Manuel De Landa, War in the age of intelligent machines, Zone Books; New York, 1991, 
p.128. 
26 Paul N. Edwards, The closed world: computers and the politics of discourse in Cold War 
America, MIT Press; Cambridge, Mass, 1996, p.12, cited in Antoine Bousquet, The scientific 
way of warfare, p.123.  
27 Antoine Bousquet, The scientific way of warfare, p.189. 
28 John R. Boyd, The Essence of Winning and Losing, military briefing / slide presentation, Jan 
1996. The OODA positive feedback ‘loop’ is a cognitive model that could apply to any level of 
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of the fighter pilot, the OODA loop reopened strategic planning to the unpredictable 
reality of battle, and the ‘dynamics of survival and growth of competing complex 
adaptive systems’.29 US tactical and strategic superiority during the Persian Gulf War of 
1990 could be said to be due, in no small part, to the influence of Boyd’s ideas. Boyd’s 
subsequent influence on the development of NCW is apparent in the following three 
concepts: 
 
(1) The idea of maneuver conflict; (2) the image of a swarm-like organization of 
netted but relatively autonomously operating units, […] and (3) the idea that 
information superiority will offer a decisive advantage because it allows a more 
rapid and accurate completion of the OODA loop, or decision cycle.30 
 
The broad influence of this model in organising competitive behaviour in complex and 
unpredictable environments led to its wide use in the commercial sector as a business 
strategy tool. Arthur K. Cebrowski (one of NCW’s principal advocates) points to Wal-
Mart and Deutsche Morgan Grenfell for examples of a more sustained exchange 
between the NCW doctrine and advanced commercial management models.31 The 
current digital backbone for such ‘network-centric’ business strategies is the Internet 
which famously has its origin as a US Department of Defence communication network, 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET).  
 
In both the commercial and military sectors the network has emerged as a way of 
managing and capitalising on increasingly chaotic events and environments. The basic 
principle of the military battlefield network, however, is a collection of adaptable links 
                                                                                                                                      
the conflict environment from combatant and unit behaviour on the battle field to strategic 
planning and procurement. For a full account of the influence of the OODA loop see Robert 
Coram, Boyd: the fighter pilot who changed the art of war Little, Boston: Brown and company, 
London, 2002. 
29 Mark Safranski (ed), The John Boyd Roundtable: Debating Science, Strategy, and War, Ann 
Arbor MI: Nimble Books, 2008, p.38. 
30 Safranski, The John Boyd Roundtable, p.39. 
31 Arthur K. Cebrowski, ‘Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future’, Proceedings, US Naval 
Institute, January, 1998, p.4. ‘Characteristic of big winners, they [Wal-Mart and Deutsche 
Morgan Grenfell] employ network-centric operational architectures that consist of a high-
powered information backplane (or information grid), a sensor grid, and a transaction grid. These 
architectures provide the ability to generate and sustain very high levels of competitive space 
awareness, which is translated into competitive advantage’. With the advantage of hindsight it is 
now possible to observe that all major corporation (companies of any size, in fact) employ a 
range of digital ‘information grids’ to seek a competitive edge – a presence on the internet being 
the most visible. 
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and nodes, where a lost component or section can be replaced relatively quickly 
without a great loss to the structural integrity of the whole, or more complex systems 
such as those ‘modelled on flocking algorithms simulating the behaviour of birds in 
flight. Autonomous units are programmed to avoid crowding their flock mates, always 
steering towards the average heading of the entire flock’.32 A node can be any one of 
the weapon or sensor platforms in the theatre of war, a vehicle, a drone or a single 
soldier. In addition, within the taxonomy of NCW and NEC, targets can also be nodes in 
an enemy network, a concept which emphasises the apparent interconnection and 
competition of adversarial networks in the battle space.  
 
The gradual evolution of military networked operations and decentralised power 
structures was given a sudden, traumatic jolt after the attacks of 11th September 2001. 
All the advanced weaponry inspired by the RMA, the nominally devolved battlefield 
hierarchy or the barrage of state-of-the-art sensors could not anticipate or defend the 
United States against asymmetrical attacks. The flow of militant resentment from 
antagonised or failed states had coalesced into a global networks of loosely connected 
cells which at once resembled the most modern geographically dispersed ‘social 
network’ and a hierarchical social structure that is ‘conventionally viewed as pre-
modern’.33 Despite the massive investment in the RMA and later in NCW, it almost 
seems as if the achingly modern and future-obsessed western military imagination still 
could not conceive of an enemy that did not fit their standard template. Conventional 
weapons, networked or not, would prove to be worse than useless: antagonistic and 
blunt in equal measure. During the US-led retaliatory wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
Jihadist and Islamic militant organisations were able to ‘turn the table on networkcentric 
warfare, moving the battle field into the cities’, and used the internet as an ‘effective 
control and command mechanism to coordinate and plan future attacks’.34 Curiously, 
these wars are often cited as examples of NCW35 and NEC36 working successfully but 
                                                
32 M. Christine Boyer, ‘Urban Operations and Network Centric Warfare’, in Michael Sorkin (ed.), 
Indefensible space: the architecture of the national insecurity state, London: Routledge, 2008, 
p.64. 
33 John Gray, Al Qaeda and what it means to be modern, London: Faber, 2004, p.80. Gray goes 
on to say that ‘Al Qaeda is organised on the model of an extended family. Using the trust that 
bind families together, it can make considerable use of informal banking systems (hawala) that 
are global in their reach and are effectively untraceable […] The deep commitment fostered by Al 
Qaeda’s familial structure enables it to mount long term missions such as the attacks on the 
American embassies in Africa, which were preceded by years of patient preparation’. 
34 M. Christine Boyer, ‘Urban Operations and Network Centric Warfare’, p.70 
35 Dennis Murphy, Network Enabled Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom: initial impressions, 
Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College, 2005. 
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the true value of  these disastrous interventions must be measured in the civilian (non-
combatant) body count, which in Iraq alone exceeded 60,000 deaths between 2003-
08.37 The frictionless, casualty-free wars envisaged by the advocates of RMA were 
absurd hallucinations, summoned in the heat of 1980s prosperity and global ambition, 
and before the technology produced in the market outshone the products of military 
R&D. Today, soldiers move around Baghdad and Kabul with iphones because they 
offer advanced GPS and the Vcommunicator translations package.38 It is an obvious 
paradox that the same economic market that encourages the Western military to seize 
the possibilities of the network also connects and arms a global insurgency of Islamic 
militants against them. 
 
War in the cities and amongst urban populations requires a completely different set of 
skills to those associated with combat in open terrain but also, and most fundamentally, 
it ‘challenges the West’s faith in the transformational potential of sophisticated 
technology’.39 There is a sense of desperation about urban operations, where NCW and 
NEC have limited value and specialised, urban combat training is being undertaken as a 
matter of urgency. The ersatz Bavarian villages built on army training grounds across 
Britain during the Cold War are again being intensively used to train troops for urban 
warfare abroad. The Fighting in Built Up Areas (FIBUA) villages of Copehill Down on 
Salisbury plain, Gorse-Fach Farm at Sennybridge, Stone Camp near Faslane submarine 
base, Eastmere at Stanford Training Area near Thetford, Whinny Hill at Catterick 
Garrison, Lydd Ranges and Hythe Ranges near Dungeness, Longmoor Camp near 
Bordon in Hampshire, Sherfield Farm in the Brambley Training Area near Basingstoke, 
are all currently used for Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG) courses 
before deployment to war zones. Some of these sites have seen significant investments 
to remodel them as ‘middle eastern’ villages including a new £14m complex at Stanford 
Training area which opened in May 2009. ‘With the help of Afghan nationals and others 
who take on the role of insurgents in these training areas OPTAG will be able to 
                                                                                                                                      
36 See the following for the use of NEC within Operations Telic in Iraq and Herrick in Afghanistan, 
'NEC: Understanding Network Enabled Capability', Ministry of Defence, 2009. 
37 Madelyn Hsiao-Rei Hicks, Dardagan, Hamit, Serdan, Gabriela Guerrero, Bagnall, Peter M., 
Sloboda, John A., Spagat, Michael, 'The Weapons That Kill Civilians -- Deaths of Children and 
Noncombatants in Iraq, 2003-2008', New England Medical Journal, Vol. 360, no. 16, 2009, pp. 
1585-8. 
38 Benjamin Sutherland, 'Apple’s New Weapon', in Newsweek Magazine, April 27th 2009. 
39 Alice Hills, ‘Continuity and Discontinuity: The Grammar of Urban Military Operations’ in 
Stephen Graham (ed), Cities, war, and terrorism: towards an urban geopolitics, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004, p.231. 
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replicate the sights, sounds and smells of the Middle East’.40 NATO and British troops 
can also experience the ‘sights sounds and smells’ of a roadside bomb scenario at the 
new NATO Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) centre at DM (Defence 
Munitions) Kineton, Warwickshire - another brand new mock village designed to 
replicate counter-insurgency operations.41  
 
The incongruity of fake villages and the reappearance of urban army exercises across 
the landscape of the UK are just a few of the unusual by-products of networked warfare 
(and its failings) elsewhere. Despite its apparent limitations, the broader application of 
NEC into military training exercises is an ongoing process, one in which technology is 
introduced incrementally. The Agile Thunder exercise of October 2007 on Salisbury 
Plain saw the testing and introduction of Northrop Grumman’s Advanced Information 
Architecture (AIA), a communication network which allowed near real-time gathering 
and transmission of data between airborne and ground-based units which ‘makes 
everyone’s information discoverable in the network’.42 The unfolding, three dimensional 
spaces created during a large exercise occur within the larger semi-permanent Military 
Air Trafic Zones (MATZ), low fly zones and restricted airspace architecture around and 
above the British training sites (in this case Salisbury Plain). The interconnection of these 
spaces and fixed volumes will be explored in greater detail in the following chapter. It 
remains to be said, however, that while all military exercises are unique in their planning 
and execution, Agile Thunder’s reliance on emerging NEC technology is an example of 
a spatial structure defined to a greater degree by a fluid distribution nodes and hubs. Its 
is not known whether there were any UAVs integrated into Agile Thunder but their 
increasing presence in network-enabled exercises is defining new forms of segregated 
airspace over the domestic civilian landscape. Agile Thunder (and other recent NEC-
based exercises), reconceptualise the battlespace as an ‘architecture’, an unfolding, 
                                                
40 ‘New training area recreates Middle East in Norfolk’ Ministry of Defence  (National Archives),  
<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/TrainingAndAdventure/NewTrainingAreaRe
createsMiddleEastInNorfolk.htm>, (accessed 17 September 2009). 
41 These villages and spaces are remarkable not simply because they look uncanny or fake but 
because they throw into relief the peculiarly bland style and poor quality of so many recent 
housing developments in the UK. Many FIBUA villages look remarkably similar to certain modern 
Barratt or Taylor-Wimpey-style homes but are, perhaps not surprisingly, built to be more 
durable. 
42 Exercise Agile Thunder employed a variety of platforms including a Nimrod MR2 aircraft, a 
Hercules C-130J, two Tornadoes, forward and rear operations centres and a number of ground-
based Army and RAF troops. See Rich Mercadente, ‘Agile Thunder: Providing Near-Term NEC 
with Existing Systems’, Royal Air Force,  
<http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/E887F5A7_1143_EC82_2EBDEFB0B53D7EF9.pdf>, 
(accessed 17 September 2007). 
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potentially limitless theatre of war in which information is passed between static and 
mobile nodes.  
 
Recent counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have failed to paint the 
emerging ‘networked capability’ as a paradigmatic shift in modern warfare. Despite the 
reliance on joint operation strategies and an ‘increased situational awareness’, NATO 
forces struggle to contain insurgencies which employ asymmetrical tactics. Back in the 
UK, however, the ‘network paradigm’ has found a more benign and passive 
environment to remodel. 
 
Another looming problem is NEC’s dependant on a fickle commercial environment for 
technology: Elizabeth Quintana remarks that ‘[…] a few [study participants] observed 
NEC may soon be dead as far as their organization was concerned, citing insufficient 
money and stability in decision-making timelines to keep them in the market long-
term’.43 The reliance on the commercial sector for advanced information technology and 
complex component sets could fatally undermine current military ideology, particularly 
when so many IT companies are struggling or collapsing in the current global financial 
crisis. 
 
8.4 . Conclusions 
The development of the defence estate throughout the twentieth century saw the 
introduction of substantial infrastructural networks and systems to connect airfields, 
training sites and storage facilities. In times of war the value of rapid fuel distribution, 
communications and radar surveillance became integral to the defence of the UK and 
the continuous deployment of troops and vehicles. The current defence estate may be 
significantly smaller than it was in 1945 but many of the infrastructures remain and 
many more have been introduced, particularly in the area of communications. The 
gradual transformation of the defence estate has, nevertheless, moved away from a 
rigid dependence on land to a more flexible use of space and a greater dependence on 
digital communication networks. In fact, the military mantras in recent years of 
‘digitization’ and ‘networks’ can almost be viewed as a reaction to the weakening of 
territorial control at home and abroad – an emasculation of sorts. Desperate for a new 
                                                
43 Elizabeth Quintana, ‘Is NEC Dead? An Analysis of Industry’s Perspective on the UK’s NEC 
Programme’,  Royal United Services Institute, 2007, 
<http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NEC2007.pdf>, (accessed 12 June 2010). 
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direction after the bankruptcy of Cold War posturing but conscious of institutional 
conservatism,  
 
the proponents of military change [began] to behave like “capitalist marketeers” 
picking out “a symbol, a vision, a logo, a saying”, and promoting it ceaselessly 
in writing and presentations. Mechanization had been such a concept in its 
time, and the slogans of digitization were the same […]’.44 
 
As it neglected then abandoned many of its physical infrastructures to private sector 
management, the MoD increasingly invested in new digital technologies across the 
defence estate to reflect the changes in society at large and the shifting nature of 
warfare.  NEC is part of a much broader engagement with the commercial sector in 
which the divestiture of defence infrastructure to the private sector is seen as a 
necessary act of rationalization.   
 
There is also a sense in which ‘network’ is a metaphor for a burgeoning military doctrine 
that is moving away from pyramidal battlefield command structures towards a 
decentralised distribution of power. The aim of this is simply to emulate the apparent 
efficiency of commercial enterprise in the global market.45 Indeed, the emergence in the 
last two decades of NEC as Britain’s over-arching military doctrine seems as much 
about commercial enterprise as it is about military strategy. Such is the power of the 
commercial sector that the procurement of military technology is no longer following 
military strategy but dictating it.46  
 
                                                
44 Patrick Wright, Tank, p.427. 
45 Alfred Kaufman, 'Caught in the Network: How the Doctrine of Network-Centric Warfare Allows 
Technology to Dictate Military Strategy', Armed Forces Journal, Vol. 142, no. 7, February 2005, 
pp.20-2.  
46 Alfred Kaufman, 'Caught in the Network’, p.1.  Kaufmann states that one of the 
‘consequences of our [American] victory in the Cold War  […] is the virtual collapse of the 
intellectual structure that was erected to control the development of Western military technology. 
That structure, which ensured that the acquisition of military technology was guided by the 
specific operational requirements that flowed from a well-articulated national security strategy, 
rested on the simple proposition that military technology should follow, rather than precede, the 
national security needs of the nation’. Kaufman goes on to say that ‘military technology emulates 
commercial technology in the hope that adapting the latest commercial innovation to war may 
bring to national security that same benefits that undoubtedly accrued to commercial enterprises 
[…]. Technology is thus beginning to dictate military strategy’. While this may be a USA-
orientated supposition, the same could be said for the British  military who follow US military 
procurement strategies very closely. 
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Without wishing to conflate the static infrastructures of the defence estate with the 
nebulous doctrine of NEC, both have recently been defined in their separate ways by 
the private sector. Both represent different forms of military space and connectivity. 
One is conceived, perhaps unwisely, as the future of warfare (which redraws the theatre 
of war as a three dimensional network), the other physically links sites ‘horizontally’ 
across the domestic defence estate. NEC may be conceived as a battlefield concept 
but it is also redefining training environments in the UK by introducing new training 
patterns and technologies, and, as the following chapter will show, by subtly changing 
airspace design to accommodate UAVs.  
 
The current vogue for everything ‘networked’ must be considered in a wider historical 
context. The British military have been forming networks and infrastructure across the 
landscape of the UK with increasing intensity for the last hundred years. This chapter 
has offered a comparison between military utility networks in the landscape which have 
evolved over the course of the 20th century and the more recent changes in military 
doctrine which have focused on employing digital networks to reorganised the battle 
space. NEC, and its reliance on the commercial sector, is only the most recent chapter 
in a much broader reconceptualization of space that has occurred over the course of 
the 20th century. However, it continues the military imperative to dominate territory in 
horizontal, vertical and in volumetric terms. With this in mind the next chapter will build 
on the concept of a military ‘networked landscape’ by explicitly addressing the design 
and function of airspace architecture in relation to a broader structural model for 
interpreting military spatial relations.  
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         Figure 9.1. Model of a Watchkeeper UAV taken at the  
         Salisbury Plain Airspace Change public consultation session,  
         Amesbury. Photograph: M. Flintham. 
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9.1 . Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw together a number of persistent (but not 
always obvious) themes introduced by the case study material gathered within this 
thesis. These themes, however, should not yet be considered evidence of an 
archaeology of military or state power. Rather, they should be regarded at this 
stage simply as building blocks in the construction of an assemblage, a structural 
model for interpreting spatial relations. The themes in question relate, of course, to 
the way military spaces are ‘produced’, how those spaces then become 
connected over time and how they appear in their current manifestation. The 
purpose of sections 9.2 and 9.3 will be to establish and summarise the 
commonalities between certain exemplary sites, their shared spatial features and 
the principles that organise and animate them. Furthermore, it will describe the 
logic of how these spaces are gathered and mobilised as geographically-defined 
assemblages, how each one under analysis is unique but may share certain 
material, invisible and institutional characteristics with others across the UK. Also 
evident will be how each ‘poly-spatial’ form is defined by the historical, social and 
geographical specificities described in previous chapters, and how the military 
imperative is limited by these factors and by the nature of its own historically 
evolving posture. For the purposes of sections 9.2 and 9.3, the term ‘assemblage’ 
will be used as a temporary, if somewhat arbitrary descriptive term.  
 
Sections 9.2 and 9.3 will also contextualise these assemblages as local, regional 
and national phenomena. The specific spatial examples described in these 
sections will be shown to be components in a much larger assemblage 
encompassing large areas of the sovereign British airspace and a considerable 
network of inter-site connections. In this respect military space can be seen as an 
observable and measurable manifestation of an evolving military presence across 
the UK, a vast resource defined by the armed services and the private sector to 
contain their specialised activities.  
 
In the search for a descriptive vocabulary, the term ‘complex’ will be tested in 
sections 9.4 and 9.5 for its descriptive value and productive analysis. Just as 
military institutions around the world are currently using the term ‘network’ as an 
organising paradigm (which can equally be described as a technology of military 
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power or as a constituent of a broader apparatus), so ‘complex’ has been 
employed in a variety of ways to describe a sometimes pervasive militarisation of 
civil society. Section 9.4 will ask if, given its leaden connotations, it is appropriate 
or useful to classify these spatial formations as military complexes. Section 9.4 will 
also asses the increasing influence of the private sector and the current status of 
the British military-industrial complex (if it can be regarded as such) in the formal 
constitution of military space. It will describe the disposal of certain state-owned 
assets and sites as they become elements in the new geography of military 
privatisation. In section 9.5, the term ‘spatial complex’ emerges as a public/private 
entity, a military/industrial hybrid defined by corporate ‘rationalisation’, localised 
military processes and a set of incumbent spatial parameters.  
 
9.2 . Poly-spatial  forms 
Throughout this thesis many methods have been employed to visualise historical 
and emerging forms of militarised space. Mapping techniques have been used to 
describe bylaw boundaries, site perimeters and military settlements but also to 
visualise invisible forms of spatial production such as airspace volumes and danger 
areas. These methods of visualisation have allowed this research, in a sense, to 
‘see the unseen’. Just as the Cold War predilection for subterranean spaces is at 
last being documented by scholars and dedicated amateurs, current military 
spatial assemblages must also be revealed and recorded before they change form. 
However, there is a sense in which they have already changed, or rather 
‘dematerialised’ to an extent. The disposal and privatisation of some military sites, 
and increased public accessibility to others has contributed to this 
dematerialisation, as has the increased use of simulation technology for training. 
But, as this study has highlighted, the defence capability itself is not shrinking so 
where is it going? Research at Salisbury Plain (chapter 6) has demonstrated that 
there is an increased rationalisation of land used by the armed services for training 
(although in this case, not a reduction in the actual amount of military-owned land) 
which is facilitated by private sector management (Landmarc). This private sector 
methodology now extends across the entire training estate which will ultimately 
lead to more troops being trained on fewer but larger sites.1 Much of Salisbury 
                                                
1 The new strategy of creating ‘super garrisons’ at Salisbury Plain, Aldershot and Catterick 
amongst others, and a major new tri-service training establishment at St Athan, Wales, 
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Plain Training Area (SPTA) is now accessible to the walking public which not only 
blurs the distinction between boundaries but also the conceptual distinction 
between militarised and non-militarised space. While this increased accessibility 
may be welcome in many respects, there is also an ambiguity here that falsely 
implies a reduction in military activity. In actual fact, SPTA has never been busier.  
 
Current spatial formations at SPTA are evident in Chapter 6 and here in Figures 
9.2 and 9.3, including how invisible Danger Area volumes mirror the footprint of 
military land ownership, but also how they connect with Military Aerodrome Traffic 
Zones (MATZ) in the region (see Appendix 9.1 for a map of all active MATZ across 
the UK). These spaces are designed in relation to each other and their constitution 
is negotiated with the Civil Aviation Authority and other stake holders. These 
invisible volumes are carefully fashioned with military training in mind and 
subtracted from the civil realm for specific periods of time. As described in Chapter 
6, Figure 9.4 shows a proposed volume of airspace which has been designed to 
accommodate new Watchkeeper UAVs for their eventual integration into military 
training exercises. 
 
 
Figure 9.2. SPTA Danger Area volumes. Satellite image from Google Earth with additional 
graphic modelling by Lloyd Bailey and M. Flintham. 
                                                                                                                               
bears out the message of rationalisation and consolidation proposed in the Defence 
Training Review of 1999. Also sown here were the seeds of privatisation and the creation 
of Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) and Public Private Partnership (PPP) deals.  
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Figure 9.3. Salisbury Plain Danger Area volumes with Military Aerodrome Traffic Zones 
(MATZ). Satellite image from Google Earth with additional graphic modelling by Lloyd Bailey 
and M. Flintham. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.4. Salisbury Plain Danger Areas with proposed segregated airspace for UAVs (in 
blue). Satellite image from Google Earth with additional graphic modelling by Lloyd Bailey 
and M. Flintham. 
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At Sennybridge Army Field Training Centre (SENTA) on the wild Mynydd Epynt 
plateau in Powys, things are simpler. At 12,000 ha (37,000 acres),2 SENTA is just 
over a third the size of SPTA and principally used to train infantry but has no 
facilities for heavy armoured vehicles. A single Danger Area volume extends up to 
23,000 feet and encapsulates SENTA, the Mynydd Epynt in its entirety and much 
of the surrounding region. 40 miles to the west of Sennybridge is Cardigan Bay 
and the village of Aberporth, a fishing community which has led a double life for 
nearly 70 years. Since the Second World War it has also been a centre of sub-
orbital solid rocket testing and aeronautical science. Today, the village is host to a 
Welsh Assembly-supported ‘centre of excellence’ for the development of UAVs at 
former RAF Aberporth. It is also home to QinetiQ’s surface-to-air weapons centre. 
A radial Danger Area over the airfield connects to the vast MoD Aberporth Range 
Complex,3 a series of restricted airspace volumes of unlimited height over the Irish 
Sea, the total area of which is over 3,500 square miles (see Figure 9.5).4 This area, 
used predominantly for surface-to-air missile tests using sub-sonic aerial targets 
will also see Watchkeeper UAVs operating within it. Developed by Thales and 
adapted at Aberporth, these drones will also operate over the skies of Powys and 
Wiltshire as they become integrated into training exercises at SENTA and SPTA. 
                                                
2 Of which 31,000 acres is MOD freehold land and 2,500 ha (6,000 acres) is leased from 
Forest Enterprise. 
3 ‘QinetiQ readies Aberporth UAV centre for Watchkeeper’ QinetiQ, 
<http://www.qinetiq.com/home/newsroom/news_releases_homepage/2009/2nd_quarter/
aberporth_may09.html>, (accessed 08 December 2009). 
4 Based on approximate measurements using Civil Aviation Authority coordinates of the 
MoD Aberporth Range Complex. 
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Figure 9.5. The Aberporth Range Complex over Cardigan Bay and the Irish Sea. The 
Sennybridge Army Field Training Centre (SENTA) airspace volume can be seen bottom 
centre. Satellite image from Google Earth with additional graphic modelling by Lloyd Bailey 
and M. Flintham. 
 
 
Similarly at MoD Shoeburyness, the Danger Area perimeter covers the whole of 
Foulness island and out to sea (nearly 45 km in total) and rises up to 35,000ft 
(10668m). As Chapter 5 reveals, MoD Shoeburyness also plays hosts to a range of 
weapons testing facilities which are evenly dispersed across Foulness island but 
which are almost exclusively managed by QinetiQ on behalf of the MoD. Each site 
within this geographical dispersed arrangement has a unique function but all are 
gathered under the canopy of the designated Danger Areas to accommodate live 
firing, weapons disposal, static explosions and engine testing. Once again, the 
landscape, the airspace volumes, the facilities and the processes that occur within 
and around them are all components within an interconnected assemblage of 
quasi-military space. Even the civilian community at the heart of the island is 
encapsulated within this invisible architecture, even agriculture and animal 
husbandry are defined by the immaterial structures of weapons development. 
SPTA, SENTA and MoD Shoeburyness have complex relationships with their 
civilian tenants and their use of military-owned land. In fact, this propinquity is 
repeated across the Defence Training Estate where land is leased to the farming 
community but incorporated into military training exercises when the need arises. 
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So in this sense, both ‘military’ and agricultural land act as a foundation for much 
more complicated spatial assemblages. MoD Shoeburyness shows in the starkest 
terms how such an assemblage is constructed from the ground up, how the island 
of Foulness acts almost as a tabula rasa for military activity: a skeletal network of 
roads, infrastructures and facilities spreads across the island and incorporates the 
existing civilian community. Military bylaws are imposed, infrastructural networks 
quickly follow and the island becomes both a training ground and a military-
scientific community. Its relative isolation make it perfect for clandestine activities 
such as atomic weapons development and experimental research. Artillery firing 
out to sea make it necessary to impose shipping restrictions around the north and 
east of the island. Lateral and vertical dimensions for restricted Danger Areas are 
imposed as national airspace becomes rationalised after the Second World War. 
Today, all these elements are in place for the duration of the working week and 
can be imposed whenever the need arises. Enter these areas at your peril.  
 
While each spatial assemblage described above is unique in its arrangement and 
in its relation to the geography it inhabits, this pattern of a gradual, incremental 
construction of space is repeated at all the substantial militarised sites across the 
UK. They are built to contain specific activities but are no longer protected by 
crown immunity, nor are they impervious to the concerns of civil pressure groups 
or the requirements of public accountability. More than ever, the British armed 
services find themselves constrained by the very landscape they inhabit. For these 
reasons the military spaces they create are becoming adaptive systems which are 
able to accommodate all manner of external influences; areas of national parks can 
be regularly opened to walkers and to the farming community, restricted airspaces 
can be shared with civil user groups, military-controlled waters can be open to 
commercial shipping (see Chapter 7) and conservation is managed in a way that is 
more transparent to external bodies. The level of organisation involved in 
designing, assembling and maintaining these semi-permeable structures requires 
the collaboration of a number of military and non-military agencies. For example, 
the SPTA complex falls under the overall jurisdiction of the Defence Training Estate 
(DTE) but is managed from HQ SPTA at Westdown Camp, Tilshead. Exercise 
planning also takes place at Westdown but exercise-specific maps, airspace 
charts and geographic data sets of the region are produced at the Defence 
Geographic Centre in Feltham, Middlesex. Security and range maintenance is 
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managed by Landmarc. Conservation and archaeological site management is 
coordinated by the Defence Estates’ Environmental Support Team (EST) also 
based at Westdown camp. MoD Boscombe Down (adjacent to SPTA) coordinates 
aircraft entry into the MATZ and Danger Areas. These and other agencies all 
contribute to the construction and managements of the SPTA spatial assemblage.  
 
Militarised structures and procedures such as these can be found at numerous 
other places across the British Isles. Many combine land, sea and airspace in 
unique configurations, poly-spatial edifices built to contain perilous and secret 
events. Once detected and visualised, they can be measured, interpreted and 
brought into the broader register of analysis and critical discourse. They can now 
be understood as the tacit, perhaps even clandestine borders of military control. It 
is not simply a question of a new ‘air grab’ (following the extensive military land 
grabs of the 19th and 20th centuries), but an articulation of land, sea, air as a 
combined entity. 
 
There also seems little point in describing spaces in isolation, divorced from their 
social, political and economic determinants or consequences. For instance, after 
having studied SPTA, MoD Shoeburyness and HMNB Portsmouth it was 
necessary to raise the following question: is a space ‘militarised’ if it is managed by 
a private sector organisation (in the first two cases, Landmarc and QinetiQ)? The 
answer was yes, simply because in all three cases the land in question was owned 
by the MoD and protected by military bylaws. Similarly, the question of whether a 
volume of airspace above and around a military site is ‘militarised’ must be asked 
in the knowledge that it was constituted and regulated by a civil authority (the CAA) 
in consultation with a broad group of (non-military) stake holders. The answer in 
this case was slightly more complicated since many of the airspace in question are 
constituted in slightly different ways; some are Danger Areas which are legally 
accessible to civil aircraft when active, others are an extension of military land 
bylaws (and hence illegal to enter without authorisation), and some are simply 
‘restricted’ airspaces within the rule of civil law. In all cases, however, their 
parameters are defined by military activity – and hence, they become ‘militarised’. 
 
9.3 . Mi l i tar ised ai rspaces 
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Chapter 8 described some of the other, less pronounced ways in which military 
sites are connected by infrastructure such as fuel pipeline networks, water and 
waste processing networks and other utility services. These webs and networks 
are permanent, material features of the defence estate, binding military sites 
together to form an interdependent, increasingly interconnected totality. As we 
have seen, many of these utilities are now managed as PPPs, PFIs or sold in their 
entirety to the private sector. This fact does not detract from their function as 
assets of the defence estate or components in the machinery of the  British military 
capability. 
 
One notable and emerging form of inter-site connectivity is temporary airspace - in 
particular, those spaces that are currently being designed and proposed as 
segregated volumes for UAVs. This research has encountered two examples 
where these airborne surveillance (and potentially weaponised) systems will require 
their own airspace, extending existing volumes over civil space and connecting 
existing Danger Areas together. The case of Aberporth Range Complex described 
above, is a prime example of this emerging form of inter-site connection. Figure 
9.5 shows the massive Aberporth rocket testing complex which currently 
incorporates the nearby ParcAberporth UAV test facility within the same airspace. 
However, the area highlighted in blue represents a proposal (which is very similar 
to the one currently under review for SPTA and visualised here as Figure 9.4) for an 
extension of existing airspace which links the Aberporth complex at Cardigan Bay 
to the SENTA complex in mid-Wales (shown in red). This illustration shows one of 
three possible designs, all of which are subtly different but which share the 
objective of linking the two sites.5 This airspace bridge will facilitate the passage of 
UAVs from Aberporth to military training exercises in and around SENTA. 
 
 
                                                
5 This Google Earth visualisation is based on coordinates and maps found in the following 
public document: 'Consultation on an Airspace Change to Establish Segregated Airspace 
for The Wales Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Environment', Welsh Assembly 
Government, May, 2009, 
<http://wales.gov.uk/docs/det/consultation/090507aberporthconsen.pdf>, (accessed 8 
June 2010). 
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Figure 9.6. The Aberporth Range Complex and the Sennybridge Army Field Training Centre 
(SENTA) airspace volume are seen here connected by a proposed volume of segregated 
airspace to facilitate the transit of UAVs between the two complexes. Satellite image from 
Google Earth with additional graphic modelling by Lloyd Bailey and M. Flintham. 
 
 
With UAVs increasing being viewed as a panacea for the failures in British and 
NATO counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan, it seems highly likely that these 
two segregated airspace proposals (SPTA and Aberporth)  will be adopted and, 
furthermore, there will be many more like them in the coming years.6 These 
volumes, however, are mere fine adjustments to a national airspace system in 
which British sovereign skies are segregated and stratified into a system of 
monumental complexity. Chapter 3 described a system in which the military have, 
since the Second World War, negotiated a considerable amount of space for 
training. This is unsurprising since the National Air Traffic Service (NATS) was 
managed until 1996 as a joint civil/military organisation. There followed a 
transitionary period culminating in its reconstitution as a PPP under New Labour in 
2000 with the government retaining a balancing share. While no longer part of the 
organisation’s management structure, the MoD has enshrined its influence in the 
Civil Aviation Authority’s (CAA) Directorate of Airspace Policy which is ‘charged 
                                                
6 Or to put it another way, ‘You heard it here first. The skies will be full of these things 
[UAVs] in a few years’, remarked an RAF base commander during a conversation with the 
author at the Salisbury Plain Airspace Change public consultation session at the Bowman 
Centre, Amesbury on Thursday 11 June, 2009. 
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with reconciling civil and military operational needs, without affording preferential 
treatment to either’.7 How the CAA reconciles this statement with their decision to 
classify almost the entire area of the UK (from the surface to 2,000 feet) as a 
Military Low Flying System (UKLFS) is somewhat mystifying. Even more mystifying 
is that it apparently permits a wide distribution of low flying ‘in order to reduce the 
impact on the environment’.8 Figure 9.6 show how this largely unrestricted 
continuum is divided into 18 traffic management regions with large areas of 
Scotland, Wales and the border regions designated as Tactical Training Areas with 
flying down to 100 feet. Fast jets, transporters and helicopters, while seemingly 
enjoying carte blanch of the British lower airspace, are nevertheless advised to 
avoid large conurbations, controlled airspace and Aerodrome Traffic Zones (ATZ).  
                                                
7 ‘CAP 724: Airspace Charter’ Civil Aviation Authority, 2009, 
<http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP724.PDF>, (accessed 12 June 2010). 
8 ‘Aeronautical Information Circular: Military Low Flying Training in the United Kingdom’, 
Civil Aviation Authority, 2006, 
<http://www.nats-uk.ead-it.com/aip/current/aic/EG_Circ_2010_Y_027_en.pdf>, (accessed 
12 June 2010). 
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Figure 9.7. The military UK Day Low Flying System (UK DLFS). Source: National Air Traffic 
Service (NATS).  
 
 
The Military Low Flying System may not be constituted in volumetric terms like the 
Danger Areas described above but it is, nevertheless, a highly complex system of 
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airspace design, a cartographic framework for military training on a national scale. 
Within it, however, certain parts may be designated as Danger Areas and Tactical 
Training Areas which are reserved for high energy and sometimes very low altitude 
manoeuvres. The Highlands Restricted Area (otherwise known as Area 14T) for 
example, becomes crystallised as a volume with vertical and area coordinates that 
cover a great deal of northern Scotland including the Cape Wrath Range on the 
northern coast. The incorporation of extreme terrain into low flying sorties is 
another way in which the British landscapes becomes a spatial resource for the 
military: the extreme pre-cambian topography, which doubled for Soviet territory 
throughout the Cold War, now presents nothing more than a navigable challenge 
for the fast jet pilot, a way of understanding complex irregularities within a larger 
spatial system. See Appendix 9.2 for a military low-flying map which incorporates 
UK coastal waters. 
 
Just as cartography developed as a technology of orientation and navigation so 
airspace itself has become a technology (rather than simply a territorial possession) 
of military control. The NATS airspace chart below (figure 9.7) resembles nothing 
less than a mechanism, a military technology of national proportions. Invisible 
mechanistic structures sit side by side against organic land forms, nominally built 
around coastal contours and which are, at times, fully integrated into civil airspace 
structures. Restricted and hazardous area such as these open and collapse at 
predetermined intervals suggesting a realm of precisely defined voids. Just as the 
MoD Shoeburyness case study revealed a system of spatial structures that both 
protect and control civilian movement across the island, so we find here a similar 
system but one of Byzantine complexity that structures and limits travel around 
sovereign British airspace. The scale and proliferation of militarised airspace across 
the British Isles is a startling feature of a nation that is apparently reducing physical 
control of its military estate. This study could not possibly describe all the features 
and formations present in Figure 9.7, but it does offer a glimpse into a vast invisible 
realm of military spatial delineation. 
 
The grey channels on the chart represent civilian air traffic routes which connect 
major UK towns and cities to each other and to airspaces outside sovereign 
territory. Many of the assemblages examined in this research appear on this chart 
as danger areas within and around the landmass of the UK; MoD Shoeburyness 
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on the Thames estuary, SPTA in Wiltshire, SENTA in central Wales, the 
Portsmouth Danger Areas over the English Channel and the Aberporth Range 
Complex over the Irish Sea. All of these, vast in themselves, pale in size next to the 
enormous off shore complexes such as the Hebrides Range at Benbecula, the 
Manorbier and Castlemartin Ranges in South Wales or those over the North Sea. 
Together with the military Low Flying System described above they provide the 
armed services with a vast connected system of spaces, a training resource of 
national proportions.  
 
 
Figure 9.8. Chart of United Kingdom Airspace Restrictions and Hazardous Areas. Source: 
National Air Traffic Service (NATS).  
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9.4 . The evolv ing mil i tary-industr ial  complex  
The alliance of warfare and commerce is not an issue this research set out to 
address in detail but after encountering so many sites where the private sector has 
assumed control of services, management and logistics, the subject suddenly 
seems hard to avoid. This enquiry began by my assuming, perhaps naively, that 
military land and space was defined solely by the military. If this notion was ever 
true, it is certainly no longer the case. 
 
Having determined that the British military (and their numerous private sector 
partners) produce complex volumetric structures and permeable geographical 
areas using an almost limitless number of processes, it is now possible to critically 
interpret these unusual poly-spatial forms. It seems difficult to do this, however, 
without mentioning the ‘military-industrial complex’, a term which this thesis has so 
far been reluctant to deploy: its almost ubiquitous use during the 1960 and 1970s 
led to the term becoming something of a cliché in academic discourse. Its over-
use has possibly contributed to a lack of serious discussion around military-
industrial relations at the end of the Cold War – precisely the time when military 
budgets were being cut and the private sector was mobilised for an even greater 
influence in the defence sector.  
 
But what of the relationship between the spatial assemblages described above 
and the nebulous, almost mythical military-industrial complex? US President 
Eisenhower’s Farewell Address of 1961 brought the term into common usage, 
warning of the ‘conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms 
industry’.9 For Eisenhower, the question was not whether the military-industrial 
complex existed (of which he had little doubt), but whether it sought or exerted 
‘unwarranted influence’ over the decisions of state. Much of David Edgerton’s 
exemplary Warfare State is dedicated to the examination of Britain’s fundamental 
role in the creation of ‘big science’ during the ‘White Heat’ period of intense 
                                                
9 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address, January 17, 1961. ‘In the councils of 
government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether 
sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise 
of misplaced power exists and will persist […] Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry 
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military-scientific production between 1955 and 1970. For this reason it is one of 
the few texts to detail the growth of a distinctly British military-industrial dynamic. It 
is also fervently anti-declinist in its dissection of Britain’s interwar period, shredding 
the notion of the UK as a sleepy, technologically backward nation, obsessed with 
disarmament and ‘caught out’ by the rise of Hitler and the rearmament of 
Germany: 
 
Britain was not a military-technological superpower in the interwar years for 
there was then so such thing; but it could claim to be the most powerful of 
the great powers’. In fact, it managed to maintained a ‘globally based 
capacity, to intervene in Europe to make the world safe for multinational 
capitalism.10  
 
It could also be argued that military-industrial complexes existed before the 20th 
century. The great naval powers of the 18th and 19th centuries were driven by 
increasingly sophisticated production processes developed during the industrial 
revolution, but tracing the complex historical patterns of conjunction between the 
military and industry is never easy (and perhaps beyond the remit of this study) but 
there are notable examples: the British Royal Dockyards were at the forefront of 
industrial manufacturing and were, according the Jeremy Black, ‘amongst the 
largest permanent employers of labour in Europe, and in their own right centres of 
strategic and profitable international trade in naval stores’.11 In addition, the 
development dockyards, arsenals and ordnance factories as part of a broader 
industrialization of military activity had a fundamental role in the creation of 
systematizes labour processes.12 The previous chapter on the emergence of a 
                                                                                                                               
can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense 
with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together’. 
10 Edgerton, Warfare State, p.58. 
11 Jeremy Black, European warfare in a global context, 1660-1815, London: Routledge, 
2007, p.33. 
12 Edgerton, Warfare State, p.327. ‘Merrit Roe-Smith turned the conventional view of the 
‘American system of manufacturers’ of the nineteenth century on its head finding its origin 
not in civilian Yankee ingenuity applied to arms, but in ‘armory practice’, a creation of 
military institutions which demanded interchangeability of parts for military reasons’. De 
Landa also follows a similar line of enquiry, attributing the institutionalization of these 
manufacturing processes to the French military engineer Jean Baptiste Gribeauval: ‘It was 
in the French and American armories that standardization and routinization of 
manufacturing practices was first introduced. Indeed, the nineteenth-century military drive 
to create weapons with perfectly interchangeable parts marked the beginning of the age of 
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military ‘network’ paradigm explored some later examples of exchanges between 
military and industry. The ‘network’ has not only been adopted by the military as a 
means of emulating the technologies and the efficiency of the global market, but 
the finance industries have adopted military cognitive combat models (the ‘OODA 
Loop’, for instance, and its variants) as management tools.  
 
Today, the military-industrial complex has a new permutation, one which has been 
accelerated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the persistent lobbying of the 
US senate by military contractors. With an estimated 15,000-20,000 private 
security contractors working in Iraq during March 2003, the conflict has been 
referred to as ‘the first privatized war’,13 which fundamentally ‘challenges 
conventional assumptions about the roles of the nation state as the main 
protagonist in military affairs’.14  
 
The private sector rush to the combat zone, however, is only one side of the coin: 
back home the management of bases, training facilities and the myriad services 
required to keep the military apparatus moving have all been subject to private 
sector interest. The US, with its massive military capability and its liberalised 
economic policies is often assumed to be the world leader in military privatisation,15 
but there is compelling evidence to suggest that Britain was more advanced than 
the US in forming a new, revitalized military-industrial dynamic. At a conference 
convened by RAND at Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire in April 2000, a group of 
businessmen, consultants and high-ranking military officials laid the groundwork 
for an unprecedented defence privatisation strategy. The co-chair of the ‘Joint US-
UK Conference on Privatizing Military Installations, Assets, Operations and 
                                                                                                                               
the rationalization of labor processes. The command structures developed in armories 
during this period were later exported to the civilian sector in the form of  “scientific 
management” techniques.’ See, De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, p.31. 
13 ‘Military-Industrial Complexities’, The Economist, 29 March 2003, p.56, cited in Caroline 
Holmqvist, 'Private Security Companies: The case for regulation', SIPRI Policy Paper No.9, 
Stockholm: SIPRI, 2005, p.1. 
14 Caroline Holmqvist, 'Private Security Companies: The case for regulation', SIPRI Policy 
Paper No.9, Stockholm: SIPRI, 2005, p.1. 
15 If there was any doubt about the continued and accelerating US military-industrial 
relationship, Nick Turse notes that ten years after Eisenhower’s farewell speech, ‘[…] there 
were twenty-two thousand prime contractors doing business with the US Department of 
Defence in 1970. Today, the number of prime contractors tops forty-seven thousand with 
subcontractors reaching well over the one hundred thousand mark […]’. See Nick Turse, 
The complex: how the military invades our everyday lives, London: Faber, 2008, p.3. 
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Services’, was future Vice President of the United States, Dick Cheney, then Chief 
Executive and Chairman of Halliburton.16 Soloman Hughes remarks that: 
 
While the US has some notable privatizations close to what the conference 
called ‘the bullet line’, they were generally jealous of Britain’s overall lead in 
military sell-offs. Dick Cheney told the Oxford gathering, ‘My general 
impression is that our British colleagues are far ahead of us in the US in the 
extent to which they have adopted changes in culture, attitude and style of 
operations that are required for successful privatization efforts’.17 
 
One such sell-off was the disastrous sale of 57,000 military housing units to 
Annington Homes Ltd in 1996, the penultimate year of John Major’s Conservative 
government.18 This was just the latest in a series of bold moves by the 
Conservatives to dispose of state-owned defence assets. Other sales during 
Margaret Thatcher’s tenure as Prime Minister included British Aerospace (sold 
1985), Rolls Royce (sold 1987) and Royal Ordnance (sold 1987). Tony Blair’s New 
Labour government seamlessly continued the project establishing numerous 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) and Private Finance Initiative (PFI) deals for 
‘leveraging private sector capital and expertise in the provision of defence activities 
and support services’.19 Each deal had its own particular set of multinational 
investors and stakeholders, and its own audacious profiteers and outraged 
detractors. A number of things were certain about these deals, however: they 
                                                
16 Solomon Hughes, War on Terror, Inc.: corporate profiteering from the politics of fear 
London: Verso, 2007, p. 58. Hughes continues, ‘Nine months later [after the conference], 
Cheney’s old firm [Halliburton] won a contract to provide ‘sponsored reserves’ – British 
soldiers who were employees of a US multinational’. Halliburton later went on to secure the 
contract for the construction of the Guantánamo Bay prison complex and established 
managerial control of the Iraq’s oil infrastructure during the second Gulf War and 
subsequent occupation. 
17 Ibid., p.61. 
18 ‘Ministry Of Defence: Sale of the Married Quarters Estate’, National Audit Office, London: 
The Stationary Office,1999. The NAO concluded after an investigation that the £1.7 billion 
paid for the homes by Annington Homes (via the Japanese investment bank Nomura) was 
somewhere between £77 million and £139 below their actual worth. Furthermore, the 
‘burden of managing the estate still rests mainly with the Department’, and ‘The 
Department are now in the business of maintaining and upgrading an estate which, as the 
quarters were sold on a 999-year lease, is in effect owned by somebody else’. 
Consequently, the MoD struggled throughout 2007-8 to justify the scandalously dilapidated 
dwellings in which many service personnel and their families continue to live. 
19 Rachel Hart & Ellen Pint, ‘Joint US-UK Conference on Privatizing Military Installations, 
Assets, Operations and Services’, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000. 
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exposed large parts of Britain’s defence capability to market forces and to the 
turbulent effects of seemingly random takeovers and mergers. The military-
industrial complex as it stands today is an evolved being: before the end of the 
Cold War, industry simply made ‘things’ for the military but today no area of 
military activity is left untouched by the private sector. Housing and building 
contracts, security, research and development, logistics support, water and waste 
management, information technology, land management, the training of soldiers, 
the feeding of soldiers, even some of the soldiers themselves can be subject to 
private sector contracts.  
 
The transformation of the military-industrial dynamic from what is essentially is a 
socio-economic condition to a geographical reality is plainly illustrated in the case 
of Portsmouth – not just in the naval base or the dockyard (or in their combined 
presence) but in the city as a whole. The distribution of naval and military-related 
sites across the region is the historical aggregation of prolonged martial activity. It 
is also the expression of a recent private sector colonization of military sites and 
services in the region, where organizations such as BAE Systems, QinetiQ and VT 
have taken over roles traditionally undertaken by the military such as training, R&D 
and site management. Naval shipping building, which was previously the preserve 
of a military/civil labour structure is now wholly private sector. This fact adds an 
additional layer of complexity to a landscape and seascape of intense military-
related activity, once again blurring the distinctions between defence, production, 
and profit margins.  
 
It is worth mentioning that while Margaret Thatcher’s government hesitated over 
the privatisation of Portsmouth Royal Dockyard, it had no such reservations in 
transferring the administration of Devonport Royal Dockyard, Plymouth to 
Devonport Management Limited (DML) in 1987. DML was the creation of Brown 
and Root (the UK subsidiary of Halliburton), the Weir Group, BICC (subsidiary of 
UK construction firm Balfour Beatty), and the international bank, Barclays. The 
Dockyard remained the actual property of the MoD until 1997 when Brown and 
Root took the majority share of DML and purchased the Dockyard for £40.3m.20 
                                                
20 ‘Anglo-American consortium buys Devonport Royal Naval Dockyard for pounds 40m’. 
The Independent, Wednesday, 12 February 1997, p.17.  
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Hughes remarks that Halliburton, BICC and the Weir Group ‘were all Tory donors, 
with Tory lords serving on their boards. The Conservative commitment to 
privatisation was by itself a enough to ensure the sell-off, but the cash and 
connections probably helped’.21 The deal included the refuelling and refitting of 
Britain’s ‘Vanguard’ class of nuclear submarines, the UK’s only nuclear weapon 
delivery system. When DML’s costs began to escalate from the target of £576m to 
an estimated £933m, the MoD believed it could win a legal case against them but 
chose not to because delays ‘would have adversely impacted on the effectiveness 
of the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent’.22 Putting Britain’s nuclear deterrent at the 
centre of a high profile court case would have not only made a mockery of the 
privatisation process but seriously undermined the wisdom of entrusting it to a 
consortium of banks and foreign corporations. DML was eventually bought out by 
Babcock International Group PLC who also manage the Rosyth naval dockyard in 
Fife, Scotland and numerous other assets around the world. Today, Devonport 
and Portsmouth dockyards are just two constituents of the new hybrid military-
industrial landscape - part state-owned, part private sector. The geographies of 
defence and training are evermore closely aligned to the geographies of capitalist 
production- a relationship which will be examined in greater detail in the following 
chapter. 
 
9.5 . The mi l i tary  spatia l complex  
Despite its uncertain scale and diffused characteristics, the evolving military-
industrial complex is a useful theme to draw into this research on assemblages of 
space. It not only reveals the fallacy of a rigid military/civil (or indeed, 
military/commercial) dichotomy but throws into relief the increasing ambiguity of 
their respective identities. Much the same can be said of the hybrid spaces they 
produce – flexible, permeable and much harder to identify or visualise. It also 
highlights the multiple ‘personalities’ evident at many of the sites examined here – 
indeed, the term ‘complex’ hints at an indistinct anxiety or neurosis. If it is possible 
to talk about a conflict of interests occurring within a space – which has been 
described time and time again within this research – it seems equally possible to 
                                                
21 Solomon Hughes, War on Terror, Inc., p.46. 
22 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Ministry of Defence: The 
construction of nuclear submarine facilities at Devonport, 2002-2003, cited in Solomon 
Hughes, War on Terror, Inc., p.46. 
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consider space as a product of institutional or social anxiety. As military sites pass 
from state to private ownership they can exude, for instance, social tension in 
labour relations, or if a site of intense military training activities also happens to be 
one of the richest archaeological sites in the UK (SPTA) it can lead to truly 
paradoxical exercise planning strategies. Likewise, if an isolated island used for 
weapons testing also happens to be home to a village community (MoD 
Shoeburyness), it can require extremely convoluted strictures to both limit and 
protect the movements of civilians. There must also be an inherent anxiety in 
knowing that because one’s home is close to a nuclear submarine base, it is also 
a prime target in a foreign power’s attack strategy. In fact, perhaps domestic 
military spaces are inherently anxious: many are created to contain different forms 
of controlled violence or dangerous activities, from hand-to-hand combat to target 
bombing, from small fire arms practice to armour-piercing artillery trials. Simulating 
the terrors of war and the extreme discipline of military training can only imbue a 
space with a tension that is at odds with the surrounding environment. Where the 
military-industrial complex might be described as a diffused socio-economic 
condition, here the term complex might describe a psychosocial condition which 
emanates from specific locations. In essence, however, this research is 
sympathetic to the term precisely because it implies an aggregation of elements, 
their synthesis or their interconnections. 
 
Rather than use the ambiguous, all-inclusive idiom ‘military-industrial complex’, this 
research will use the term ‘spatial complex’ to usefully describe the material and 
invisible aspects of the defence estate. It would be grounded in something quite 
specific, an entity in the landscape, a conglomerations of air, land, sea, 
architecture and processes. These complexes of space are also specifically 
created (often with precise dimensions) to contain the effects of the military 
directive or order as it unfolds across the domestic landscape, as it passes like a 
ghost between humans, vehicles and weapons systems. The military order is the 
only constant in these spatial transmutations. This thesis will proceed, therefore, 
with the term spatial complex to describe a multiplicity of connected spatialities - 
all related, of course, to the relentless preparation for war and the defence of 
sovereign territory.  
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The majority of this research has been devoted to the building blocks of the military 
spatial complex, as we will now call it. These form an invisible topography of 
cylinders, cubes and irregular volumes across the British Isles which, in many 
cases, are connected by infrastructural networks like stolons between organisms. 
Above the ground, spaces are connected by temporary air corridors, low fly zones, 
and Special Use Airspaces (SUA). The 14 major Defence Training Estate sites act 
as points of convergence, attracting military units from all over the UK and the 
world for training. These sites experience traffic flows much like any urban centres, 
except that they correspond to hazardous military exercises and irregular training 
schedules. The process of moving between sites is therefore an everyday 
occurrence. Increasing with the steady rise in military training, these transitory 
connections link barracks and bases to training sites across the UK. Similarly, 
military air traffic is constantly moving between local and regional complexes 
following specific routes. 
 
9.6 . Conclusions 
The question of whether these complexes, in their interconnected totality, form a 
kind of militarised ‘parallel landscape’ will be reserved for a more speculative 
enquiry in the final chapter. Before this however, it is worth restating that the 
growth of the defence estate should not simply be measured in acreage but also in 
the additional infrastructural connections, bureaucratic systems, transport routes 
and airspace design. Many of these elements have been completely ignored within 
critical academic discourse in what Woodward has broadly termed ‘the invisibility 
of military geographies’.23 There are a number of factors contributing to its 
peripherality as a subject, not least the access to restricted geographic information 
in the latter half of the 20th century but also its marginalisation as a ‘radical’ 
discourse during the 1970s and 1980s. Today, another factor contributes to its 
invisibility: the transfer of military services and assets to the private sector has 
proved to be a world of shifting conglomerates, consortiums and wilfully obscure 
identities. It is precisely these organisations that are so radically altering the British 
military landscape and rationalising the defence estate as a whole. They at once 
fragment the identity of military space and attempt to optimise its use as a 
commodity.  
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The poly-spatial forms addressed in section 9.2 (and encountered throughout this 
research) are complex structures which connect land, air, sea, architecture, 
technological processes (both hazardous and mundane), with human activity. 
These complexes are in turn connected to others around the UK to form a flexible, 
dynamic totality. This totality can be characterised as a national military spatial 
complex which incorporates the British sovereign territory but also extends its 
connections as ‘air bridges’ to war zones and relief efforts around the world. In this 
sense, the research represents a snapshot of an evolving, shifting military 
presence which is becoming more embedded in civil structures (CAA, NATS) and 
is increasingly defined by commercial enterprise (QinetiQ, BAA, VT, Landmarc, 
SERCO, et al). Evidence of market competition is visible across the entire military 
estate and is characterised by forms of spatial efficiency, increased connectivity 
and often an ambiguous distinction between military and non-military space. There 
is also strong evidence (described throughout this thesis) of poor performance, 
financial mismanagement, and where the MoD has adopted a private sector 
methodology for ‘Smart Procurement’, a series of massively inflated project 
costs.24 Indeed, some have accused Smart Procurement of leading directly to 
fatalities in military operations in Afghanistan.25  
 
Proximity to the market has emboldened the MoD (and other major global military 
institutions) to adopt commercial management models, including the network-
based methodologies, to restructure procurement, training methods and combat 
systems. Chapter 8 showed how this attitude is also apparent in new spatial forms 
across the UK (segregated airspace for UAVs and new parallel infrastructural 
networks). The strengthening of links between the military and the private sector 
(particularly in the areas of training, logistics support and site management – many 
of which fall under the ambiguous ‘service provision’ category) has redefined the 
British military-industrial complex for the twenty-first century. This is not simply a 
socio-economic condition or a hidden field of production but a spatial reality - and 
                                                                                                                               
23 Woodward, Military Geographies, p.4. 
24 Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Audit office slams air force’s PFI nightmare’ the Guardian, 
Tuesday 30 March 2010, p.22. 
25 Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘RAF Nimrod crash report describes 'lamentable' failings of MoD 
and BAE’, Guardian, Wednesday 28 October 2009, p.1 
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the national military spatial complex presented here is but one aspect of a much 
larger, diffused set of global relations. If this research were undertaken 20 years 
ago, it would probably have encountered a much clearer distinction between the 
military, civil and commercial spaces. Today these distinctions are breaking down 
making it more critical than ever to define, track and visualise their relations.  
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                    Figure 10.1. Military warning flag  
       at Gedney Drove End, Lincolnshire.  
       Photograph: M. Flintham. 
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10.1. Introduct ion 
On the edge of the Lincolnshire Wash, past low marshes and fenlands, the sea 
defences at Gedney Drove provide an abrupt end to an intensely cultivated, ‘reclaimed’ 
landscape. Beyond this are the almost corporeal, brain-like tributaries and mudflats that 
lead inevitably into the wash itself. From here it is easy to picture Stanislav Lem’s 
sentient world, Solaris with its oceans of mutable matter churning into half-recognised 
forms and structures. The salt marshes and mud flats stretch all the way from Boston 
to King’s Lynn across the square jaw of the Wash; a transitionary medium between 
solid and fluid, cultivation and chaos, wet and dry. The living communities, both human 
and non-human, that survive and thrive on its periphery are innumerable. One such 
community is represented, at first, by tall red flags that echo the swaying poppies that 
inhabit the field and hedgerows. There are also unusual observation towers and 
warning signs along the sea wall, and out across the marches an assemblage of 
scuttled barges, stranded scaffold structures and painted targets all seem part of a 
related group of objects. The thing that binds them together with a connected purpose 
suddenly appears in the sky as if from nowhere (which is the point, I suppose). The 
Harrier ground attack jet makes a low pass, (maybe 150 feet), and drops something 
over the targets. A delayed engine-roar quickly follows and a thin white plume is 
suddenly visible in the distance. The jet makes several more passes, each slightly 
different from the last but tracing a basic racetrack pattern above the salt marshes; an 
invisible form that connects the land to the air with the passage of a missile. The jet 
disappears just as suddenly leaving only a thunderous doppler-distorted wake; not so 
much a sound as an amorphous force folding through space. If this sortie were a real 
air strike it would be both terrifying and life threatening but here it is simply incongruous. 
This bombing range is one of several around the coasts of the UK that are used for 
target practice by the RAF, USAF and jets from other NATO countries. Such patterns of 
simulated warfare, repeated day in day out at RAF stations, army training sites and 
naval ports, exemplify what could be considered as a parallel form of spatial activity – a 
disruptive form of production which is, by necessity, segregated from civil space.  
 
The previous chapter described a national framework of military sites, airspaces, 
processes and connections, a vast arrangement of militarised spaces which are both 
integrated with and separated from civil space. Military frameworks such as this have 
existed throughout the 20th century and before, reconfiguring with each change in threat 
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and defensive posture, extending or contracting with each new technological 
development. The sovereign territory is its defining and constraining feature, the body 
over which the armature is placed. Could this spatial framework be considered parallel 
to civil space? If so, what is the real value in discussing this parallel landscape of military 
activity? This chapter will attempt to answer these and other questions relating to the 
spatial constitution of military power in the British landscape. 
 
Much of this thesis has concentrated on the increasing permeability of military spaces 
and their connections with civil society. There remains, however, a sense in which they 
retain a degree of ‘detachment’, which ultimately relates to the function of military 
power in British society. One aim of this chapter then is to assess the status and 
constitution of military power as a component of the British state apparatus. It has 
already become apparent during this research that military power is defined in the 
broadest sense by its relationships to geography, territory and space. While this fact 
may seem obvious, it is worth stating clearly since the control of space has historically 
been so closely aligned to the accumulation of wealth and property which, in turn, is 
linked to the formation of the nation state and the emergence of capitalism. If British 
military power has served the territorial ambitions of the state it has done so in varying 
proximity to British capitalism itself.  
 
Section 10.2 of this chapter will briefly reiterate the social origin of the military’s 
‘detachment’ from civil society as a function of state coercive force. In this respect the 
original function of the barrack system as a form of segregation will be assessed, as will 
the military’s subsequent release from the obligation of civil control. The mass-purchase 
and appropriation of land by the military during the 19th and 20th centuries will be 
considered as the basis for an acute spatial differentiation of martial activity which 
would ultimately manifest in the hermetic, anxious landscapes of the Cold War.  
 
Section 10.3 will study military power and its relationship to national economic ambition 
and its role as a form of ‘extra-economic’ coercion. Military coercion will be assessed 
as a distinct and separate form of state control, but one which has been, (and 
continues to be) employed to open up spaces for capital accumulation. For this reason 
military coercive power is dependent on cartographic knowledge as a technology for 
territorial control. The end of the Cold War will be shown to be a pivotal moment in the 
evolution of (western) state coercive force, when military power itself is opened as a 
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space for commercial enterprise. In this respect, the influence of the private sector on 
the British military landscape will be developed in this section. 
 
Section 10.4 will discuss military space as vessel of British state power. However, the 
definition of ‘state’ control will also be called into question in light of the increasing 
influence of exterior, non-state agencies such as private sector companies, NGOs, 
public interest groups and cross-national alliances. All these parties contribute to a 
blurring or a ‘dematerialization’ of domestic military landscape which was once so 
distinct during the Cold War. As military space is increasingly woven into the fabric of 
civil society, this chapter reiterates the need to monitor and track its changing status. 
 
The persistent theme that military space is distinct, parallel or somehow uncoupled 
from other social activities will be further explored in section 10.5. Paul Virilio’s analysis 
of military space as an ‘original continuum’ will be addressed in relation to the dynamic 
arrangements of spaces defined within this thesis. This final speculative interpretation 
will consider the consequences of military technology and speed on the perception of 
geographical distance, and the possibility that the martial imagination has outgrown 
human territory. 
 
10.2. The social  detachment of  mil i tary space. 
In order to maintain its status as a world power the British government allows the 
armed services to maintain a large permanent presence across the landscape of the 
UK. It is a presence which has become largely detached from the burden of civil 
‘coercion’ or civilian control. What follows is a summary of the significant moments in 
history when domestic military space and power became detached from these social 
requirements. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a permanent British Army was established after the English 
Civil Wars. It was simultaneously subject to the sovereignty of parliament and the crown 
but was largely billeted amongst the people – integrated into the civil population. 
However, the organised barracking system that emerged in the UK during the 18th and 
19th centuries was a reflection of growing imperialist ambitions, threats from abroad, 
internally contested borders, and the sporadic threat of civil unrest. This move was also, 
in part, a desire by the state to remove the military from the revolutionary or seditious 
influence of disaffected industrial or agricultural labourers. The geographic distribution of 
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barracks often mirrored the patterns of sustained labour disputes and actions around 
major towns and cities – a way of providing a localised but socially segregated force to 
subdue unrest. In addition, new railway networks were assisting the distribution of 
troops to hot spots around the country, particularly the midland and the north, 
suppressing unrest among disaffected industrial workers and craftsmen. The strategic 
presence of the army represented a direct form of state control. However, while this 
control could be attributed to the ongoing formation of the state (and its attempts to 
consolidate a unified sovereign territory), the emerging form of industrial capitalism was 
confidently defining state policy.1  
 
During the 19th century, a burgeoning regional police force released the army and 
volunteer forces from the obligation of civil enforcement. This it seems, was another 
decisive moment in the creation of a military that is at once present but separate – 
parallel, in fact, to civil society. This moment marks another degree of localised 
‘detachment’ from the coercive requirements of capitalist production. From this point 
the military ceased to exercise violent control over the British population but, curiously, 
began, instead, to acquire vast tract of land on which to train. Control of the population 
ended but control of the landscape began in earnest with the mass acquisition and 
appropriation of land at the end of the 19th century and continued throughout the next. 
Military land from this point attains value as a training resource but is removed from the 
agricultural production cycle (until such a time when it is either leased back to the 
farming community or sold outright). Research here on Salisbury Plain suggests that 
most of the land was bought at near-market value but was generally acquired through 
forms of compulsory purchase. This seems to be indicative of the military purchase 
trend during the first half of the 20th century where land was effectively subtracted from 
the stock of agricultural land or from large private estates. The purchase of land on this 
scale greatly accentuated the difference between military and civilian activities where 
the former were given licence by the state to strictly limit access to their land under 
threat of prosecution. This spatial differential was therefore a social phenomenon too, 
defined by uneven power relations. 
                                                
1 Ellen Meiksins Wood, Empire of capital, London: Verso, 2005, p.19. ‘The Poor Law Reform of 
1834 represented a moment, in the early days of industrial development, when capital needed to 
uproot labour, to separate it from local attachment. But, while the state continued to perform 
that role, making labour freely available by movements within and across borders whenever 
required, such movements have always been rigorously controlled. It has been one of the state’s 
essential functions to keep a firm grip on the mobility of labour, so that the movements of labour 
enhance, rather than endanger, capitalist profit’.  
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The ‘totality of defence’ that occurred later during the Second World War was, in fact, 
based on a 20% requisition of the British landscape for training and defence. Britain 
effectively became a war zone during this period and as such the distinction between 
civil and military aspects of society was less pronounced. Another study might 
speculate on the degree to which mass conscription militarised civil society or whether 
the process, in fact, ‘civilised’ the military. Certainly, the hazards of military activities 
were a part of everyday life in a way that galvanised a common purpose in the face of 
adversity. After the war much of the requisitioned land was returned to its original 
owners leaving the landscape littered with the relics of military production and 
destruction, many of which are still visible today. However, a much higher proportion of 
land was retained by the military after the Second World War than after the First. 
 
During the Cold War, military sites in the UK were defined by their acute difference and 
their detachment from civil space; they were highly secure, wilfully secretive, and in 
many cases controlled by a foreign power (USA). The presence of nuclear weapons 
invested many of these spaces with an apocalyptic charge: the triple-fenced 
perimeters, the ‘sterile’ zones around the hardened bunkers all spoke of difference, 
exclusion and ultimately, the absence of life on earth. Freud’s Todestrieb was there; the 
‘death drive’ in its most sophisticated form, presided over by an impenetrable shell of 
political (il)logic. Military space was a place of retreat or exile for the soldier 
contaminated by his association with the ultimate weapon. Smelling death perhaps, the 
commercial sector (that would figure so significantly at military sites in later years) was 
nowhere to be seen. These hermetic spaces with their incumbent national framework of 
early warning systems, their partial invisibility and cult-like detachment, could 
undoubtedly be considered parallel to civil society and, in fact, parallel to life itself. 
These are spaces which, to borrow from Sebald, ‘cast the shadow of their own 
destruction before them’.2 Any serious study of the Cold War military landscape 
(including those immense underground bunkers that prefigured the spectacle of mass 
premature burial) would be one not of war but an exercise in eschatology. 
 
                                                
2 W.G Sebald, Austerlitz, trans. Anthea Bell, London: Penguin, 2002, p.24. 
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Figure 10.2. ‘Hot row’, hardened nuclear weapons storage facility, RAF Bentwater. 
Photograph: M. Flintham. 
 
 
In many ways the military landscape of the Cold War embodies the key theme of this 
research; it is the parallel landscape in extremis. The complex arrangement of spaces, 
networks and processes present during this period exemplify the notion of an 
alternative, hidden landscape of military control, one defined by the probability of 
nuclear attack. In this instance, the national military assemblage is orientated towards 
three related military imperatives: the defence of the sovereign territory (in relation to the 
bi-lateral US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement of 1958)3 which included a pronounced 
nuclear deterrence and the electromagnetic surveillance of home and foreign territories; 
the training and maintenance of the military capability itself across the defence estate; 
and finally the establishment of a sub-surface regional command network. Special Use 
Airspaces, segregated for military activity, emerged during this period, as did the notion 
of Low Flying Systems for strategic V-Bombers and fast jets. In many ways these 
comprehensive systems formed the most radical defensive complex of the 20th century; 
a carapace hardened against the threat from the Soviet Union, organised around the 
devastating possibilities of the ultimate weapon and braced for the total breakdown of 
civil society.  
                                                
3 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement 1958. 
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This section outlined some of the ways in which military power and space became 
‘detached’ from civil society culminating in a segregated, parallel landscape of Cold 
War military activity. The following section will describe how this landscape has 
changed in the last two decades under the influence of the private sector and the 
principles of the liberalised US and British economies.  
 
10.3. The ‘rea l’  Revolution in  Mil i tary Affairs. 
There is a sense in which every space seems parallel to the next; houses are parallel to 
one another, streets run side by side, fields systems subdivide a great deal of the British 
landscape, even the sky seems parallel to the land below. The British military 
landscape, however, deserves to be categorised separately, as a unique type of space 
that is deliberately created or produced in parallel to civil society as an act of self-
imposed segregation. As a manifestation of state power, domestic military space is 
essentially constituted on the use and containment of controlled violence and on a strict 
martial judicial system. In addition, military spaces and communication networks serve 
to control the flow of certain kinds of privileged information or knowledge. The following 
section will argue, however, that the degree to which military space is detached, 
segregated or indeed parallel to civil society is also influenced by its fluctuating 
relationship with capitalism and the global market.  
 
In order to understand the relationship that military space currently shares with capital 
and capitalism it is necessary to study the constitution of military power itself in the 
broadest terms. To begin with, it is easy to assume that such power is largely indivisible 
from the will of the state. However, as David Harvey points out,  
 
While obviously part of the state apparatus, military power deserves to be 
categorized separately because it is in this area that the connection between 
privileged geographical knowledge and the pursuit of power becomes most 
obvious […]. The conventions and the norms which attach to military 
requirements affect the nature of the geographical knowledge produced. 
Engineering perspectives, like the evaluation of terrain conditions affecting 
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vehicular movement, tend to take precedence over evaluating cultural 
conditions in the population, for example.4 
 
Harvey is correct in placing the single-minded acquisition and production of 
geographical knowledge at the heart of military power and hence spatial production. 
There is a strong historical precedence for the use of cartography as a technology of 
military power and the aspirations of state. It was, for instance, during the imperialist era 
that the military cartographic identity became productively aligned with capitalist 
accumulation, when ‘the cartographic basis was laid for the imposition of capitalist 
forms of territorial rights in areas of the world (Africa, the Americas, Australasia, and 
much of Asia) that had previously lacked them’.5 In this equation, capitalist forms of 
production and accumulation follow the military production of space (in this case, 
territorialization): military power opens up the ‘possibility for the “rational” organisation of 
space for capital accumulation’.6 Today, cartographic analysis remains central to 
military power but it is as much about the interpretation and delineation of three 
dimensional space as it is about plotting topographical features and surface densities. 
The influence of capital and capitalism on the function of military power is, however, 
somewhat more opaque. Military conquests of the type described above have been 
described (in their proximity to capitalist accumulation) as ‘extra-economic coercion’ - a 
way of differentiating between the coercive powers of state-sanctioned violence and 
commerce. However, Henri Lefebvre draws a much closer bond between military/state 
violence and capitalism, implying that that the two are somehow indivisible and mutually 
constitutive: 
 
[…] before the advent of capitalism, the part played by violence was extra-
economic; under the dominion of capitalism and the world market it assumed 
an economic role in the accumulation process; and in consequence, the 
economic sphere became dominant. This is not to say that economic relations 
were now identical to relations of power, but merely that the two could no 
longer be separated […]. What followed was the establishment of the world 
                                                
4 David Harvey, Spaces of capital: towards a critical geography, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2001, pp. 213-214. It is interesting to note that even at Salisbury Plain Training Area 
(SPTA) where conservation is very much an emerging factor in changing military behavior, 
operational objectives ultimately take priority over ecological or environmental concerns. 
5 Ibid., p.220. 
6 Ibid., p.220. 
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market, and the conquest and the plunder of the oceans and continents by 
Europeans  […].7 
 
And, more fundamentally, military ‘violence enthroned a specific rationality, that of 
accumulation, that of bureaucracy and the army – a unitary, logistical, operational and 
quantifying rationality which would make economic growth possible […]’.8 Ellen 
Meiksins Wood takes a less absolute position arguing, in fact, that; 
 
[…] capitalism is unique in its capacity to detach economic from extra-
economic power, and that this, amongst other things, implies that the economic 
power of capital can reach far beyond the grasp of any existing, or conceivable, 
political and military power. At the same time, capital’s economic power cannot 
exist without the support of extra-economic force; and extra-economic force is 
today, as before, supplied by the state.9 
 
If Harvey follows Lefebvre in stressing the fundamental union of ‘state’ violence and 
capitalist growth, Wood seems to suggests that the modern capitalist state retains the 
ability to ‘detach’ military force/coercion from economic ambition, although the two 
remain very close bedfellows. Indeed, the development of highly militarised Western 
economies after the Second World War emphasises, for Wood, the continuing (and in 
this case open-ended) role that ‘extra-economic’ force plays in defending and ‘policing’ 
the flow of (particularly US) capital around the world.10 Huge defence budgets typified 
this period but it was, as it is now, hard to gauge the ‘production function for national 
security, [and] it was difficult to correlate military expenditure levels to distinct 
improvements in national security’.11 So even in recent history, with fact and figures 
readily available, it is hard to asses the actual functional value of defence spending in 
relation to projected outcomes. If, however, the function of western Cold War defence 
spending was ultimately to preserve the free flow of global capital then the strategy 
                                                
7 Lefebvre, The production of space, p.276. 
8 Ibid., p.280. 
9 Meiksins Wood, Empire of capital, p.5. Curiously, in Empire of Capital, Wood ignores the    
coercive properties (extra-economic or otherwise) of Soviet military/state power or indeed, the 
role of ideology in forming a coercive Socialist economic identity. 
10 Ibid., p.129. 
11 Robert Higgs, ‘The Cold War Economy: Opportunity Costs, Ideology, and the Politics of 
Crisis’, The Independent Institute, 1994,  
<http://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1297>, (accessed 27 January 2010). 
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succeeded. The globalised markets of the late 20th and 21st century can be regarded as 
the most obvious outcome of a Western ‘victory’ in the Cold War. 
 
It was the economic burden of the Cold War that ignited the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) in the Soviet Union and the USA during the 1980s, the doctrine of harnessing 
emerging information technologies to ‘lift the fog of war’. Or as Bousquet puts it:  
 
In the post-Cold War environment in which military budgets were cut as part of 
the “peace dividend”, the promises of the RMA were particularly appealing as 
they became a way of doing more with less and substituting technology for 
manpower.12 
 
It was also a time in which the ‘futurological avant-garde took over the mainstream’ and 
the shift to information-centric warfare, hypersonic weapons and even artificial 
intelligence (AI) was expected to substantially reduce the old spatio-physical limitation of 
international conflict.13 Chapter 8 demonstrated that while information technology has 
found a significant place in the battlefield and in military infrastructures, many of the 
fundamental aspects of warfare remain unchanged. Paul Hirst alludes to the birth of the 
RMA in an era of US economic prosperity and hyperbole, in which an information-
based ‘knowledge economy’ expected to suspend ‘the old laws of economics, abolish 
scarcity’, remove limits to growth and transform the functioning of capital markets.14 
 
How does all this influence the British military landscape in the current era? It was in this 
climate that both US and UK governments began privatising defence assets and 
outsourcing services in an effort to reduce their defence budgets, leveraging private 
sector capital and disposing of certain risks associated with defence infrastructure.15 
The real revolution in military affairs is actually the sale and transfer of large elements of 
                                                
12 Bousquet, The scientific way of warfare, p.218. 
13 Hirst, Space and power, p136. 
14 Ibid., p136. 
15 We have already explored the fundamental shift in the British military’s current relationship to 
the market; not only as it emulates ‘free’ market principles in its adoption of a ‘network’ 
paradigm but in its divestiture of so-called ‘non-core’ services and provisions across the defence 
estate. When the private sector steps in to manage large sections of British military land, 
training, accommodation, catering and maintenance, its influence on the constitution of military 
space is considerable - so considerable, in fact, that the spaces themselves sometimes become 
commodities with an exchange value. In the recent case of MoD housing sold to Annington 
Homes Ltd and then leased back to service personnel and their families, that exchange value 
was £1.662bn. 
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the US and UK military capabilities to the private sector and the re-orientation of 
capitalism’s relationship to the state’s ‘extra-economic’ force. Once again we witness 
the changing proximity of the military to the market and the fluctuating constitution of 
military space. The parallel landscapes of military and civil activity, once so distinct 
during the Cold War, are brought closer together in the post-war liberalised economic 
environment. Both at war and at home the military landscape is certainly changing. 
Naomi Klein’s theory of Disaster Capitalism may have convincingly described the role 
that neo-conservative and neo-liberal economic strategies played in recent years in 
exploiting wars and manufacturing national crises for corporate profit,16 but the US and 
British armed services themselves have also been actively transformed by these 
strategies.  
 
Today’s parallel landscape of military activity may be less distinct, less hard-edged and 
less brutally nihilistic than that of 30 years ago but it is now being rationalised as a site 
of production by the private sector, a streamlined resource for hire. Since the Cold War, 
low-key changes to airspace design, land management, military housing and 
infrastructural networks have created what this research has termed a new ‘military 
spatial complex’ which is adaptable, fluid in its parameters and permeable to external 
influence. Technological and market-driven systems attempt a greater concentration of 
use within increasingly systematised structures, across a military landscape that is 
effectively managed for profit by a group of Russian-doll-like consortiums and 
multinationals. David Craig reveals that the MoD is the single biggest Whitehall investor 
in Private Finance Initiatives (PFI), boasting ‘52 signed schemes worth £4.25bn on its 
books’ with further deals that, in terms of payments, ‘will dwarf those already signed 
up’.17  
 
In summary, any analysis of the apparent ‘detachment’ or otherwise of military coercion 
from economic imperatives has to take into account the fundamental differences 
                                                
16 Naomi Klein, The shock doctrine : the rise of disaster capitalism, New York: Metropolitan, 
2007. 
17 David Craig and Richard Brooks, Plundering the public sector: how New Labour are letting 
consultants run off with £70 billion of our money, London: Constable, 2006, pp.152-153. ‘The 
Defence Training Review deal pencilled in for the combined Armed Forces is estimated to be 
worth £19bn, while the Future Strategic Air Tanker PFI (providing planes to refuel fighter jets in-
air) is expected to generate £13bn for the PFI companies’. Notable examples that relate to the 
defence estate include the new Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) site at Corsham in 
Wiltshire worth £690 million over a 25-year deal, and the proposed £12bn Defence Technical 
Academy at St Athan in the Vale of Glamorgan. 
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between domestic military spaces and the spaces of conflict. Recent conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan may or may not have been economically motivated but those domestic 
military sites ‘back home’ are rapidly becoming the new arena for private sector profit 
and competition. For the British MoD, the management of its defence estate and 
related services became something of an economic burden in the late 1980s: to borrow 
from Harvey again, they resolved to open up the ‘possibility for the “rational” 
organisation of space for capital accumulation’. This time the territory was domestic 
military landscape itself and the possibilities for profit that reside within it. The military 
spatial complex offered in this thesis is a manifestation of that ‘rational organisation of 
space’. The coercive force of the state is currently allowing itself to be reordered and 
remodelled by the market.  
 
10.4. The vessel  o f  mil i tary space. 
It now seems clear that military sites and space are not always entirely observable or 
easily defined. There is a sense, however, in which they could almost be described as a 
vessels designed to contain and legitimise violence for which ever actor or apparatus 
possesses it. Whether in the service of a despotic dictator, a nation state, a commercial 
enterprise or a combination of all three, military space enshrines and defines a set of 
power relations in which violent coercion is either rehearsed, implied or actively 
deployed. In this sense, military power is not exclusively nor ‘obviously part of the state 
apparatus’, as Harvey stated earlier, but more specifically, a force which is mobilised by 
a dominant (though not exclusively governmental) apparatus. A definition of this 
apparatus may be closer to Foucault’s ‘complex composed of men and things’.18 For 
Foucault, this is a way of exploding ‘the mental constructs he calls “the universals”, 
such as the State, Sovereignty, Law, and Power’,19 but it is useful here as a way of 
showing that these entities are not static or self-contained but dynamic systems in 
which power shifts between parties, dissipates and re-emerges elsewhere. Foucault’s 
model also allows for the influence of exterior (non-state) agencies and forces. Today, 
                                                
18 Michel Foucault cited in Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden, Space, knowledge and 
power: Foucault and geography, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, p.7. ‘I think it is not a matter of 
opposing things to men, but rather showing that what government has to do with is not territory 
but, rather, a sort of complex composed of men and things. The things, in this sense, with which 
government is to be concerned are in fact men, but men in their relations, their links, their 
imbrications with those things that are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory 
with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, and so on … what counts is essentially this 
complex of men and things; property and territory are merely one of its variables’. 
19 Giorgio Agamben, “What is an apparatus”? and other essays, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2009, p.7. 
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market forces, flows of capital and capitalism itself are all exerting considerable 
influence on the way in which wars are conducted and military might is configured - war 
zones remain violent and unpredictable (despite or perhaps because of the increasing 
influence of ‘corporate warriors’ and private security organisations)20 but domestic 
military spaces of the kind under discussion here are increasingly mediated and 
systematised, quietly being reordered under the influence of the private sector.  
 
So military spaces, like many others produced by social activity, are continually being 
defined and redefined according to the changing dynamics of the ‘state’ apparatus 
(actually a matrix of different agencies and actors). Foucault may problematise the 
concept of ‘state power’ but here his critique can help articulate the various forces at 
play within a domestic militarised environment. If military spaces were problematised 
during the Cold War because of their association with nuclear weapons and a climate of 
acute anxiety, today this critique should also include their relations with the private 
sector service industry and various public interest groups. It is likely that this current 
alliance has contributed to an increased permeability or a visible ‘softening’ of domestic 
military space.21  
 
As it becomes integrated into commercial and civil structures there is a sense in which 
militarised space is becoming much harder to see, define or measure: many spaces 
now have the ability to ‘switch’ on and off in accordance with public and private sector 
needs; there are regular flows of personnel and vehicles between sites across the UK, 
and even the British atomic weapons industry is now managed predominantly by US 
companies. In short, military activity is slowly dissolving into the domestic landscape, 
into the fabric of civilian and commercial life. It may be overstating the matter to suggest 
that this is, to borrow from Virilio, ‘the sign of a rupture effectuated between human 
territory and the continuum of violence’.22 Rather, this process of dematerialization 
appears to be evidence of the ongoing preparation for war which has changed during 
the modern era ‘from being a strategic, military principle – the fare of martial experts – 
                                                
20 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2003. 
21 For example, elements of the military landscape, hitherto used for clandestine research and 
development, now have the appearance of being part of the corporate sector, with few visible 
markers to link them to their martial landlords or clients. QinetiQ, for instance, occupy 38 
locations around the UK, many of which are still owned by the MoD and undertake major 
contracts for them but which, to all intents and purposes, look like commercial cleaning 
providers or pharmaceutical companies. 
22 Paul Virilio, Bunker Archeology, New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2006, p.20. 
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to becoming part of the inmost fabric of civil society’, where it is now ‘wired into the 
filigree of peace’’.23 What began in the UK at the end of the 19th century as a large scale 
acquisition of land, an internal colonisation, is today transforming into a commercial and 
bureaucratic procedure: military space as a negotiated entity, woven into the fabric of 
the landscape and blooming invisibly in the skies above.  
 
The parallel landscape of military activity, so distinct during the Cold War, can no longer 
be relied on to make explicit the distinctions between war and peace, death and life. 
For this reason alone, the discourses surrounding military geographies must engage 
with its dematerialization, its invisible, vertical dimensions and its growing economic 
exigency.  
 
10.5. An ‘or iginal  cont inuum’? 
The previous chapter described a connected complex of military spaces and sites, 
many of which are now time-sensitive, switching between active and inactive, or can 
shift their shape according to a negotiated set of coordinates. These spaces are more 
elusive than ever before; not only are they difficult to track and visualise (many spaces 
have changed during the course of this research) but they are even harder to 
conceptualise in the broader field of spatial culture. Even more perplexing is their ability 
to connect and intersect like a mechanism of moving parts. This behaviour increases 
the flow of activity between and within certain areas just as electricity passes across an 
analogue circuit, pooling into different components according to a particular command 
or calculation. 
 
The nature of this flow is another unusual point of interest: flows and rhythms of activity 
within regulated environments are common in all societies, but within the constraints of 
a developed military environment such as the United Kingdom’s, these flows can  are 
characterised by eruptions of controlled violence, high energy manoeuvres and the 
passage of supersonic projectiles. Virilio takes the matter further and suggests, 
                                                
23 Beatrice Hanssen, Critique of violence: between poststructuralism and critical theory, London: 
Routledge, 2000, p.102. One could interpret Hanssen’s ‘filigree of peace’ in this context as the 
domestic territory, but Britain is, of course, currently at war. The ‘War on Terror’ may have 
slipped from the lexicon of international politics but the conflict in Afghanistan shows no sign 
ending, and the threat of international terrorism sustains a highly pervasive international security 
surveillance assemblage. It is in this climate that  the commercial sector is thriving, penetrating 
previously closed markets and sectors. 
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somewhat obliquely, that the military are now inhabiting an ‘original continuum’.24 He 
describes an apparent omniscience and omnipresence experienced within a ‘locus of 
violence’, a realm in which speed has revolutionised warfare and social space in its 
wake: 
 
The superior speed of various means of communication and destruction is, in 
the hands of the military, the privileged means for a secret and permanent social 
transformation, a projectile for the destruction of the social continuum, a 
weapon, an implosive […]. The scientific conquest of energies and of speed is 
thus but the conquest of the reduction and contraction of the world.25 
 
Reading sometimes like lost Futurist texts by F.T. Marinetti, the apocalyptic, polemical 
style of Virilio’s work is actually informed by solid historical research. While the Futurists 
are often considered as proto-Fascists, Virilio, writing from the left, regards speed as 
being fundamentally fascistic in nature, organising the world to function in a constant 
state of anxiety and crisis.26 In this schema, the exploitation of the world is controlled by 
those who have speed at the expense of those who do not. In this respect, Virilio 
suggests that speed itself has become the new military habitat supplanting the need to 
acquire territory, controlling it instead from the point of high resolution surveillance and 
instantaneous deployment. While this proposition now seems wildly exaggerated in the 
wake of the protracted insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan (in which ground-based 
infantry forces arguably play the most significant role), it is, however, worth considering 
in relation to the domestic military landscape.  
 
In the UK, something unusual is happening to military space: it does indeed appear to 
be detaching itself (at least partially) from the responsibilities of territory, from the 
managerial burden of a large training estate and migrating instead to more rationalised, 
flexible forms of space. Unlike Virilio’s proposition, however, the domestic military 
landscape retains a strong link to ‘geographical reality’, albeit one that is increasingly 
mediated by the private sector. In fact, space (rather than speed) remains very much 
the locus of military control, echoing Massey’s assertion that, ‘(Contrary to popular 
                                                
24 Virilio, Bunker archeology, p.18. ‘The “conquest of space” by military and scientific personnel 
is no longer, as it once was, the conquest of the human habitat but the discovery of an original 
continuum that has only a distant link to geographical reality’.  
25 Ibid., pp.19-20. 
26 Paul Virilio, Speed and politics: an essay on dromology, New York: Semiotext(e), 1989). 
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opinion) space cannot be annihilated by time’.27 In fact, the increase in aeroplane speed 
brought about by the jet engine serves to reduce the time of travel rather than reduce 
geographical distance.28 In addition, infantry and armoured vehicle training continues to 
require vast tracts of land to accommodate increasingly intensive schedules despite 
advances in simulation technology. The word ‘vast’ here is used in relation to the scale 
of the human body - not to the speed of military vehicles or the range of current 
weapons systems, both of which appear to straining against the limited scale of the 
British training estate.  
 
Despite the questionable notion that military technology has somehow been 
responsible for a psychosocial ‘contraction’ of geographical distance, there is, 
nevertheless, a sense in which sovereign territories are struggling to contain their 
military technologies, as if its range, speed and lethality has somehow exceeded the 
scale of  human relations, like a child outgrowing its playpen. Certainly the capacity to 
destroy the world several times over with atomic weapons is a clear sign that the martial 
imperative (as a functional mechanism of ‘state’ power) can imagine a realm of 
destruction beyond human territory. 
 
10.6. Conclusions. 
This chapter has concentrated on the means by which militarised spaces becomes 
parallel to civil space. The barracking system consolidated state power in local and 
national terms, but it also it also gave military power a recognisable, standardised 
typology in building design. The subsequent ‘detachment’ of the armed services from 
the obligation of civil control during the 19th century can be seen as a significant era in 
the distribution and consolidation of state power in the landscape. After relinquishing 
these forms of social control the military began expanding, haphazardly acquiring land 
                                                
27 Doreen Massey, For space, London: Sage, 2005, p.90. Massey’s critique of temporally-fixated 
accounts of globalisation is one that seems to need repeating with each new era. George Orwell 
was voicing similar concerns in 1944: ‘Reading recently a batch of rather shallowly optimistic 
‘progressive’ books, I was struck by the automatic way people go on repeating certain phrases 
which were fashionable before 1914. Two great favourites were ‘the abolition of distance’ and 
the ‘disappearance of frontiers’. I do not know how often I have met with the statements that 
‘the aeroplane and the radio have abolished distance’ and ‘all parts of the world are now 
interdependent’. Cited in David Edgerton, The shock of the old : technology and global history 
since 1900 (Profile, 2006), p115. 
28 Military jets are generally restricted to a speeds under 450kt (7.5 miles per minute), although 
speeds of up to 550 kt can be authorised for short periods during simulated attacks and 
practice interceptions. The RAF’s new Typhoon fighter jets can travel over 1,000mph faster than 
a Second World War Spitfire, but they are still dependent on a substantial ground-based 
infrastructure.  
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close to barracks or spaces large enough to accommodated increasing troops 
numbers and weapons with ever-longer ranges. The concept of ‘military land’ became 
enshrined in subsequent Acts of Parliaments. The two World Wars of the 20th century 
greatly accelerated the acquisition of land consolidating a permanent and substantial 
military presence in the British Landscape. However, the spatial differentiation between 
military and civil land was, perhaps, never more pronounced than during the Cold War. 
Fences became thicker and higher, buildings were hardened against nuclear attack and 
sovereign airspace became charged with possibility of imminent attack by soviet aircraft 
or missiles. 
 
In studying the current differences between military and civil environments this chapter 
recognised the influence of the private sector in the post-Cold War defence 
environment and, more generally, the climate of economic deregulation advanced 
during the Reagan/Thatcher axis and which continues to this day. What this chapter 
called the ‘real revolution in military affairs’ can be read as a period when defence sites, 
spaces and activities where opened to commercial competition, when the US 
Department of Defence and the British MoD began transferring the management of 
sites, training services, catering, accommodation and elements of logistics to private 
sector control. Britain may have a much smaller military capability than the US but, as 
the previous two chapters showed, the MoD was in no way backward in embracing the 
private sector. This process epitomises the changing role capitalism plays in the 
constitution of the state’s coercive force. The character of British military power has, 
therefore, become more ambiguous in its increasing proximity to private sector 
investment. Equally, the spaces of military power in the UK are becoming less uniquely 
segregated from civil space, less parallel. 
 
What is the real value in discussing a parallel landscape of military activity? This 
question was posed at the beginning of this chapter, and the answer lies in the 
essential need to critically distinguish between what is military and what is not. The 
question is fundamentally about the apprehension and accountability of military (and 
ultimately state) power. To explain, Chapter 3 described a defence estate that has 
visibly diminished over the last 25 years while simultaneously managing to increase its 
combined ownership and use of land. This feat was achieved by the MoD using a 
number of methods, many of which have been described throughout this thesis, but the 
fact remains that military activity and land use is increasing yet it is less visible in the 
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landscape.29 The point here is than when part of the defence apparatus gets bigger but 
becomes less visible something new and unusual is taking place, something which 
requires a new set of critical tools to study it. For instance, the influence of the private 
sector is fundamentally altering the character of defence sites, a fact which requires an 
intimate understanding of PFIs and PPPs, and a broad knowledge of economics. 
Interpreting and theorising airspace use is equally as challenging, demanding a set of 
skills which are rarely used outside the air traffic control tower or the aircraft cockpit. 
Our ability to apprehend the defence estate in all its changing forms is diminishing. It is 
essential, therefore, to preserve the critical distinction between what is military and what 
is not, and to acquire the tools to interpret the new spaces of military power.  
 
 
 
                                                
29 These methods can be summarised as follows: a consolidation of the defence estate into 
fewer, bigger sites; increased purchase of short term rights and licenses to use land; the 
purchase of pockets of additional land already used for military training; a more efficient use of 
existing land which treats the whole training estate as a single resource; and an increased 
permeability of training estate land. 
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11.1. Quest ions and answers 
To summarise the findings and conclusions of this research it is necessary to 
return to the original research question: 
 
• Do the operational military spaces of the United Kingdom, in their various 
interconnected arrangements, constitute a pervasive ‘complex’ which 
coexists with civilian space, creating a militarised parallel landscape? 
 
The question can be broken into parts and answered accordingly. Firstly, this 
research began with the assumption that military sites and spaces in the UK are in 
some way interconnected, and a substantial amount of this thesis (particularly 
Chapters 8 and 9) is devoted to detailing certain key methods of inter-site 
connectivity. These included substantial physical infrastructures such as the 
Government Pipeline and Storage Systems (GPSS), dedicated water supply and 
drainage systems, but also less obvious methods such as dedicated digital 
information systems and telecommunication infrastructures. Logistical movement 
between sites is by civilian roads, railways and by air, and power is supplied, in 
many cases, by the national grid. However, one of the most significant findings for 
this research was the methods by which Special Use Airspaces (SUA) and Danger 
Areas connect military sites across the UK and over sovereign waters. These 
volumes sometimes connect and combine to form complex arrangements of 
spaces that extend thousands of feet into the air and resist civilian aircraft for 
lengthy periods. These local and regional assemblages are, in turn, connected with 
others around the UK via transit corridors that open and close for military activity. 
This research has framed these assemblages of land, architecture, air and 
infrastructure as poly-spatial complexes, and proposed that, when connected to 
others around the country, could be considered as a spatial complex of national 
proportions. This complex, which has developed over the course of the 20th 
century, is the domestic spatial expression of the British military capability.  
 
Secondly, whether these complex assemblages could be deemed pervasive is 
linked to their coexistence with civilian space. With over 61 million people, Britain is 
one of the most densely populated countries in the world, and as Chapters 2 and 
3 showed, it has also developed one of the world’s most powerful military 
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capabilities with a large domestic defence estate. This estate is distributed over 
approximately 550 sites including 12 large army training areas, over 60 RAF 
stations and three large naval ports. The uneven distribution of sites across the 
country has led to a pronounced and visible military presence which currently 
includes a low flying system for fast jets that spans nearly all of the lower airspace 
of the UK. In the absence of large areas of remote wilderness on which to train or 
uncrowded skies in which to fly, the British military have, over the course of the 
20th century, inserted themselves into the domestic landscape, buying, leasing and 
appropriating land between towns and villages, heathlands and national parks.  
The nature of this distribution and proximity is pervasive in any sense of the word, 
and degrees of coexistence are, in this respect, inevitable.  
 
Coexistence is also linked to the final part of the research question which relates to 
the idea of a parallel landscape of military activity. This part of the question is 
deliberately ambiguous to allow a degree of theoretical and critical speculation 
beyond, but supported by, other forms of analysis and data in this research. The 
incremental process of ‘detachment’ from civil life and the means by which military 
spaces became separate, adjacent or parallel to civil space was explored in 
Chapters 3, 8 and 10.  
 
In summary, the parallel-ness of the current British military presence can be 
described in the following ways: 
 
• Military sites and airspaces are parallel to civil space in the most literal and 
obvious sense, existing side-by-side but separated by physical divisions or 
as adjacent volumes of space defined by coordinates. Physical and 
immaterial boundaries can be also reinforced by Crown/government 
byelaws and/or civil authority regulations and guidelines.  
 
• It also appears that over the last 25 years military power in the UK is slowly 
detaching itself from the responsibility of land and territory, extending 
instead into flexible and temporary modes of occupancy or outsourcing the 
management of land and services to the private sector. This fact is evident 
in the increased use of rights and licenses instead of leasehold/freehold 
land purchases, increased public access to training estate land, and the 
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use of time-sensitive segregated airspaces. These methods can lead to 
situations in which military and civil activities are able to share or occupy 
the same space, to be physically coexistent and yet exist in parallel social 
frameworks with wildly divergent agendas. 
 
These two differing, perhaps contradictory interpretations of military space are in 
fact symptoms of a defence estate that is, as Chapter 3 shows, in a permanent 
state of transformation – much like the British landscape itself. However, the 
defence estate and its accompanying airspaces and infrastructural networks have, 
during the last 25 years, been subject to changes driven by a broadly neoliberal 
economic and social ideology that is less inclined to maintain responsibility for 
state-owned assets, deferring instead to the private sector. Another factor is the 
increasing power of public interest pressure groups which, for instance, appeal for 
more access to military land or more ecological accountability. 
 
With these answers in mind, the answer to the research question has to be yes, 
but qualified by the following findings: 
 
• The defence estate is getting bigger. Despite the large reduction in service 
personnel numbers, from 314,800 in 1990 to 194,700 in 2009, and the 
disposal of a large number of airfields since the end of the Cold War 
(1990), the use of land for training shows a steady upward trend. Freehold 
land (owned by the MoD) has remained relatively static at around 220,000 
ha, while short term rights and licenses (normally for 10 years or less) and 
leasehold purchases have shown a steady, if sporadic, increase since the 
end of the Cold War. Other increases include the abandonment of the Cold 
War era low flying areas in favour of using almost the entire lower airspace 
over rural Britain for fast jet training. Today, Special Use Airspace (SUA) 
and Danger Areas are constantly being designed and redesigned around 
military activity, and while the CAA is a constraining authority in this 
respect, it continues to reserve truly huge sections of the sovereign sky for 
military activity. 
 
• The increasing influence of the private sector on the defence estate is 
substantial and ultimately beyond the scope of this research. However, 
Chapter 11. Conclusions 228 
examples of where the MoD is leveraging private sector capital and 
‘expertise’ through the use of PFIs, PPPs, outsourcing services or selling 
assets (only to rehire them later) are evident throughout this thesis. In many 
such cases this has led to a ‘spatial ambiguity’, where the military/non-
military differentiation becomes unclear.  This has been referred at times in 
this thesis as a form of dematerialisation or permeability, where it becomes 
increasingly difficult to identify military activity or military space, and hence 
determine accountability.  
 
Both of these factors suggest that the parallel military landscape described above 
is increasing but becoming more diffused, ambiguous and harder to detect.  
 
11.2. Or igina l contr ibution to  research 
The principal aim of this research was to introduce airspace, infrastructure and 
networks into current discourses on military land use, military geographies and 
other related subjects. This was necessary to widen the field of analysis to include 
those flexible, temporary, immaterial and invisible components of the defence 
estate, to gain a more inclusive understanding of domestic military activity. Any 
comprehensive analysis of military activities in the UK must take these additional 
components into account because these are precisely the areas in which the 
defence estate is growing and changing. The defence estate has invisible and 
vertical dimensions that need to be studied and incorporated into the discourses 
on militarism, military geographies or defence studies in general. This research is a 
contribution to that process. 
 
With hindsight, undertaking this research from within an arts institution allowed for 
a unique interpretation of military sites in which the exploration of different forms of 
visualisation and representation were encouraged as a legitimate methodology. 
This led to an implicit visual analysis of the research question and the subject as a 
whole. 
 
11.3. Other f indings 
The choice of space as an organising principle for this thesis was based on the 
presumption that a study of land use alone could not fully address the three 
dimensional, dynamic aspects of military activity in the landscape. The research 
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also began with the belief that that space was somehow fundamental to military 
activity and ambition. Territoriality and the possession of land became key themes 
in this thesis, demonstrating that the projection of power and control of space is 
still fundamental to military activity in the UK. However, it also emerged during this 
research that space can be mobilised as a technology of military control, rather 
than something which is simply occupied, built or acquired. While this may have 
always been the case, it is now possible to design invisible and/or temporary 
spaces for defence, training or combat activities, to be used as a tools then 
instantly disposed of when necessary. The use of computer technology now 
enables the easy manipulation of complex three dimensional forms with 
geographical coordinates, altitudes and multiple variable. The same principles are 
also applied to the use of land, where complex flows of activity can be planned 
across training areas and weapons testing ranges using Geographic Information 
System (GIS) technology. 
 
The MoD doctrine and technology of Network Enabled Capability (NEC) is being 
incrementally introduced into military combat operations. The impact of this 
doctrine on training environments in the UK is evident in the design of at least two 
new segregated airspaces for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) over civilian land to 
facilitate the inclusion of Watchkeeper drones into training exercises.  
 
11.4 Future research 
Looking to the future, military aviation will continue to exert an increasing influence 
in an already overcrowded sky. Military activities such as air policing (escorting 
suspect aircraft), search and rescue, air transport, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
activities, mission training, and refueling will, in all probability, be integrated into a 
single airspace management system. Eurocontrol, the organization that regulates 
European airspace, is leading a project called Single European Sky Air Traffic 
Management Research (SESAR) in which airspace management evolves into 
‘trajectory management’. In this scenario, flexible airspace will be timed precisely 
to open and close for the duration of particular activities, and volumes of 
segregated airspace will surround and accompany military aircraft along a 
specified trajectory. These flexible, adaptive systems will mean that militarised 
activities in segregated airspaces will be closely harmonized with commercial 
aviation. Indeed, the military unit of Eurocontrol envisage a time in the near future 
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when military and commercial trajectories will share the same continuum, when 
territorial air borders will no longer be necessary. This will inevitably affect the 
nature of military and civil airspace and redefine the distinction between what is 
military and what is not – a process which will undoubtedly require critical 
interpretation. 
 
Autonomous UAVs are likely to be integrated much more into domestic training 
activities above military areas and in mixed airspace over civil land. In addition, 
UAVs will be introduced into other sectors such as law enforcement, agriculture, 
traffic control and observation, crowd control and meteorological data gathering. 
The only impediment to this burgeoning technology is the development of 
acceptable avoidance capability. In order to be fully integrated into mixed-use 
airspace, UAVs must be at least as able to avoid other aircraft and obstacles as a 
human pilot. Astraea, a consortium of aerospace and defence organizations has 
been assembled to address this deficit with a view to opening non-segregated 
airspace to UAVs in the near future. There is, however, almost no discussion on 
the wisdom of introducing a whole new class of aircraft into an already 
overcrowded sky or, indeed, the ethics of creating a whole new sector of the 
surveillance industry. A comprehensive study should be undertaken on the ethics 
of UAV technology before industrial advances outpace critical discussion. 
 
The price the British public pays for maintaining a large and powerful military 
capability is evident in the amount of land reserves for training and national 
defence. However, the distribution of military sites remains muddled and uneven, a 
fact which the MoD is beginning to address by consolidating its activities into 
fewer, larger sites. How this strategy will effect the overall size of the defence 
estate remains unclear. It is unlikely that the creation of ‘super garrisons’ and large 
training complexes will force a reduction in the size of the army’s training estate, 
which continues to press for additional land. In light of the impending Defence 
Review, a formal discussion should be opened to address the overall size of the 
military training estate with an aim to reducing the total area of land and the 
volumes of militarised airspaces. The requirement for land and space must be 
balanced against actual defence needs, the changing/diminishing status of the UK 
as a world power and a systematic revaluation of the British military capability. 
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Appendix 2.1 
 
Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) commissioned by the MoD. Source: MoD Annual 
Reports and Accounts Volume 2 for 2008-2009.1 
 
 
Off Balance Sheet ! 
 
Training, Administration and Financial Management Information System: Provision of training 
administration and financial management information systems to the Army Recruiting and 
Training Division.! £36m – Aug 1996 Nov 2009 
 
Hazardous Stores Information System: Provision of an information management service for 
hazardous stores safety datasheets with 2,000 users.! £1m – Oct 1997 Oct 2008 
 
Defence Fixed Telecommunications System: Integration of 50 fixed telecommunications 
networks used by the Armed Forces and MOD, including the delivery of voice, data, LAN 
interconnect and other WAN services. £200m – Jul 1997 Jul 2012 
 
Medium Support Helicopter Aircrew Training Facility: Provision of 6 flight simulator training 
facilities, covering three different types of helicopter, at RAF Benson.! £114m Oct 1997 Oct 
2037 
 
Hawk Synthetic Training Facility: Provision of replacement simulator training facilities at RAF 
Valley !£19m Dec 1997 Dec 2015 
 
Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC): Design and delivery of a new tri-
Service Command and Staff Training College infrastructure and supporting services, 
including single residential accommodation and married quarters.! £29m – Jun 1998 Aug 
2028 
 
Attack Helicopter Training Service: Provision of full mission simulator, 3 field deployable 
simulators, ground crew, maintenance and armament training. !£165m – Jul 1998 Sep 2017 
 
Family Quarters Yeovilton: Provision of married quarters accommodation for 88 Service 
families at RNAS Yeovilton. !£8.2m – Jul 1998 Jul 2028 
 
RAF Lyneham Sewage Treatment: Refurbishment of existing sewage treatment facilities, 
serving a population of 7,000, to meet regulatory standards at RAF Lyneham!. £3.8m – Aug 
1998 Aug 2023 
 
VIOLA PFI (formerly Thames Water and Tidworth Water and Sewage): Pathfinder project 
providing water, sewerage and surface water drainage, serving a population of 12,000 
military and dependants at Tidworth!. £5m – Feb 1998 Aug 2018 
 
RAF Mail: Provision of informal messaging services for the RAF!£12m – Nov 1998 Nov 2011 
                                                
1 ‘Annual Report and Accounts, Volume Two 2008-2009’, Ministry of Defence, 2009, 
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/77428463-6C55-46F2-AEE4-
522FB73D1B98/0/mod_arac0809_vol2.pdf>, (accessed 29 May 2010). 
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Fire Fighting Training Units: Provision of fire fighting training for the Royal Navy. !£22.5 – Apr 
1999 Jan 2021 
 
Light Aircraft Flying Training: Provision of flying training and support services for Air 
Experience Flying and University Air Squadron Flying Training!. £20m – Apr 1999 Mar 2009 
 
Tornado GR4 Synthetic Training Service: Provision of aircraft training service at RAF 
Marham and RAF Lossiemouth. !£61.7m Jun 1999 Jun 2031 
 
Army Foundation College: Provision of teaching and training facilities for the further 
vocational education and military training of high-quality school leavers !. £73.4m – Feb 2000 
Dec 2029 
 
RAF Cosford/RAF Shawbury Family Quarters: Provision of married quarters accommodation 
for 145 Service families at RAF Cosford and RAF Shawbury. !£15m – Mar 1999 Jun 2025 
 
Central Scotland Family Quarters: Provision of married quarters accommodation for 164 
Service families in Central Scotland!. £24.7m  Aug 1999 Jan 2021 
 
Tri-Service Material Handling Equipment: Provision of Tri-Service materials handling 
capability!. £35m – Jun 2000 Jun 2010 
 
E3D Sentry Aircrew Training Service: E3D Sentry simulators instructors and maintainers at 
RAF Waddington!. £6.9m Jul 2000 Dec 2030 
 
Lynx MK 7 and 9 Aircrew Training Service: Provision for simulator training facility for Lynx 
MK 7 and 9 helicopter aircrew. !£15.5m Jul 2000 Jul 2025 
 
Tri-Service White Fleet: Provision, management and maintenance of support vehicles in the 
UK. !£40m – Jan 2001 Jan 2011 
 
Family quarters at Wattisham: Provision of married quarters accommodation for 250 Service 
families. !£34.2m – May 2001 Mar 2028 
 
Family quarters at Bristol/Bath/Portsmouth: Provision of accommodation for 317 Service 
families. !£78m Nov 2001 Sep 2028 
 
Defence Housing Information Systems: Provision of a management information system for 
Defence Housing. !£11.6m – Oct 2001 Sep 2010 
 
Marine Support to Range and Aircrew Training: Provision of management, manning, 
operation and maintenance of Air Support and Range Safety Craft!. £11.9m – Dec 2001 Mar 
2012 
 
Astute Class Training: Provision of a training environment for crewmen and maintainers to 
support Astute Class submarines for 30 years. !£79.6m – Sep 2001 Jan 2037 
 
Strategic Sealift (RoRo): Provision of strategic sealift services based on six RoRo ferries in 
support of Joint Rapid Reaction Force deployments !. £167.9m – Jun 2002 Dec 2024 
 
Material Handling Equipment: Provision of Tri-Service material handling equipment for Army, 
Navy and RAF storage depots. !£5.9m – Aug 2002 Jul 2010 
 
Aquatrine Project A: Provision of water and waste water services !. £154m Apr 2003 Nov 
2028 
 
Aquatrine Project B: Provision of water and waste water services!. £48.5m Sep 2004 Mar 
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2030 
 
Aquatrine Project C: Provision of water and waste water services. !£174m Oct 2004 Mar 
2030 
 
Hayes Records and Storage: Pan-Government Records Management and Archive Services!. 
£11m – Sep 2003 Sep 2028 
 
Defence Sixth Form College: Development of a sixth form college to help meet the future 
recruitment requirements in the Armed Forces and MOD Civil Service. !£20m – Jun 2003 
Aug 2033 
 
Colchester Garrison: Redevelopment, rebuilding and refurbishment to provide 
accommodation and associated services (messing, education, storage, workshops). !£539m 
Feb 2004 Feb 2039 
 
Skynet 5: Range of satellite services, including management of existing Skynet 4 satellites. 
!£1,360m – Oct 2003 Feb 2020 
 
C Vehicles: Provision of Earthmoving and Specialist plant, Engineer Construction Plant and 
Material Handling Equipment and support services !. £703m 4 Jun 2005 Jun 2021 
 
Portsmouth 2 Housing: Provision of 148 Family quarters in Portsmouth!£27,1m Oct 2005 
Oct 2030 
 
Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA): FSTA is an innovative PFI programme that will 
provide modern air-to-air refuelling and passenger air transport capabilities !. £2,688m – Mar 
2008 Mar 2035! ! 
 
 
On Balance Sheet 
 
Defence Helicopter Flying School: Provision of helicopter flying training services. !£93m Apr 
1997 Mar 2012 
 
RAF Lossiemouth Family Quarters: Redevelopment and re-provision of 279 Service family 
quarters !. £24.8m Jun 1998 Aug 2020 
 
Joint Services Command and Staff College: Command and Staff College for military and 
civilian personnel (also see JSCSC – Off Balance Sheet). !£58.2m Jun 1998 Aug 2028 
 
RAF Fylingdales: Provision of guaranteed power supply. !£7.5m Dec 1998 Dec 2023 
 
Main Building Refurbishment: Redevelopment and management services for MOD Main 
Building!. £347.9m May 2000 May 2030 
 
Defence Electronic Commerce Service: Strategic partnership to deliver e-business 
environment to share information between MOD and trading partners!£6.5m Jul 2000 Jul 
2010 
 
Defence Animal Centre: Redevelopment of new office and residential accommodation, 
animal husbandry and training support!. £10m Aug 2000 Nov 2026 
 
Heavy Equipment Transporters: Provision of vehicles to replace existing fleet and meet 
future requirements. !£58m Dec 2001 Jul 2024 
 
Field Electrical Power Supplies: Provision of generator sets to support operational electrical 
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requirements in the field. !£73m Jun 2002 Jun 2022 
 
Naval Communications: Submarine fleet communications service!. £58.5m Jun 2003 Dec 
2030 
 
Devonport Armada Single Living Accommodation: Provision of Support Services and Fleet 
Accommodation Centre services at Devonport Naval Base. !£44.5m Jul 2004 Mar 2029 
 
Project Allenby/Connaught: Rebuild, refurbishment, management and operation of facilities 
for Service accommodation at Aldershot, Tidworth, Bulford, Warminster, Larkhill and 
Perham Down. !£1,300m Mar 2006 Apr 2041 
 
Northwood: Rebuild, refurbishment, management and operation of facilities for the 
Permanent Joint Headquarters !. £161m Jul 2006 Oct 2031 
 
Provision of Marine Services: Provision of marine services at UK Dockyard Ports at 
Portsmouth, Devonport and Clyde and support to military exercises, training and deep water 
trials, worldwide. !£90.5m Dec 2007 Dec 2022 
 
Corsham Development Project: rebuild, refurbishment, management and operation of 
facilities of the Basil Hill site. !£111m – Aug 2008 Jul 2033 
 
UK Military Flying Training System: Advanced Jet Trainer, Ground Based Training Equipment 
Element. !£59m – May 2008 May 2033 
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Appendix 2.2 
 
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) orbit area map. Source: Fighter 
Control/Aerosource website.1 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 ‘AWACS Orbit Area Map’, Fightercontrol, 
<http://www.aeroresource.co.uk/#>, (accessed 21 June 2010). 
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Royal Observer Corps bunkers (1956 -1991). Networks and cluster across the British 
Isles. Source: Wayne Cocroft, Roger J. C. Thomas and P. S. Barnwell, Cold war : 
building for nuclear confrontation 1946-1989, Swindon: English Heritage, 2003. 
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Appendix 9.1 
 
Military Aerodrome Traffic Zones (MATZ) map. Source: National Air Traffic Service 
(NATS) and Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).1 
 
 
 
                                                
1 ‘Military Aerodrome Traffic Zones (MATZ) map’, NATS,  
< http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-
B9D77735D21F82BE3C289DB5524C8278/7FE5QZZF3FXUS/EN/Charts/ENR/NON_AIRA
C/EG_ENR_6_2_2_3_1_en_2010-01-14.pdf>, (accessed 21 June 2010). 
Appendix 9.2 252 
 
Appendix 9.2 
 
 
Military Low-Flying Area map incorporating coastal waters. Source: 
Fightercontrol/Aeroresource.1 
 
 
                                                
1 ‘Military low-flying area incorporating coastal waters’, Fightercontrol/Aeroresource, 
<http://www.aeroresource.co.uk/aviationmaps/>, (accessed 21 June 2010). 
 
